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ANNUAL SURVEY OF ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS:
1976-1977
PETER C. CARSTENSEN*
I. Introduction: The Words and The Music
In speaking of the Supreme Court's decisions on securities law, Profes-
sor Ratner has cautioned that one should pay attention to the "music" as
well as the words of the decisions.' Unless one has a sense of the "music"
the Court is playing, one can easily misinterpret the words in the opinions.2
This task is no less important in antitrust matters.
In both securities law and antitrust law the task of understanding is
made harder because the Court is in transition to new concerns and atti-
tudes. How far and in which directions will the new majority proceed? This
is the harder to predict because its concerns are not consistent. On one
hand, the Court is promoting a more rigorous adherence to the competitive
ideal than it has in the past when looking at state economic regulation from
a first amendment perspective,3 but on another hand, it is cutting back on
the substantive requirements of the antitrust laws in ways which suggest
less faith on the part of the majority in competition as a socially useful goal
than has been the case in the past.' In addition, even when assuming a
* Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. LLB, MA (Economics) Yale
University. In this age of consumer warnings, it is probably incumbent to disclose that the
author has already published his views with respect to the merits of several of the cases
discussed herein and that he regards himself as an antitrust "hawk."
I Professor Ratner used this description in the course of a discussion of Supreme Court
securities law opinions at the ALI-ABA, Securities Law Training Seminar, June 27, 1977,
Madison, Wisconsin. A similar view is presented in Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Deci-
sions Under The Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L. J. 891 (1977).
2 E.g., the Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), only held that
scienter is required-something which is not very hard to plead-but refused to let the
plaintiff try its case under the new theory. Clearly the music was about cutting down on suits,
and the words had to be understood in that vein. See Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts
To Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 213
(1977).
See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977) and Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See text accompa-
nying notes 280 - 296 infra.
E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977). See text
accompanying notes 15 - 188 infra.
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violation, the Court has been reluctant to allow victims of that violation
to sue5 and has begun to narrow the kinds of losses for which a victim
allowed to sue may recover.'
These antitrust decisions are also part of a larger pattern of decisions
involving business and commercial issues in the federal courts. These deci-
sions tend to follow two patterns. The first is to define in very limited ways
both the substantive and liability aspects of federal causes of action.' The
second is consciously to redirect much of this litigaton into the state courts
by refusing to find that a federal cause of action exists.8 The first of these
themes has a pro business aura,9 but the second does not necessarily. The
two themes are, of course, consistent with a goal of reducing the workload
of the federal judiciary regardless of the consequence for the parties seeking
judicial aid. But the Court's willingness to evaluate state regulation under
the first amendment'" and antitrust rules" opens a vast range of litigable
issues, introducing much more federal judicial review of state action and
denying businesses the protection of anticompetitive state regulation.
If the themes are in evidence but their harmony in doubt, the words
pose all too well the traditional problems of deciphering what the Court
means. Whatever direction it goes, the Court seems largely unable or un-
willing to decide antitrust or other business matters on principles that can
be grasped and used productively as tools of analysis and decision. The
new majority, as result oriented as the Warren Court was charged with
being, seems to decide cases in terms of desired results without identify-
ing, explicating or evaluating underlying principles and without apparent
reference to the implications of the decision taken.
This past term, the Court decided seven antitrust cases. Two dealt with
matters of substance; another two dealt in different ways with the relation-
ship between antitrust law and state legal systems, judicial and regulatory;
a third pair dealt with the special problems of private damage actions. The
seventh case, not treated in this discussion, fundamentally concerned a
general criminal law issue although it also suggests the problems of achiev-
ing effective relief in antitrust cases.'
2
1 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See text accompanying notes 307 -
375 infra.
I Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477. See text accompanying
notes 375 - 402 infra.
I E.g., Piper v. Chris Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
E.g., Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 432 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66
(1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
1 See Tushnet, " . . . And Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice"-Some Notes On The
Supreme Court 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. Rav. 176.
,o See cases cited at note 3 supra.
E.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
"S United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). The only issue in this,
the only government antitrust case taken up by the Court this past term, was whether or not
entry of a judgment of not guilty after a hung jury in a criminal contempt case was an
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II. Substantive Antitrust Law: Standards for Judging Restrictive
Conduct
The two substantive cases which the Court decided both involved prob-
lems of restrictive conduct and both presented the question of what stan-
dards should be used to judge cases in which a contract in restraint of trade
is conceded. In United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. 3 the
Court adhered to a traditional analysis of tying and exonerated the defen-
dant while leaving the stated legal standard much as it was. But in Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 4 the Court refused to interpret or
distinguish the existing standard and instead replaced it with an unformu-
lated "rule of reason" whose specifics and operation are entirely unstated.
Moreover, although both cases involved the problems of the use and abuse
of market power, the Court's opinion in Fortner demonstrates an aware-
ness of these issues, but in Sylvania its opinion ignored those problems
although they were clearly present.
A. Restraints on the Conduct of Resellers: Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.
1. Business Analysis of Resale Restraints
Restraints ought to be analyzed functionally.'5 To do so, we need to
have functionally relevant categories, and we need to know both the mar-
ket conditions required for the restraint to have its desired effect and why
that effect is desired and useful to the parties.
a. Definition
While all so-called vertical restraints arise in association with some
other business dealings between the parties thereto, one differentiation
among them is to compare the level of production or distribution to which
the restraints specifically relate to the level of production or distribution
at which the parties have their other dealings. Restraints which control
how one or both parties deal with third parties, customers or suppliers, not
on the same level as the parties' business dealing, are "external" to that
dealing. Producer control over dealer resale practices, as in Sylvania's
appealable order in light of the double jeopardy bar. The Court held that such a judgement
was not appealable. While this may be good criminal law, it does make effective enforcement
of antitrust decrees more difficult.
13 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977).
'5 To treat restraints in a non-functional way, labeling them according to some character-
istic, e.g., vertical or horizontal, price or non-price, leads to the obvious problem that re-
straints having dissimilar functions are labeled and treated legally as if they were the same,
and, equally bad, similar restraints serving the same function are labeled and treated differ-
ently, reducing the impact of the law on restraints to a sterile formalism. Cf. C. KAYSEN &
D.,TURNER, ANTITRUST P0LICY (1959); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L. J. 781 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bork I].
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restraints on dealer resale locations, 8 typify such external restraints. Con-
versely, restraints which specifically define the business relationship be-
tween the parties are "internal" to that dealing although they will never-
theless restrain the freedom of one or both parties in dealing with others
in transactions similar to the parties' dealings. Tying as in Fortner typifies
such an internal restraint. It is functionally relevant to define these catego-
ries because the character of a restraint, internal or external, implies quite
different necessary relationships to market power.
b. Necessary Market Condition for External Restraints
Because an external restraint limits the freedom of action of a party in
its dealings with third parties, it can be useful only if such control has some
economic significance. The market condition under which such control can
be significant occurs when the producer and/or distributor has or expects
to obtain in consequence of the restraint some market power over the
product." External restraints, unlike internal ones,18 will make no sense to
either party in the absence of this condition because the competition of
completely substitutable products and distributors (i.e., the absence of
market power) will make the restraint of resale entirely valueless to either
party.
19
The quantum of market power needed to achieve and make useful an
external restraint is not necessarily very great. A trademarked product
which is physically identical to other similar products serving the same
function may, by virtue of its trademark, have sufficient differentiation to
possess power to make resale control possible. Likewise, a product only
slightly different in design or quality from others functionally similar may
also possess the necessary quantum of power." Market power can also arise
" The restraints also had a necessary but subordinate internal dimension which specified
that the producer would restrict its sales to the chosen distributors. The distributors were
under no similar restraint and so remainded free to stock and sell any substitute product at
any location. Because the only internal dimension to these restraints is incidental to its
external goals, it is proper to characterize it as an external restraint.
"T This point is made by commentators with widely varied points of view. E.g., Bowman,
The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825 (1955);
Commoner, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motors and Its Aftermath,
81 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Commoner]; Louis, Vertical Distributional
Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a Partial
Per Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REv. 275 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Louis].
" See text accompanying notes 188-189 infra.
" This argument is developed in Carstensen, Vertical Restraints and the Schwinn Doc-
trine: Rules for the Creation and Dissipation of Economic Power, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
771, 777-79 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Carstensen]. Briefly, a producer of a fungible good
has no power to control the resale of its product in the absence of a producer cartel because
its distributors can get fungible substitutes not subject to such conditions; and, even if control
were possible, it could not affect the resale market since the controlled distributors could
resell other producer's goods and other distributors could enter any market area with those
same substitutes thus making any control economically irrelevant.
" See E. CHAMBERLAIN, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed., 1962)
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from a producer understanding, actual or implied, to take collective con-
trol over production of a product and its distribution.2'
c. Reasons for External Restraint
Given the presence of the basic condition of market power with respect
to a product, there are two possible explanations of why the parties might
wish to engage in external restraints. The first explanation is that of
achieving efficient distribution of the product. For a variety of reasons,
producers may need distributor participation in the promotion, servicing,
and selling of a product be it new or already on the market.22 In order to
obtain this conduct, the producer may simply condition the sale of its good
on the distributor's doing certain things by way of selling activity. In some
cases the conditioning could be truly unilateral in that no understanding
would exist as to what requirements other distributors are to meet. 
2
More often, each distributor must have some assurance as to the nature
of the rest of competition that it will face with respect to the sale of the
product. Investment in and commitment to a product is logically going to
be tempered by the prospects for making a reasonable profit on its resale
under the conditions imposed. In this conceptually pure case, the dealer
gets the restraint on other dealers in return for performing efficiently the
distribution functions required of it, and the producer employs only that
degree of restraint on both dealers individually and on inter-dealer compe-
tition needed to achieve efficient distribution.
24
The other reason for restraints is to exploit collectively the latent mar-
ket power of the parties. While traditionally the label "cartel" has been
narrowly used to describe a group of competitors which have gotten to-
[hereinafter cited as E. Cimm.RAIN]; J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECr COM-
PrnToN (2d Ed. 1969).
1 It is also possible to imagine a case where a group of distributors select a single
producer of a fungible product and use restrictive contracts with such a producer as devices
to control and police a distributor cartel.
1 The reasons are canvassed in Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price
Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bork II]; see also
Louis, supra note 17.
1 Thus one distributor would be required to operate a large show-room and invest heav-
ily in promotional activity while another in the same area might only be required to dedicate
some shelf space to the product.
24 Bork II, supra note 22; see also Amicus brief for Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
tion in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 97 S. Ct. 2549 at 3-6 [hereinafter cited as MVMA
Amicus Brief] (this brief was signed inter alia by Donald Turner).
The matter becomes more complex whenever the dealer, as is very often the case, has
some market power of its own. Such power usually arises from the locational or transactional
advantage of each particular dealer in dealing with some market or class of customers. In such
situations, the producer's use of inter-dealer restraint must take into account the dealers'
desire to have their power respected. If we assume efficiency is the only goal, then the
producer will impose and enforce only restraints related to efficiency tempered by the need
to respect the power of the distributors. Bork's conceptual framework causes him to ignore
these issues. Bork II, supra note 22; see Carstensen, supra note 19, at 784-89; see also Bow-
man, supra note 17.
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gether solely to establish collective control over price and/or production,'
it is an appropriate label for all conduct which involves the same basic
activity: collective action solely for the purpose of creating and exploiting
market power.
Traditional analysis has viewed cartel arrangements as arising only at
the behest and instigation of the parties which were to benefit directly from
such activity." What is not traditionally recognized but is equally obvious
is that a producer might act as an entrepreneur and promote and organize
a latent distributor cartel interest. A producer realizing that distributors
would like and might profit from some form of distributor cartel offers
itself and its products as the devices to make the cartel possible. There are
classic antitrust cases in which individuals have acted as the coordinating
and policing forces in cartels for their own profit. 7 There is no reason to
think corporate entities will not also offer this kind of service if it is profita-
ble.
There is good, albeit speculative, reason to believe that retail cartel
organization is an attractive business venture. Many retailers in selling
certain kinds of goods have both locational advantages as to some cus-
tomers and relational advantages as to others. But in order to make use of
this potential power over customers, the retailer must be in a position to
offer a sufficiently differentiated product in the sale of which there is little
or no competition so that the risk of lost sales or customer displeasure is
kept low. To the extent then that a retailer with such latent power can have
access to such goods it can exploit that power. Despite the potential advan-
tages to them, many retailers are too small and too badly organized either
to create house brands, individually or collectively, or to create cartel
organizations to police their own conduct. Hence the demand for a cartel
exists among many retailers, but they have neither the internal capacity
nor the organizational skill to achieve these desired ends in the absence of
some kind of third party effort.
2 9
2 This implicitly narrow definition is what one sees in Bork I, supra note 15; Posner,
Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizon-
tal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 CoLUM. L. Rzv. 282 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Posner].
25 Bork I, supra note 15; Posner, supra note 25. Cf. MVMA Amicus Brief supra note 24.
Thus producers might create a cartel to seek to obtain monopoly profits, and in order to make
that cartel more efficient and effective might engage in vertical restraints of their distributors.
Similarly, distributors might pressure producers into engaging in vertical restraints so that a
distributor cartel might be created or made to operate more efficiently and effectively.
E.g., United States v. American Linseed Oil, 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
Items which customers buy infrequently as well as items which they find it difficult
or costly (in terms of time if nothing else) to shop for will be likely candidates.
2 Such activity will not, of course, always be in the interest of the producer. The high
volume producer with a well-established product is not interested in seeing that product used
as a device for retailers to reap monopoly profits. This will reduce volume and so adversely
affect profit, but producers of similar, but less successful goods, may well find it attractive
to differentiate their product for the distributor as well as the customer and offer it to the
distributor as part of a cartel package. See MVMA Amicus Brief, supra note 24.
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If there are several producers of substitute products doing this, we may
have competing cartels each trying to offer the retailer a better package of
competitive restraints. Moreover, since a producer will only do this to the
extent that its own profits are served thereby, from the producer perspec-
tive restraints on resale serving only a cartel function may appear fully
justified as a business necessity and can be claimed to be essential to
retention of that producer in that business.
One of the most common but least useful distinctions made in discus-
sions of restraints is that between vertical and horizontal restraints. In
traditional terms, vertical restraints are those imposed by one level on
another, while horizontal restraints are those which involve only entities
at one level." In some degree this distinction is parallel to that between
efficiency justified restraints and cartel based ones. The traditional hori-
zontal restraint is one whose only function is to create and allocate market
power while a vertical restraint is perceived as one designed to produce
efficiency in production and distribution. But as the preceding discussion
has suggested, both horizontal and vertical restraints can be either effi-
ciency or cartel based.'
d. The Problem of Characterizing External Restraints
When evaluating an external restraint, the analyst knows at the outset
that it involves the use and perhaps creation of market power. The analyst
can then ask whether the restraint's function or use to the parties is of an
efficiency or cartel character, or both. Resolution of the characterization
Compare United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) and Continen-
tal T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977) with United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972) and United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
1' "Horizontal" restraint could also mean any restraint which derives its usefulness for
the participants from its mutuality among firms at the same level, and a "vertical" restraint
would mean one in which the parties are indifferent as to what others on the same level do.
If this were the distinction, then most external restraints are "horizontal." Central to most
of them is an understanding as to what others at the same level will be expected to do or not
do. There is thus a mutality of restraint among actual or potential competitors. Indeed, the
best known and most convincing of rationales for efficiency based restraints rest on the need
for that kind of mutual understanding between firms on the same level of distribution. Bork
11, supra note 22; Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and
Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw & CONTEM. PROB. 506 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Preston];
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J. LAw & EcoN. 86 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Telser].
A "vertical" restraint in the sense of one lacking any horizontal mutuality would be a
rare case and would reflect very substantial power on the part of the party imposing such a
condition if the condition was at all onerous since the party imposed on would not be given
any protection in return for its required conduct. Such a vertical restraint is very likely to be
for efficiency purposes, but not necessarily so since it could represent an effort to secure or
protect future power or to divide or allocate existing power.
The "vertical" and "horizontal" tags even if redefined to focus on a genuine difference,
therefore, do not distinguish between the two functions of a restraint and serve only to confuse
and obscure the ways in which restraints actually operate. This is more clearly the case when
the usual meaning of the vertical and horizontal labels is intended.
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question would focus on what the restraint is supposed to make possible.
If it is an efficiency oriented restraint, one would expect that either
explicitly or implicitly one could find a set of conditions that the distribu-
tor is to meet and a clear relationship between the restraints on distribu-
tors and the achievement of a compensation for those activities. 3 This also
implies that the producer has itself some fairly articulated idea of how
much restraint is needed in order to get certain kinds of desired conduct,
when such conduct is fully compensated, and how the conditions can be
manipulated in order to achieve the desired conduct with the minimum
of cost to the producer. In short, one looks for the full agreement, actual
or implicit, which reflects the total business understanding and expecta-
tion between the parties.
If one finds that no specific conduct is expected of the distributor, or
that the expected conduct is largely or entirely unrelated to the restraints
imposed, then the function of the restraint is only to allow the distributor
an area free from competition. As in the case of an efficiency based re-
straint, each distributor gets its benefit from the restraint on others and
not on itself, but the producer gains only by being a cartel manager and
having its products sold and not as a result of specific conduct required of
the parties.
Even restraints requiring large amounts of effort may nevertheless be
ultimately cartel in character. The required activities may not in fact be
required (what policing does the producer do) or else the activities may be
unrelated to the restraint thus making it clear that they are mere surplu-
sage. Alternatively, the required activity, while related and required, may
be so disproportionately little with respect to the restraint involved that it
is clear that the activity itself is but an incident to the restraint. Finally,
in some cases, one can imagine a fairly elaborate set of required activities
which upon examination turn out to implement the restraint. 31
In a static economic world restraints can be expected to be of only one
character and correctly identifiable. This is so because in a static world,
economic power is already distributed and a vertical relationship will not
affect that predetermined power allocation .3 Hence the producer will have
whatever power it may possess and will, if it is engaging in efficiency based
3 This is the ancillary analysis which Taft held necessary to establish a right to a rule
of reason analysis. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
3 Once one dimension of competition is fixed, it is quite possible, indeed probable, that
firms may start to compete in other dimensions, e.g., "excessive" service or promotional
activity. To avoid this and insure the participants their monopoly profits, it may become
necessary to restrict this competition. Such restriction, in order to avoid the appearance of
blatant illegality, may take the form of a list of required activities which appear to be
affirmative obligations but which in fact are upper limits.
3 See Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History Of An Eco-
nomic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 157 (1954). This limiting character of static analysis
is explored in Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the ShermanAct: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. Rxv.
869 (1976). See also Carstensen, supra note 19.
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restraints, seek only to impose on the distributor the least amount of re-
straint necessary to achieve the desired goal. Hence any restraint which is
excessive will be by that fact clearly a cartel type restraint since it would
make no business sense otherwise.
The real world of commercial activity is not, however, static. It is a
world in which market power is a dynamic element created and allocated
by ongoing market activity." In such a world, restraint may and probably
will serve both efficiency and cartel interests either over time or at the
same time. It will create market power by inducing the doing of things
needed to differentiate and otherwise establish a product; it will allocate
that power by determining how much is retained by the producer and how
much by the distributor, and it may operate in a longer perspective to try
to fix and determine, to the extent that the parties can, the relative power
relationships among the parties for the future and in more general terms.
Hence once the dynamic character of market power is recognized, it is
not possible to assume with Mr. Bork that all "vertical" restraints which
have an efficiency justification are reasonable, nor is it possible to con-
clude that by showing a restraint to be unreasonable one can infer that
the restraint is entirely of a cartel character. In fact, given a dynamic eco-
nomic world, it is reasonable to suppose that many restraints may have
both characteristics in some measure, and purely cartel or efficiency
oriented restraints will be the exception.37 The key point for present
purposes is that there is no reason to believe a priori that an external re-
straint involving firms vertically related is necessarily purely efficient in
character. This is true even in a static economic world but is even more
likely in the real world of dynamic market power.
2. The Legal Analysis of External Restraints: Pre-Sylvania
a. Resale Price Restraints
The development of the law on this topic has received extensive treat-
ment elsewhere 38 and need not detain us for very long. Certain salient
features do however deserve mention. The initial resale price control deci-
sion, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Inc.," from which
" This idea is developed in general terms in Adams, Market Structure and Corporate
Power: The Horizontalist Dominance Hypothesis Reconsidered, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1276
(1974), and related to market restraints in Commoner, supra note 17, (generally restraints
are relevant to creating market power by facilitating product differentiation which in turn
creates market power for such products which is then protected, augmented and entrenched
by the use of restraints); cf. Louis, supra note 17.
m Bork II, supra note 22.
31 Bork recognizes this to be the case for horizontal restraints because such restraints can,
even in a static world, create market power and thus can serve both cartel and efficiency
interests. Bork II, supra note 22.
E.g., Bork, supra notes 15 and 22; Posner, supra note 25; Carstensen, supra note 19;
Telser, supra note 31; Preston, supra note 31.
' Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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many have derived a per se rule 0 with respect to all price fixing in vertical
resale situations was a frank and confessed cartel situation.4' The case thus
fitted closely with the existing run of price fixing cases in which the defen-
dants had sought to prove the reasonableness of the agreed price.12 The
only novel legal claim advanced to justify and distinguish this conduct was
the assertion that resale price control is an attribute of the property rights
of the producer. 3 This is a claim for general and absolute, hence
"property," right to control subsequent resale of a producer's output. Al-
though rarely remarked upon in commentaries, it is nevertheless signifi-
cant that the ancient general rule against "restraints on alienation" was
invoked only with respect to this contention.
Dr. Miles was decided contemporaneously with Standard Oil Co. v.
United States44 and American Tobacco Co. v. United States45 and so should
be read and was clearly intended to be read as an application of the rule
of reason announced in those cases. As such, Dr. Miles condemns as unrea-
sonable without inquiry (i.e., per se illegal) only a cartel-type vertical price
control agreement, and rejects any assertion of a non-contractual,
"property" right to control the conduct of resellers.
Subsequently in United States v. Colgate & Co.4" the Court explicitly
recognized that a producer has a legitimate interest in the conduct of the
reseller of its product. The implicit rationale for the holding is that all
vertical controls were not necessarily of a cartel character. In order to allow
some protection for these efficiency interests,47 the Court upheld an an-
nouncement of policy and subsequent refusal to deal rationalizing this as
a circumstance lacking an agreement. The unfortunate result of this ap-
proach was that the next set of cases involved the issue of whether or not
there was an agreement rather than whether or not price control protected
E.g., M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PrrOFSKY & H. GoLDsCmHm, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRADE REGULATION, 568 (1975) [hereinafter cited as M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE et. al.].
1' This is clear from the complaint by Dr. Miles which only asserted that the favored
dealers could not charge the desired prices if there was competition and did not in any way
assert that the purpose of this price control was to allow dealers to do things needed to
promote distribution.
1 United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85
F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
The only difference was the vertical relationship between Dr. Miles and its distributors,
but that, as has been argued above is not a functional difference. See text accompanying notes
30-37 supra.
220 U.S. at 385-87.
" 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
221 U.S. 106 (1911).
" 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
The Court was not at all clear or explicit on this characterization issue, and indeed
the allegations suggest Colgate was operating a modified retail cartel. Nevertheless, the
appeal of the Colgate result is that it recognizes the obvious interest of a producer of differen-
tiated products in the way its distributors behave and the need to have some control over
that behavior including pricing policy.
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a legitimate interest of the producer." In these cases the defendants'
argument of no agreement was in reality a variation of the property right
argument rejected in Dr. Miles." Moreover, since few if any of these cases
involved anything other than cartel conduct in fact, by refining the defini-
tion of agreement to encompass the various cases in which a producer and
competing distributors had reached an understanding on resale prices, the
Court was only covering all the variations in which cartel conduct came.
Only in the Albrecht v. Herald Co.50 case did the issue of the justifica-
tion for a price fixing agreement finally surface. Albrecht involved the
efforts of a monopoly newspaper to control the maximum resale price of
its carriers each of which had an exclusive territory. Presumably exclusive
territories were an efficient distribution technique," but their effect was
also to create significant market power in the carrier within their territo-
ries. Hence, the newspaper conditioned continuance of the assignment on
the agreement to honor the price schedule. In condemning this agreement
as per se illegal the Court suggested that it may have been a cartel. 2 But
rightly conceding that it could not tell (and indeed the balance of probabil-
ity tips the other way), it ultimately condemned the agreement as illegal
without opportunity for justification even though it may have been an
efficiency justified one.53
The Court justified its result on the ground that individual businesses
must have nearly absolute freedom to decide what price to charge. Such
freedom is essential to the independence of business. 4 The Court may have
been suggesting that although there are social costs in terms of economic
inefficiency, the gain in terms of other social values offsets these costs, or
that as a matter of dynamic economic policy the better approach is to
disallow certain controls efficient in the short run because of their cost to
the dynamic potential for development of our economy.5
b. Non-Price Controls on Reseller Conduct
There is a paucity of case law prior to 1963 on the proper analysis of
1 See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
11 The appellee was asserting a "Colgate" right to announce and enforce terms of resale
and not defending on the grounds of efficiency considerations. Id. at 35-37, 45-46.
390 U.S. 145 (1968).
' Because of the need for quick delivery and intensive coverage of an area, the arguments
are especially compelling here. See Preston, supra note 31.
u 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
33 Id. at 152-53.
u Id. at 152.
m This is the thesis of the writer's earlier analysis of these cases, Carstensen, supra note
19.
A third alternative rationale for Albrecht which, in light of Sylvania, may have greater
significance is that the difference between a cartel justified and an efficiency justified external
price restraint is so hard to determine in practice (an experience over 70 years suggests that
efficiency justifications are unlikely, and in any event unlikely to justify price control as
opposed to other less restrictive controls) that the public interest is best served by the blanket
condemnation which includes even efficiency justifications. See Louis, note 17.
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non-price external restraints. 6 Indeed, it was not until the early 1950's that
the antitrust enforcement agencies concerned themselves with these prob-
lems in any degree. 7 A few early cases condemned non-price controls, but
these involved situations where there was also a direct price control to
which the territorial or customer assignments were incidental, and the
entire package was clearly of a cartel character.-"
Hence, the Supreme Court first faced the issue of a fairly pure non-
price restraint in United States v. White Motors Co.,5" and White Motors
presented one of the more forceful arguments for the efficiency analysis of
external restraints. White Motors did not assert that it was necessarily
not in violation of the antitrust laws but only, that it deserved to make a
record on the need for restraints and the reasonableness of the restraints
employed. The Court, therefore, remanded the case for a full trial leaving
open the prospect that it would still adopt a "per se" rule after that trial.
Such a per se rule might not have distinguished cartel and efficiency re-
straints, but could have condemned all equally. If the Court had empha-
sized that there is a problem of characterization in all restraint cases and
that only those situations fitting within the cartel characterization are to
be treated as per se illegal, then its use of "per se" would have been clear
and consistent with its past practice. As it was, especially in light of Justice
Brennan's concurrence,"' it seems that the Court felt it could and should
in light of a suitable record condemn generally even an efficiency justified
restrictive practice.2
The only cases in the Supreme Court prior to Schwinn were FTC v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923) (territorial assignments upheld where assigned parties were charac-
terized as, and appeared in fact to be, true agents and not independent business entities);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) (equally divided court
affirmed a finding of no violation as to territorial restraints).
' Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CORNELL L.
REV. 254 (1959).
'5 E.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
372 U.S. 253 (1963).
White Motors asserted that its trucks were in large part custom-made and the dealer
must therefore engage in expensive design work with a prospective buyer. If the buyer, once
a suitable design was developed, could then go to other dealers for the truck, the other dealers,
not having the costs of doing the design work, could easily beat the price of the dealer who
had to cover design expenses. Hence, it argued, some control over the dealer competition was
essential, and its use of customer controls and territorial assignments was a reasonable solu-
tion to that problem.
" Justice Brennan sought to define when a nonprice restraint might be reasonable, and
his terms of reference clearly exclude from reasonableness many potentially efficient re-
straints, 372 U.S. at 264-75 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Bork I, supra note 15, at 826-27;
Bork II, supra note 22, at 470-71.
" Whatever the Court intended by way of fuller record in White Motors never occurred
for White Motors settled the case largely on the terms that the government had sought. 1964
TRADz CAs. (CCH) 71, 762 (N.D. Ohio). Thus, having represented to the Court that a full
defense was possible and having implicitly promised to provide it, White Motors then agreed
that none of its restraints were needed.
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The first fully litigated case to reach the Court was United States v.
Arnold Schwinn & Co. 3 which arrived four years after White Motors.
Schwinn has been extensively canvassed elsewhere." It is customarily read
as announcing a rule based on formal title, 5 but it can be read as announc-
ing a rule base on the functional relationship of the parties. " The rule,
however based, forbade external non-price restraints. How generally was,
of course, an open question. In understanding the Schwinn outcome, it is
important to recall that much of Schwinn's argument had the flavor of a
claim that as a producer it had an absolute right to control non-price resale
activity,6" that neither Schwinn nor the government distinguished between
cartel and efficiency based restraints," and that Schwinn's rule of reason
argument was cast solely in dynamic terms, i.e., the right of a small firm
to survive, and did not separate out an explicit efficiency claim for the
restraints. "
- 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
" See, e.g., Louis, supra note 16; Posner, supra note 25; Carstensen, supra note 19.
Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (1977).
Where the manufacturer retains title, dominion and risk with respect to the
product and the position and function of the dealer in question are, in fact, indistin-
guishable from those of an agent or salesman of the manufacturer, it is only if the
impact of the confinement is "unreasonably" restrictive of competition that a viola-
tion of §1 results from such confinement, unencumbered by culpable price fixing.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added). The implications
of this functional approach are developed in Carstensen, supra note 19.
61 See Brief for Appellee, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1968)
64-5, 56-7 [hereinafter cited as Schwinn Brief for Appellee]. The argument was put in terms
of a right which Schwinn ought to have in its own interest as a small producer and in the
interest of its retailers who were small businesses competing against giants. This right was
one to which apparently not all producers, especially larger ones were entitled. Cf. Baker,
Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.
J. 537 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Baker].
11 Schwinn Brief for Appellee, supra note 67, did purport to assert an ancillary analysis,
id., at 59-60, 62-64, but in fact never related the restraints to specific conduct required of its
retailers or distributors so as to complete the argument. The real argument was a populist
claim that "little" Schwinn and its small dealers had a right to impose these restraints to
stay in business. Id. at 30-31, 65-68, 90-96.
The government's Brief was similarly nonspecific about the efficiency and cartel analy-
sis. It essentially equated any restraint which involved any horizontality with a cartel. See
Schwinn, Brief for Appellant supra note 67, excerpts reprinted in R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
CASES, ECONOMIc NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 266-72 (1974).
0 The recurring theme of the Schwinn brief was that it, and more importantly, its
retailers would some how be driven from the market unless these restraints were upheld. Brief
for Appellee, supra note 67, at 90-96. Without more, this was a reverse form of the argument
for protecting independent business used in Albrecht and Topco and did not imply an effi-
ciency justification for the restraint since a cartel based one would also have served this
ultimate good purpose. See note 80 infra.
Indeed, the facts in Schwinn suggest that its efficiency case was very weak. Schwinn
already distributed most of its products via a system which employed agents to book orders
which Schwinn then filled by direct shipment. Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods
After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U. L. Rav. 595, 606-07, (1968). Even for fill-in purposes, most of the
necessary supplies were stored by Schwinn at its expense in warehouses from which it author-
ized its retailers to draw supplies as they required and for which Schwinn then billed them.
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It is nonetheless true that when Schwinn lost its case it did so in a way
pointed toward general condemnation of non-price restraints regardless of
the functions which those restraints served. Particularly in light of
Schwinn's alternative distribution methods and White Motor's surren-
der,7" the Court may well have inferred that such controls were generally
unnecessary or that the same ends could be handled in other ways.
The next major development in the area of non-price restraints was
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.7" Topco, a joint venture among a
group of small retail grocery chains, provided for its participants a general
buying agency and had its own trademarks placed on some of the products
it obtained for its members.72 Each participant could sell Topco brands
only in an assigned territory, and within that territory the participant's
stores were the only ones that promoted and sold the Topco brands. This
made the Topco branded products the functional equivalent of large
chain's house brands, which are very important to success in the retail
grocery business.
73
Topco was by its own evidence as much as ten times larger than it need
have been.74 It, therefore, produced up to ten times as much competitive
foreclosure as was needed assuming rigid territorial assignments were es-
sential.7 5 Despite this obviously unreasonable character, the trial judge
Id. at 607-08. Having thus demonstrated that it had effective alternatives to control and
functionally independent distributors for the distribution of its products, Schwinn should
have been hard pressed to justify its use of territorial and customer restraints as reasonably
necessary for efficiency.
Schwinn might also have argued that even when the bicycles were "sold," the "buyer"
was not a functionally independent business, but was in reality nothing more than an agent
or employee, and the title transfer was but a tax or property law device having no functional
significance. Instead, Schwinn accepted the implicit characterization of the buyers as func-
tionally independent business even while establishing that these same entities when dealing
with Schwinn under other distribution arrangements were nothing more than manufacturers
representatives or agents.
70 See note 62 supra.
7' 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Topco is characterized as a horizontal case although it involved a
clear vertical relationship between Topco and the participating grocery chains. The reason
for the characterization is apparently that the grocery chains had created Topco. If the facts
were otherwise, perhaps it would have been regarded as a vertical case.
72 It is perhaps significant that Topco itself did little or no productive work of its own,
but rather acted almost entirely as a middle man or agent for its members. Id. at 602-03.
13 House brands appear to be important for several reasons. First, they have a lower cost
to the store and so can either be marked up more or sold at a rate significantly below that
asked for similar products sold under nationally advertised brands. Second, to the extent that
house brands generate consumer loyalty, the retailer can be assured that consumers will have
to return to its store because, by definition, no other retailer carries that brand. The argu-
ments for Topco's restraints related primarily to this second reason.
11 Topco's members combined total retail sales in 1967 were more than $2.3 billion. 405
U.S. at 600. But according to Topco's evidence for an efficient house brand program a retailer
or group of retailers needed sales of $250 million or more. 405 U.S. at 614 n. 1 (Burger, C. J.,
dissenting).
11 What is postulated here is that Topco could have been divided into about ten coopoer-
atives, and each would have been as efficient as Topco and, even assuming rigid territorial
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found that Topco was reasonable. In reversing, the Supreme Court con-
firmed 'the sweeping rule of per se illegality for territorial restraints relying
in part on the Schwinn case but including a number of other cases all of
which involved cartel situations.7 6 At some points in the opinion the Court
refers to the Topco arrangement as a naked restraint; 7 and if the Court
perceived the facts in Topco that way, Topco was merely a variant of the
traditional cartel. On the other hand, the stated rationale is similar to that
in Albrecht and suggests a general social policy of antitrust law to suppress
all restraints on the freedom of business regardless of justification.
7 8
Justice Marshall's majority opinion also asserts the desire to avoid
rambling in the economic thickets,79 but what thickets does he have in
mind? On the one hand if Justice Marshall saw this as a cartel case in
which the cartel seeks to defend itself on the ground that it is a good
cartel, 0 then the refusal to be lured into a discussion of possible economic
arguments to justify such a cartel is consistent with the long line of cases
going back to the very first price fixing cases. On the other hand, if this is
indeed a joint venture which requires some restraint in order to operate
efficiently, and the Court is refusing to consider that argument,' then its
position can be defended, if at all, only on the ground That the dynamic
economic or social implications of such restraints, absent special facts,
preclude a full consideration since the balance between the economic gain
in static terms of an efficient restraint and the social or dynamic economic
costs in any specific case is something impossible for a court to determine."
allocation, there could have been ten chains with a right to compete in each area where there
was presently only one.
11 405 U.S. at 607-08.
Id. at 608.
79 Id. at 610.
7 Id. at 611-12.
It is a good cartel, presumably, because it protects small chains from competition inter
se thus creating partially protected markets (protected from competition by other small
chains) and preserving more competitors for some ultimate comercial Armageddon. Such
partial protection may be very valuable if customers who use regional and local chains are,
in any economically significant number, differentiated from those who use national chains
so that competition between small chains would be more intense and more worrisome. There
is some evidence of this, see National Tea Co. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) % 17, 463 (1966), and its theoretical predicate exists. See E. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note
20; Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN. L. REv. 919, 920-32 (1976).
" This is the way Chief Justice Burger saw the case in dissent, 405 U.S. at 613-24, but
his failure to detect the obvious problems in even a prima facie efficiency case on these facts
greatly weakens the force of his general position.
" And yet despite the per se label and sweeping language of the opinion, the trial court
entered a decree which allowed Topco to continue to exist and to allocate territories among
its members, and the Supreme Court affirmed that decree. United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc., 414 U.S. 801 (1973), per curiam affg 1973-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74, 485, 74, 391 (N.D.
Ill. 1973) (decree).
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c. The Pre-Sylvania Cases on External Restraints In Context
Overall, the Supreme Court, with one exception,83 has consistently re-
jected those restraints which have no defense beyond their creation and
distribution of market power and subjected them to per se condemnation.
Very generally it also has subjected efficiency justified restraints to tests
of reasonableness. External restraints on distribution, however, have not
fitted this general pattern as. the foregoing discussion has suggested. 4
The cases involving external restraints whether involving price control
or non-price control had by the time of Schwinn and Albrecht arrived at a
parallel solution to the question of the legal standard. Such restraint was
generally forbidden. In reaching this result, however, the Court rejected
more or less consciously the distinction between the cartel restraint and
the efficiency restraint as a useful distinction upon which legal standards
might depend. But as the cases came to condemn more clearly efficient
restraints, the apparent inconsistency between the outcomes and rational
economic policy and defensible social control of business became more
pronounced. At the very least, the Court was unsuccessful in communicat-
ing the true bases of its decision. The opinions in Schwinn and Topco are
two noteworthy examples of bad workmanship, sloppy use of terms, and a
persistent failure to examine the reasons why the decision might be criti-
cized.
It is fairly easy on the facts of Topco to argue that it was, in all likeli-
hood, a traditional cartel despite its appearance and so justify the result
if not the majority opinion. But in Schwinn and Albrecht and, of course,
White Motors, the Court confronted restraints more defensible on effi-
ciency grounds. Because it allowed for an exception for new and failing
firms, the per se condemnation in these cases is qualitatively different from
the traditional one found in United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.8 In
addition, those who violate the Topco-Schwinn per se rule can and have
obtained decrees which permitted them to continue some form of the ap-
parently offending practices. 7 Despite these two obvious differences from
traditional per se values the Court did not, in its decisions, either explicate
the basis for its conclusions or acknowledge that it was expanding or alter-
ing the traditional per se category. An outside observer could reasonably
conclude that the "per se" category encompassed any practice that a ma-
United States v. National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfrs., 263 U.S. 403 (1923).
This argument is developed in Carstensen, supra note 19, at 831-38. See also Bork I,
supra note 15.
14 Kauper, The 'Warren Court' and the Antitrust Laws: of Economics, Populism and
Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. Rsv. 325 (1968).
- 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 1973-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74, 391
(N.D. Ill.), modified, 1973-1 TRADE CAs. (CCH) 74, 485 (N.D. Ill.), affd per curiam, 414




jority of the Court condemned but that there was no logic to the labeling
and no way to predict outcomes.88
3. The Sylvania Case
a. The Facts
Sylvania, a subsidiary of GTE a large conglomerate, is a maker of
television sets. It was not in the late 1950's and early 1960's a very substan-
tial factor in television sales and its share was declining. 9 No reason is
given for this decline, and no claim was made that the dominant firms,
RCA and Zenith, engaged in predatory practices or otherwise attempted
to drive the smaller firms from the market, or that access to retail outlets
was in any other way restricted. Hence the most likely explanation for
Sylvania's relative decline is that RCA, and Zenith, and others made a
better product in the opinion of most customers.
Prior to 1961 or 1962, Sylvania had sold its sets to wholesalers in various
parts of the country who in turn resold the sets to retailers. In appears,
inferentially, that most retailers were very small operators having a very
low volume of sales and were not for that reason very attractive outlets
since they did little or nothing to promote the product and were expensive
to serve. 0 In 1962 Sylvania decided to bring in new management for its
television set division, and the new managers decided to alter the distribu-
tion system. They terminated most of the wholesalers and introduced in
most areas a direct factory sales system.9 Second, they decided to fran-
chise dealers and to limit those franchises to a small group of dealers
(compared to their previous selling group). The chosen dealers were to be
in the larger volume, category. 2 As part of this plan Sylvania would only
franchise specific selling locations and a chosen dealer could sell only at
its franchised location. The stated purpose of this requirement was to
provide "elbow room" for each dealer. 3 The promotional materials are
quite explicit that the function of the policy is to create market power in
the franchised dealer with respect to Sylvania set sales so that each dealer
can maintain its desired price level. 4
" See Posner, supra note 25.
Although exact shares are not given, Sylvania had about 3-5 percent prior to 1960 but
had declined to about 1 percent by 1961 or 1962.
Joint Appendix to Briefs for Petitioner and Respondent, 23-24 [hereinafter cited as
Joint Appendix].
01 This resulted in some cost savings since sets were now shipped direct from the factory
to the retailer and no separate inventory was maintained in different localities.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25. Sylvania's promotional material explained that, "the franchise contains a
good profitable selling climate by creating 'elbow room' in a sensible territory based on
market and dealer potential."
91 S.L.D. [Straight Line Distribution] also eliminates 'same brand competi-
tion.' Sylvania wants fewer dealers and-quality rather than quantity. By not over
franchising, Straight Line Distribution eliminates vicious price cutting and estab-
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Continental TV was a specialized retailer operating in the San Fran-
cisco Bay area selling primarily to customers in their own homes at prices
at least as high as those listed by Sylvania.'- Continental did also operate
several retail stores, and its business flourished so that it was also among
Sylvania's largest customers. 6
In 1965, Continental decided to enter the Sacramento area, and Syl-
vania's sales personnel understood that it planned to use Philco and Moto-
rola products. 7 Sylvania at that time had as its only outlet in Sacramento
one of the two leading television set dealers in the community" which had
produced substantial sales for Sylvania.9 The dealer was also affiliated
with a wholesaler who distributed Sylvania products in some rural areas
to which the elbow room and direct selling programs had not yet been
extended.9 0° Sylvania's managers did not want-to create any additional
competition for this firm.'' Further complicating the relationship between
Sylvania and Continental was Sylvania's decision to grant another fran-
chise in San Francisco located near Continental's show room to a seller
Conginental regarded as a likely price cutter on Sylvania products.
0 2
During the summer of 1965, Continental first placed a large order for
Sylvania products, then, having learned that the competitor to which it
objected was to be allowed to enter San Francisco, cancelled its order and
indicated that it was going to use Philco products primarily. 3 However, a
few weeks later it requested permission to have a Sylvania franchise for its
new Sacramento location which had previously been announced as a major
new Philco outlet. 0 Sylvania refused permission; Continental nevertheless
moved sets to which it had title from its other franchised locations to
Sacramento. Sylvania responded not merely by cancelling its franchise
agreements and stopping sales to Continental but by causing all Sylvania
sets still in Continental's possession to be repossessed and even having
Continental's doors chained shut.
9 5
lishes suggested 'go' prices that enable each dealer to make a fair profit. .. 'Elbow
room' gives every Sylvania dealer a geographic area in which to sell our Sylvania
products. S.L.D. does not promiscuously franchise dealers without first studying
their size, location, and effect on the market (as well as other Sylvania dealers in
the area). By franchising dealers by territory-Sylvania becomes an important
profit factor to its dealers.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 113-15 (testimony of L. French, Sylvania sales Manager).
' Continental was handling 50% of all Sylvania sets sold in the area. Id. at 58.
9 Id. at 66.
' Id. at 127-29.
Id. at 171.
10 Id. at 161.
101 Id. at 168.
102 Id. at 340.
"o Id. at 66.
101 Id. at 64-80.
105 Id. at 104. Continental survived this onslaught but was forced to close some of its
stores including its Sacramento operation.
[Vol. XXXV
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
In response to the efforts to repossess its inventory, Continental coun-
terclaimed for an antitrust violation. The antitrust issues were separated
and tried to a jury with retired Justice Clark sitting as the trial judge. In
evaluating the antitrust issue it is essential to make a business analysis of
the record to see what it tells about the business reason for this restraint.
b. A Business Analysis
The initial but fundamentally unanswered question in this case is why
did Sylvania do what it did? Why did it seek to restrict distribution to a
limited number of dealers in an area? What function or purpose was this
to serve? The testimony of the top managers of Sylvania was that re-
stricted distribution was seen as a way to increase the profits of the televi-
sion business and expand volume.' °6 How? That issue is rarely addressed
and not answered except in the very general terms of creating an exclusive
or quality image for Sylvania, i.e., to differentiate the product. There was
certainly no claim of special investment or risk taking by dealers who
handled these sets. Similarly, the field representatives charged with imple-
menting this plan were told to emphasize the fact that the participating
dealer would face less competition in selling Sylvania products,' 7 but they
offered no coherent explanation of what Sylvania expected in return or how
the elimination of competition with respect to a product which held at the
time only a one or two percent share of the total television market would
be of the slightest interest to the dealers with whom they were talking, the
larger volume dealers.
The testimony was also very unspecific as to the basis for initial dealer
sanction and for addition of dealers in areas.' 8 There was a kind of a
bottom line criteria based on a desired share for Sylvania of total sales of
television sets in an area.' 9 But how control over the number and addition
"I Morgan, president of Sylvania's TV business testified that the management, "felt that
Sylvania could fulfill a need and the need was to provide a line of merchandise to dealers
that they would be proud to sell and we would be proud to sell and everybody could make a
living at it, make the kind of profit they would make on it." Id. at 132. While Steiner, the
national sales manager, explained that Sylvania "needed something, a sales pitch that the
sales company could use in order for us to get a foot hold in the market. . . . [If] we were
in a 'me too' approach . . . there was no reason for the dealers to handle our line because
they would handle other lines." Id. at 365. Moreover, the list prices were adjusted so that a
dealer would receive a generous return on his investment. Id. at 371. Similarly, the present
head of Sylvania's TV business stressed profits: ". . . with this elbow room . . . [the cus-
tomer] has less area to shop in and we think resultingly area dealiers gross a better profit
from our line." Id. at 390.
"I See id. at 39, 183, 359 (testimony which suggests that profits were the primary selling
point).
,19 The testimony stressed that dealers were selected in terms of total sales in an area
and the sales volume desired by Sylvania in that area. Id. at 39, 52, 91, 124, 148-49, 171, 189,
206-07, 391-92. Replacement dealers were expected to take over the duties of their predeces-
sors, but those duties were never explicitly stated. Id. at 180, 52.
,' See, e.g., id. at 149. Sylvania expected each district to generate sales at least equal
to one percent of total television set sales in that area.
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of franchises was to serve the functional goal of adding to sales was never
explored."10
The selling documents that are quoted in part similarly reflect only a
final conclusion: sales and profits for both retailer and producer will be
better from the use of this system."' But why? The franchise agreement
itself is likewise not very informative. It makes no explicit, unusual re-
quirements of a dealer in terms of service, promotion or other activity;"
2
but there are several very elastic clauses that could be the basis for an
assertion that the implicit understanding was that the dealer was to do
certain things in return for a partially protected market, and that this
would vary from market to market.1
3
Looked at in terms of the alternative ways in which restraints can be
explained, either as promoting efficiency in production and distribution or
as serving only the interest of facilitating some exploitation of market
power, there are bits of evidence that go both ways."' On the side of
efficiency there is a suggestion from time to time that dealers were ex-
pected to engage in promotional activity,"' provide a reasonable amount
of display area so that the entire line of sets could be shown,"' and that in
other ways dealers were expected to undertake costs and assume risks with
respect to the promotion, sale and service of Sylvania sets that could be
recompensed only if they were substantially assured that the market de-
mand which they would have participated in creating would not be sud-
denly flooded with sets being sold by dealers who did not have to bear these
costs."7
110 See, e.g., id. at 39, 24. The goal of sales people for Sylvania was put in terms of
coverage or penetration, ultimate measures of sales volume, which the restraint somehow
made possible, and not in terms of specific conduct obtained or retained as a result of the
restraint.
See notes 93 & 94 supra.
,,2 The franchise agreement is set forth at Joint Appendix, supra note 90, at 18-22.
,,3 Id. at 19. The franchise agreement provided: "3. Dealer agrees to maintain an
adequate stock and representative display. . and to promote vigorously and effectively the
• . . merchandise." (Emphasis added). See also sections "4" and "5" of the agreement which
require "proper installation and service" and adherence to "advertising and promotional
policies from time to time established."
"I The attitude of Sylvania's managers may be one of indifference to this distinction.
They are interested in total sales; and whether those sales come from increased efficiency in
distribution or from providing a method of exploiting market power, absent external legal
requirement, is of no concern to Sylvania. Similarly, at the field representative level, it is
not unimaginable that, since either a cartel or an efficient system of restricted distribution
can achieve the same final result in terms of total sales, the actual use of the restraints may
have varied from location to location.
,, In addition to the franchise agreement requirement, see note 110 supra, several wit-
nesses mentioned this as a duty of the retailer, see, e.g., Joint Appendix, supra note 90, at
376, 390. There was, however, no evidence which indicated that this conduct included special
or unusual efforts.
,' The display of a full line was referred to as a dealer duty. Joint Appendix, supra note
90, at 39, 367, 390. See also the agreement, note 113 supra.
I See, e.g., Joint Appendix, supra note 90, at 180.
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On the other side, the emphasis on retaining profit levels and having a
product over which the retailer had power together with an independent
effort to imbue Sylvania sets with an aura of exclusivity and high status
are all consistent with a plan to create a product image and a set of
restraints suitable for dealers who wished to exploit latent power over some
classes of customers. The larger volume dealer generally may well attract
different types of customers and will want to have a range of products
available, a range not in a technological sense, but in a selling sense. It will
want to have RCA and/or Zenith sets available for which prices will be set
by competition and which will be sold to price sensitive customers. It will
also desire a product line which has or can be given a high quality image
and which is only available in the market in a way which insures little or
no price competition. The customer who is responsive to quality claims can
then be sold that higher price, "quality" set. Crucial to the success of this
selling is that such sets not be conspicuously available elsewhere in the
market at a clearly lower price because then competition in selling
"quality" goods would break out leaving the dealer without an opportunity
to exploit the customer. In essence then, the dealer in order to exploit its
latent power needs not only a quality good but also, and quite inependent
of the quality image, restriction on the degree of competition in the selling
of those sets. The strongest evidence that this was a primary function of
Sylvania's restrictive distribution program is ironically the attitude of
Continental toward its new competitor in San Francisco in light of the way
Continental sold and priced its Sylvania sets."8
The failure to produce more and better evidence with respect to the
characterization issue is explicable in part by the fact that the plaintiff was
indiffirent with respect to the issue believing that Schwinn commanded
the conclusion of illegality in any event, while the defendant apparently
was of the view that if it established that the ultimate effect of the restraint
was to permit Sylvania to stay in the business of making and selling televi-
sion sets regardless of how the restraint achieved this result, it had estab-
lished its rule of reason case."'
"1 Similarly, the evidence on the Sacramento situation provides a hint or two that
Sylvania's motive was to protect its dealer's capacity to exploit that market without any
reference to what the dealer did to promote Sylvania sales.
"I Sylvania's belief is most clearly seen in the examination of the defendant's expert
Professor Preston. Id. at 409; see Preston, supra note 31. Preston took the position that any
means by which a marginal firm remained in business was economically desirable. Joint
Appendix, supra note 90, at 413. The expert himself did not distinguish between the methods
a firm might use to stay in business nor was he pressed to do so by either side. Explicitly
asserting the self righting quality of the market, Preston maintained that even if a restraint
exists for the wrong reasons the market will work it out since competing substitutes will limit
and eventually eliminate the power of the wrongful actor. Id. at 414-15, 424-25. See also Dr.
Miles, 220 U.S. at 409-13 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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c. The Decisions Below
Justice Clark, sitting by designation, instructed the jury that if it found
an understanding between the producer and distributors to use location
franchises, it should find a violation. He gave, in short, a per se instruction
based on his reading of Schwinn which he felt outlawed such restraints.
There is also a hint, but, alas only a hint, that he was not persuaded on
the merits that the defendant had presented a case on the issue of reason-
ableness that entitled them to get to the jury.
2
1
On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circit upheld this result in a 2 to 1
vote; 12' the majority concluded that Schwinn did apply. This decision in-
duced a spate of comments, largely unfavorable;' 2 2 meanwhile the opinion
was withdrawn and the case set for rehearing en banc. The en banc deci-
sion resulted in a reversal of the district court by a 7 to 4 vote.'2 The en
banc majority argued that locational clauses did not fall under the
Schwinn rule since Schwinn involved absolute limits on the customers to
whom a dealer could sell while locational clauses did not. 24 The majority
drew support from the decrees in Schwinn and Topco both of which al-
lowed some form of locational assignment, from the continued judicial
acceptance of exclusive distributorship and other franchise arrangements,
and from general policy arguments about the purpose and goal of the
Sherman Act.2 5 The majority assumed that having found Schwinn in-
applicable, a rule of reason inquiry was in order.'
2
1
'21 "It is apparent that the territorial restrictions here involved were the result of a
contract, combination or conspiracy with willing dealers to serve the interests of both Syl-
vania and the dealers, rather than the unilateral imposition upon unwilling distributors by
the manufacturer to serve his own interests." Pet. for Writ of Cert., Continental TV, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977), Appendix B at 128 (emphasis added), citing, White
Motors, 372 U.S. at 267 (Brennan, J., concurring). One can read this finding as saying this
was a cartel restraint and so illegal under White Motors if one sees the test of a "unilateral
imposition" as really testing for efficiency (purely manufacturer) rather than cartel (dealer
included) interests.
121 GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental TV, Inc., 1974 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 75, 072"(9th
Cir. 1974), opinion withdrawn.
'" Negative comments on this decision include: Baker, supra note 66; Posner, supra note
25; Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments- 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 275-81 (1975).
Note, Antitrust Laws-Sherman Act-Vertical Restraints: Enforcement of Resale Location
Clauses Is A Per Se Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 636, 641-42,
468 (1975); Note, Antitrust Law- Vertical Restraints-Per Se Mandate of Schwinn Extended
to Location Clause to Franchise Agreement, 26 MERCER L. REV. 629, 637 (1975); Note,
Antitrust Law-Enforcement of Dealer Location Clauses Declared Per Se Illegal, 53 N. CAR.
L. REV. 775, 784-85 (1975); Comment, Schwinn Recycled-Enforced Restriction On Location
of Franchised Retail Outlets Held a Per Se Violation of Section I of the Sherman Act, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 947, 969 (1975); Note, Antitrust-Vertical Restraints-Schwinn "Per Se" Doc-
trine Extended To Location Clauses, 53 TEx. L. REv. 127, 134-37 (1974).
'2 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir., 1976) (en banc).
i Id. at 988-92.
' Id. at 991, 997-1003.
126 The opinion defined the rule of reason broadly and concluded that the testimony that
asserted that the restraints made possible Sylvania's survival established a jury question. The
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The dissenters argued that Schwinn applied because it expressed a rule
of general condemnation for restraints on where and to whom a reseller
might sell and so made no sense if it applied to only some restrictions. 2
They also argued that the exclusive dealing cases were not inconsistent
with this reading.
18
The key failure of all judges involved was neglecting to identify or
analyze the real question presented. Thus it appears that the majority
assumed that the purpose of the restraint was to promote efficient distribu-
tion, while the dissenters assumed that it operated as a cartel device.
12
1
Neither side separated the problem of characterization of the conduct from
that of determining the proper legal standard to judge such conduct. As a
result the majority incorrectly equated vertical restraint with efficiency
and so with almost per se reasonableness while the dissent, correctly seeing
the restraint as a use of market power, incorrectly equated it to a cartel
situation and so concluded that such restraint ought to be per se illegal.
d. The Supreme Court Decision
1) The Arguments
Continental sought and got a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.
Its position was straight-forward and limited to stare decisis.'30 The rule
of Schwinn governed this case; the majority in the Court of Appeals had
twisted and distorted Schwinn in order to avoid applying it and should be
reversed. There was no extensive justification of the Schwinn rule or rea-
soned explication of it. 3' The brief did argue that since vertical price fixing
and other vertical resale restraints are functionally identical, the condem-
nation of one on a per se basis should apply to the other as well.," Without
more this is merely an argument for symmetry lacking any policy basis.
Continental also argued that less restrictive conditions could have pro-
tected any proper interests Sylvania had in control of resale; 33 but because
opinion did not define further the general rule or what factual findings were necessary to
support a favorable outcome. Id. at 1001-02.
' Id. at 1008 (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 1013-14.
" The majority premise is implicit in its factual statement which emphasizes efficiency
type notions. Id. at 982-83. The minority view that this is a use of market power not related
to efficiency is evident in Browning's opinion, id. at 1018-21, but is very much intermixed
with notions of the right of retailers to be free to do so as they wish without reference to
efficiency considerations.
11 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 97 S. Ct. 2549
(1977).
"I' Brief for Petitioner, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977)
at 37-39 (presents as desirable the stated goals of the Schwinn opinion, especially retailer
freedom, but does not treat the efficiency considerations explicitly despite testimony from
one Sylvania official that Continental's entry into Sacramento was unlikely to have a disrup-
tive effect). Joint Appendix, supra note 90, at 171-72.
"I Brief for Petitioner, supra note 90, at 50-52.
'3 Id. at 48-49, 55. While the argument purports to deal with the free rider problem and
other efficiency issues, id. at 56-60, it ignores or understates the complexity of the problems
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the record did not show what interests existed or how the restraint served
them, the argument was entirely an abstraction. Interestingly, Continen-
tal's briefs did not directly address the formulation of the rule of reason
and seek to obtain a more exact or limited definition thereof.,'
Sylvania sought to defend the circuit court position that Schwinn did
not apply, ' but also made a direct challenge to Schwinn. 13R The argument
was that a rule based on title-passing made no sense in a functionally
oriented antitrust analysis. The argument focused on the impracticality
and irrationality of such rule of illegality.
Sylvania did not stress how the rule of reason would operate as a legal
standard except to assert that a manufacturer's restraints ought to be
regarded as "presumptively" legal which amounts to a return to the argu-
ment rejected in Dr. Miles.'37 In addition, Sylvania relied on one recent
rejection of the less restrictive alternative doctrine'38 by way of rebuttal to
the plaintiff's argument that such alternatives existed.' 39
and so is unconvincing especially in light of the amicus briefs that were subsequently filed in
this case. Moreover, the argument failed to distinguish the facts in the Sylvania situation
from those where real efficiency issues might arise although on the record as made this would
seem to have been possible. Such an effort would have been relevant here to create a basis to
affirm the trial court, see note 120 supra, even while rejecting Schwinn's per se rule.
" Neither did Continental argue that a proper rule of reason analysis dictated that
defendant, having already been allowed to put in its case on the issue, could not prevail and
so the judgment of the trial court was proper.
11 Brief for Respondent at 31-51. Their argument strongly emphasized possible efficiency
reasons for locational restraints without any reference to the record to show that the evidence
supported a conclusion that Sylvania had such reasons, e.g., id. at 45.
tu Id. at 51.
" Id. at 64-65.
' American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3rd Cir. 1975).
Supporting the defendant were several amicii: Associated Equipment Distributors
(retailers of heavy construction equipment who have substantial investment sales and service
facilities as well as inventory); International Franchise Association (generally concerned with
the need of franchisors to restrict competition in order to achieve specific efficiency in such
business arrangements, but the argument did not develop the implicit ancillary analysis in a
clear or specific way instead relying on the general Chicago Board of Trade formulation);
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (representing the major car makers, this brief
argued that efficiency considerations always and fully explained producer imposed restraints
and argued that the size or share of a producer should not affect this right so that, implicitly,
GM may continue to use locational clauses despite its near monopoly position). Each amicus
brief outlined specific fact situations in which it was assertedly necessary in order to achieve
or maintain efficient distribution to have some restraint over the way in which distributors
competed inter se. Although none of these briefs sought to compare its facts to those in
Sylvania to show that even if Sylvania was perhaps unjustified in its conduct, such restraint
might be justified in other cases, a rule of reason standard to cover the amicii would not need
to encompass some general right to restrain resale independent of specific justification nor
would it require protection of cartel arrangements.
Although reportedly the Solicitor General authorized the Antitrust Division to prepare




Justice Powell, writing for a five-member majority, first rejected the
effort of the courfdf appeals to distinguish Schwinn saying that there was
no principled way to achieve that result, and then concluded that the
Schwinn rule was too mechanical a way to treat antitrust issues. It followed
that if the Schwinn rule had to go, the rule of reason applied.
The opinion begins its consideration of the proper legal standard for
judging vertical restraints with the assertion that the rule of reason is the
"prevailing standard of analysis [for all antitrust situations]. . . .Under
this rule, the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in de-
ciding whether a restrictive, practice should be prohibited as imposing
an unreasonable restraint on competition." ' Conversely, a per se stan-
dard is "appropriate only when .- . . conduct . . . is manifestly anti-
competitive."'4 In order to determine when conduct is "manifestly anti-
competitive," the Court refers to a-"test" laid down in Northern Pacific:
"Practices which [have a] . . .pernicious effect on competition and lack
• ..any redeeming virtue" are those which-should be held per se illegal.
4 2
The opinion then characterizes Schwinn's per se rule as turning on the
"pivotal factor . . . [of] passage of title."'4 This distinction is then criti-
cized as lacking "analytic support."
The next logical step, although not the next step as the opinion is
written, is to demonstrate that there are "redeeming virtues" to at least
some vertical restraints. Support for this proposition is "implicit in every
decision sustaining vertical restraints," although no cases are cited.' 4
Moreover, economic analysis has "identified a number of ways in which
manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete more effec-
tively . ,,."I There is then a list of examples of what Justice Powell
presumably means by permissible or reasonable restrictions. The examples
all involve efficiency type restraints, " ' and point toward specific producer
,, Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549, 2557 (1977).
' Id. at 2558.
112 Id., citing Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
,,3 97 S. Ct. at 2559.
1' Id. at 2560.
M' Id.
,,I For example, new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets
can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and agressive retailers to make
the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution
of products unknown to the consumer. Established manufacturers can use them to
induce retailers to engage ih promotional activities or to provide service and repair
facilities necessary to the efficient'marketing of their products. Service and repair
are vital for many products, such as automobiles and major household appliances.
The availability and quality of such services affect a manufacturer's good will and
the competitiveness of his product. Because of market imperfections such as the
so-called "free rider" effect, these'services might not be provided by retailers in a
purely competitve situation, despite the-fact that each retailer's benefit would be
greater if all provided the services than if none did.
Id. at 2560-61. A footnote purports to qualify this by asserting that "marketing efficiency is
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interests in the efficient operation of production and distribution. None
involve cartels in which the outcome is deemed desirable and so the re-
straint reasonable.
Having demonstrated that some vertical restraints will have redeeming
virtues, the opinion reverts to the question of whether the passage of title
has any relationship to the presence or absence of "virtue."'47 Finding
none, the opinion concludes first that a per se rule must apply regardless
of title if at all, but, secondly, having found "substantial scholarly and
judicial authority," wide use "in our free market economy," and "no show-
ing in this case" of a pernicious effect, the per se rule "must be overruled,"
and the law returned "to the rule of reason that governed . . . prior to
Schwinn. "I4"
Interspersed in this discourse is an economic analysis of vertical re-
straints. The opinion asserts that "competition among manufacturers of
the same generic product . . . is the primary concern of antitrust law."'"
And since substantial interbrand competition exists among television set
makers, "it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand
market power. . . ."I" At another point, having acknowledged that the
purpose of vertical restraint is to "reduce . . . competition," the Court
asserts that "the ability to exploit the resulting market may be limited
both by the ability of consumers to travel . . . and . . to purchase the
competing products of other manufacturers ... ."1'5 Justice Powell also
suggests that efforts at product differentiation "convey socially desirable
information" thus indicating acceptance of a world of monopolistic compe-
tition.' 5 Finally, Justice Powell cites several lawyers, mislabelled
"economists," for the proposition that "manufacturers have an economic
interest in maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is consistent
with the efficient distribution of their products.' ' 53
The Court's premise in examining vertical restraints is that a sufficient
number of producers of generically identical products insures that market
power will not exist. But if that is so, what sense can vertical restraints
make to the parties? Why would a producer ask or distributors agree to
any of the burdensome tasks which Justice Powell associates with
not the only legitimate reason for a manufacturer's desire to exert control ... " and cites a
case involving a producer who employed customer resale restrictions in order to reduce prod-
uct liability risks. Id. at 2560-61 n.23, citing, Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3rd
Cir. 1970) (en banc). The qualification, however, is not inconsistent with the general proposi-
tion that all the examples involve problems of economic efficiency. Thus, the restraint justi-
fied by product liability concerns is an example of reducing costs of production by handling
risks in an efficient way.
"' 97 S. Ct. at 2561-62.
Id. at 2562-63.
,j Id. at 2559 n.19.
'50 Jd.
' ' Id. at 2560.
,5 Id. at 2561 n.25.
Id. at 2561, citing, as "economists", Posner, supra note 25, and Bork H, supra note
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"'efficiencies in distribution" unless control over the branded product will
produce sufficient power over price to compensate for the costs involved?
But if that is so, and it must be if vertical restraint is to make any sense,
we have also described a situation in which market power exists or can
exist and so can be misused. The fact that substitutes may limit this power
does not change the fact that the limits are loose enough to permit some
power to be exercised. The television set industry is a case in point. Syl-
vania's activities indicate that it did not view sets as fungible goods.' 4
Thus, despite an apparent small share, Sylvania still had a product which
had some market power. Justice Powell's factual premise thus does not
explain Sylvania's conduct.
The Court also may accept the Bork/Posner view that producers want
to maximize intrabrand competition' but that argument is limited to
cases of efficiency oriented restraints and not cartel ones. By not stating
that limitation explicitly, Justice Powell omits the factual issue of charac-
terization. This in turn makes his economic argument less realistic.
A second problem with the opinion is the treatment of the "pivotal"
issue of title passage. The absurdity of the denial that title properly de-
fined is relevant emerges when one considers the rule of per se illegality
for vertical price fixing which Justice Powell explicitly states is still good
law.'56 Such a rule does not apply to master and servant, employer and
employee, or to dealings with true agents or contractors. It is absurd to say
that sending a package c.o.d. means the delivery person must set a price.
To suggest that an employer may not tell employees what prices to charge
is similarly absurd. What Justice Powell refuses to acknowledge is that
title confers legal rights of control and that one with legal and equitable
title has a legal, property right to control subject to whatever limits the
law imposes. One with a legal right to control ought not to be held to be a
wrongdoer on the mere showing that he did what he had a legal right to
do. Something more is needed: the legal right may be a sham, or may result
in creation of unreasonable market power, or may unnecessarily affect
other interests. Conversely, one without an inherent legal right can control
only if a lawful contract grants that right. The antitrust laws, among
others, define when such control can be transferred. This is not to argue
that a per se line should be drawn at the point where inherently lawful
control ends, it is only to say that Justice Powell should not have treated
title as irrelevant, because such a position ignores legal and economic
realities. The real issue in this case was what contractual control is a
manufacturer to be allowed over functionally independent businesses re-
selling its products where, absent such control, the buyer would have abso-
lute freedom of action.
Justice White concurred in the conclusion that a rule of reason should
govern this case but argued that it was not necessary to reverse Schwinn
's' See, e.g., Joint Appendix, supra note 90, at 365, 390, 400-01.
', See note 153 supra.
', 97 S. Ct. at 2558-59 n.18.
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to reach that result.' 7 Justice White also suggested that Schwinn's per se
rule ought not apply because Sylvania was either seeking to enter a market
or expand therein and so fits into an exception hinted in Schwinn''' This
view of per se rules as only sometimes applying suggests that Justice White
has in mind a rule very different from that which makes cartels illegal per
se.
Justice White, the author of the Albrecht opinion, also sought to restate
the policy underlying the Schwinn, Topco and Albrecht holdings. Justice
White's argument is that Schwinn addressed the problem of how much
control a producer ought to have over a functionally independent distribu-
tor. Independence is crucial for business, and the antitrust laws have as a
goal protection of that freedom and that is at the heart of the Schwinn
rule.' '9 Justice White is obviously concerned with the way the majority has
stigmatized the Schwinn opinion and by implication the non-economic
values which it sought to protect. White's opinion does note several times
that the evolution of the law in this area has not been satisfactory or
clear, 6 0 but he urges his colleagues to proceed "deliberately" in seeking "to
improve it."' 6'
e. The Remand: What is the Rule of Reason
The case is to be remanded for a new trial under the "rule of reason."
But what is the rule of reason and what does the plaintiff or defendant in
a rule of reason case have to demonstrate? Justices Powell and White seem
to assume that the rule of reason is a clear, well-defined standard or set of
standards whose application is self-evident. There are, however, very few
cases which expound or analyze the rule of reason; and those cases do so
in quite contradictory terms.
The ambiguity of the standard is evident in Justice Powell's handling
thereof. He defines it initially as a standard requiring that "the fact finder
weighs all of the circumstances of a case . . ." and in a footnote quotes
the passage in Chicago Board of Trade in which Justice Brandeis asserted
that:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competi-
"I Id. at 2563 (White, J., concurring). Justice White asserts that the distinctions between
the restraints in Schwinn and those in Sylvania are in fact significant and since Sylvania's
restraints were not absolute, they ought not be regarded as per se illegal. Justice White
secondly argues that "Sylvania clearly had no economic power in the generic market." Id. at
2565. This conclusion like Justice Powell's is inherently suspect because it makes the restraint
illogical.
' Id. at 2566.
Id. at 2566-68.
Id. at 2568, 2569.
"' Id. at 2569. It seems evident that Justice White is not satisfied either with the past
articulation of the law in this area or with the sweeping remodeling that the majority is
engaged in. At the same time, he is not prepared to offer a broad alternative view.
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tion or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or proba-
ble. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulations or
the reverse; but because knowledge or intent may help the court
to interpret facts and to predict consequences. 2
Justice Powell does not refer to the cases which limited and circum-
scribed the formulation of the rule of reason so that restraints of a purely
cartel character were denied a "reasonableness" evaluation, but he does
assert that per se rules are "appropriate" for "conduct that is manifestly
anticompetitive." Any restraint is anticompetitive, and it is intentionally
and so "manifestly" so. Cartel restraints are, however, not merely "mani-
festly" anticompetitive, they are solely and exclusively so. To be sure,
one can argue that there is social value in a pure restraint, but it has been
common ground that the policy of antitrust was to promote competition
even where it was painful and that it was for Congress to alter that result
if it deemed it in the public interest. "'
If we assume then that Justice Powell's examples illustrate the class of
cases in which some restraint would be permissible, they all point to effi-
ciency considerations either in marketing or in fulfilling other duties of the
producer or distributor. This would be consistent with a view of all cartel
restraints as "manifestly anticompetitive" because they do not make pos-
sible specific efficient activity on the part of any party whatever ultimate
good effect they might be said to have.
However, Justice Powell does not make this connection or even suggest
it. Indeed, one can infer an exactly opposite conclusion given the facts of
the case, Justice Powell's description thereof and the argument of the
defendant's economic expert. The facts as discussed earlier certainly do
not reveal a strong case for any of the efficiency arguments that Justice
Powell lists as examples of the redeeming virtues of vertical restraints.
Moreover, Justice Powell himself is content to describe the facts in terms
of decreased competition "thought necessary to the improvement of the
company's market position" without explanation except that "aggressive
and competent retailers" were to be attracted thereby. "' Such a descrip-
tion is consistent with a producer promoted cartel arrangement which
offers "aggressive and competent retailers" a chance to eliminate competi-
tion inter se and exploit the resulting market power. The conclusion that
162 Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 238 (1918), quoted in, Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 97 S. Ct. at 2557-58 n.15.
10 Hence, the antitrust exemptions for labor, insurance and certain activities of regu-
lated industries.
"1 97 S. Ct. at 2552.
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the "strategy appears to have been successful" because Sylvania's share
of television set sales rose suggests both something of a post hoc ergo
propter hoc analysis and a focus on some final outcome as the proper
measure of reasonableness, " 5 and not the way this outcome was achieved.
Such an approach could suggest almost per se lawfulness for such re-
straints unless the evidence showed monopolization or some other indepen-
dent evil. In fact, some defendants and journalists have so read the case.'66
Sylvania through its economic expert and brief argued for a very broad
reading of the rule of reason. The expert took the position that any means
by which a marginal competitor can stay in business and offer competition
to large producers of substitute goods is reasonable.' 7 He explicitly as-
sumed that no economic power could arise for such a marginal competitor
because of this restraint.'68 The expert did not identify anything that the
retailers were required to do in return for the benefit of the restraint and
did not seem concerned about the failure to find this kind of efficiency
justification. While not fully explicit, the expert's position appeared to be
that restraint serving the function of either cartel or efficiency goals is
acceptable because of its desirable dynamic effect on the structure of a
generic product market. Sylvania's legal argument followed the expert's
position and advanced almost a structuralist agreement of reasonableness:
small firms can use restraints for any reason.
There is a danger, however, in reading these items as demonstrating
conclusively that a broad rule of reason exists. Neither at trial nor on
appeal did Continental develop or argue the issue of the definition of the
rule of reason or its application to the facts of the case.'69
The Court further obscures the standard by its failure to suggest what
factors might be relevant to the determination of reasonableness in this
case. There is no discussion of the evidence and no guidance to the trial
court as to what constitutes a reasonable restraint.
The possible versions of the rule from the opinion thus run the gamut
from a rule that makes such restraints generally lawful as an inherent right
of the producer, to a rule that allows such restraints for marginal or non-
dominant firms for any reason but would deny them to large or leading
I's This is partially confirmed by a subsequent footnote which asserts that courts can
indeed balance intrabrand competitive loss against interbrand gain. Id. at n.27.
"I See 39 NAT'L J. 1241 (1977) (report on Sylvania substantially misreporting the deci-
sion concludes that the opinion makes the conduct lawful). See also FTC WATCH, (Aug. 26,
1977) 15-16 (report on briefs in bottlers case which also apparently assert per se lawfulness).
"7 See note 115 supra, quoted at, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 537 F.2d
1001 n.36 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Preston, supra note 31. It should be-noted again that
Professor Preston reaches this result largely because of his abiding faith in the self righting
character of the market.
6s See Joint Appendix, supra note 90, at 410-11, 414-15, 421-25. Elsewhere he did ac-
knowledge that some power over some customers might be involved, e.g., id. at 440-41.
"I No effort was made to explore how the expert's judgment could be stated in general
rules that would exclude cartels nor did Continental point to the evidence of a lack of
efficiency reasons for the restraint and ask that the Court consider the problem associated
with allowing such restraints to be held reasonable.
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firms, to a rule that permits only those restraints which serve some specific
interest related to the efficient production and distribution of goods and
which do so without unreasonable restraint. It is clear from the opinion
that vertical restraints should not be condemned out of hand and in fact
should be permission that the opinion is deficient.
Considered as a matter of policy what rule of reason ought a trial court
use? A rule of reason implies reasonableness, but reasonableness in this as
in most other contexts is a relative and not absolute term: restraint can
be reasonable only in relationship to some objective and then in a compar-
ative sense.
One approach would be to treat the result in this case as declaring that
there is an inherent right in a producer to control non-price resale condi-
tions thus limiting the Dr. Miles result. If a producer has a general legal
right to use controls after it has sold its product, then any exercise of that
right is by definition reasonable unless it is objectionable as part of some
other wrongful conduct. Such a rule of reason would make controls pre-
sumptively lawful in the sales context as they are in the true consignment,
agency and employment areas where the nature of the legal relationship
mandates such control.
Such an approach would draw support from the analysis in Schwinn
which upheld as reasonable the controls over the customers and territories
in and to which Schwinn's distributors sold under the various agency
plans. In the context of the opinion it was fundamental that the actions of
the distributors were "indistinguishable in function from agents or sales-
men."'70 Moreoever, the overall system of agency and consignment distri-
bution was a legitimate one not involving monopolization so the normal
legal rights of such relationships would allow control. Because Sylvania
held that the passage of title is not "sufficient" to justify a per se rule, it
does not follow that all legal rights which exist over agents and employees
are necessarily now included in the rights of producers who sell their goods
to others. To extend the analysis from situations in which the legal rela-
tionship necessarily contemplates control in the principal to contexts
where it does not is to alter radically the bundle of rights which the law
confers upon a producer. The awarding of such rights raises grave risks of
clogging the lines of distribution, thereby erecting barriers to entry and to
effective competition, and, of course, increasing costs to consumers for no
reason. There seems to be no gain to be had by such a sweeping redefinition
of producer rights, and the reasons for objecting to Schwinn do not require
or even suggest that restraint is a matter of right on its own; it is a right
only when needed and only to the extent of that need.
A second approach would ask whether or not Sylvania would, more
probably than not, have survived as a viable entity but for this restraint.
This assumes implicitly that so long as Sylvania survives, we have
achieved a socially desirable goal.' But that is not reasonable. One can
'T' United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967).
'7' This seems to be the test which Sylvania" was arguing and which the court of appeals
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posit cases where survival is no defense,' e.g., Sylvania, to survive, en-
gages in a price fixing conspiracy or customer allocation conspiracy with
its competitors. Similarly, if, in order to survive, Sylvania makes danger-
ous and defective products, refuses to honor its debts, engages in credit
manipulation or deception of its customers, its failing condition is no de-
fense. Hence, even this broad rule of reason must concern itself not merely
with whether Sylvania survives, but how it does it. One test would be
whether the means chosen were or were not "reasonable" (assuming they
are shown to be needed, necessary and sufficient) in the sense of whether
the level of restriction chosen is socially acceptable. Such a "test" is en-
tirely open ended and logically implies no consistently applicable limita-
tion on conduct. It could uphold the creation of a cartel provided the
monopoly profits are reasonable in amount for survival.7 3 Under this ap-
proach, therefore, either the judge or jury has unbounded discretion to say
that something is or is not reasonable conduct.' This will be a case-by-
case decision and will introduce a very high level of uncertainty into busi-
ness planning most especially if it is up to the jury to say that the restraint
is unreasonable.
A rule of reason so open as to include some, but apparently not all,
forms of cartels as well as efficiency justified restraints is too unwieldy to
work. Similar cases will be treated differently and vice versa. In practice,
the litigation may become largely a matter of seeing how many economists
will say a practice in a context is good or bad. A second objection is that
any effort to adhere to it will invite mind boggling record making designed
to leave no "circumstance of the case" undocumented. A final objection is
that the primary implication of this approach is that a restraint need not
be justified in efficiency terms. While one could argue that this is accepta-
ble because even if inefficient the restraint has a dynamically useful effect
of preserving a competitor, the better view is that all business should be
was prepared to accept.
,72 This defense has been rejected in Socony Vacuum, Inc. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150,
217-18, (1940); Trenton Potteries, Inc. v. United States, 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927); United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972). But see Appalachian Coals, Inc.
v. United States 288 U.S, 344 (1933); National Ass'n Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States,
263 U.S. 403 (1923).
"I Proof of inefficiency, i.e., that the producer was a high cost, low quality operator which
stayed in business only by virtue of its use of restraints which served the cartel interests of
its distributors, would not mandate a finding of unreasonableness since an economic expert
might say this allowed a marginal competitor to stay in business and it is desirable to have
more rather than less producers.
"' This approach would rely for its legal validity on the formulation of the rule of reason
in the Chicago Board of Trade case and the restatement therefore in Sylvania. It would also
require ignoring the line of cases which have limited and qualified this open-ended mandate.
See Socony-Vacuum, Inc. v. United States, 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Trenton Potteries, Inc. v.
United States, 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Justice Brandeis, at least, might have agreed that this is
exactly the kind of situation in which a restraint could be upheld on the basis of its ultimate
social value. See American Column Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 418 (1921) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (suggests that even if the facts prove restraint it is "reasonable" because the
firms involved are small). However, the size of Sylvania's conglomerate parent might have
lead him to an unfavorable outcome.
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subjected to the test of the market in free and open competition. A re-
straint whose only function is to allow exploitation of market power while
it may keep a "desirable" producer in the market may equally keep alive
a firm which ought to have failed to make room either for expansion by
more efficient producers of substitute products or for entry by new produ-
cers of such products. To allow producers to survive by use of cartel re-
straints is to retard greatly the market place test of their actual merit. For
these reasons, this approach ought to be rejected.' 5
Finally, an approach could focus on how the restraint operates and
require that 1) the restraint have an efficiency explanation and not a cartel
one and that 2) it be no more restrictive than reasonably necessary for that
efficiency purpose.' Courts could protect efficiency justified restraints on
the ground that efficiency is itself a primary antitrust goal and reject
categorically restraints whose only justification is that they generate
enough market power to make possible the survival of the perpetrators.
This formula still involves complex factual analysis and a series of subjec-
tive judgments, but by starting with the problem of characterization which
identifies broad classes of favored and disfavored restraints and then set-
ting a general mechanism for assessing the reasonableness of those which
are favored, it creates a viable analytic framework.
This approach is the better policy choice because it minimizes the
amount of interferences in the economy that will be allowed. Only when a
restraint serves a valid interest of one of the parties and is the efficient way
to serve that interest is it reasonable. This would seem an approach m~ost
consistent with a general policy of promoting economic competition while
still recognizing a public interest in efficiency. Its great virtue is that it
provides a way to balance these considerations which also defines what
"I The recent ABA monograph on vertical restraints demonstrates, apparently uninten-
tionally, the problems with this broad formulation. The authors, while using the formulation,
offered next, as a basic guide, seek to find and define what else Chicago Board of Trade
permits. The resulting verbal and underlying intellectual swamp reveals the pitfalls and
dangers of trying in a legal context to expand the coverage of the rule of reason beyond the
Addyston Pipe formulation. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL RESTRIC-
TIONS LIMITING INTRA-BRAND COMPETITION 53-70 (1977).
"I' This approach which has common law roots has its original Sherman Act articulation
in the Addyston Pipe case in which Chief Justice Taft distinguished naked (cartel) and
ancillary (efficiency) restraints and argued that it was impossible to make consistent judge-
ments about the merits of restraint whose only function was to restrain. United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), afl'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Bork has
argued that this is the understanding that Chief Justice White had arrived at by the time he
wrote the Standard Oil and American Tobacco opinions. Bork I, supra note 15. Certainly
Hughes' opinion in Dr. Miles is consistent with this approach. Moreover, the facts in Chicago
Board of Trade are also consistent with this approach for the restraint could be regarded as
ancillary to the operation of the commodity exchange. Indeed, when defendants charged with
naked restraints sought to raise reasonableness issues after Chicago Board of Trade the Court
distinguished the case on those grounds and reiterated its objection to trying to assess naked
restraints or cartels for their reasonableness. E.g., Socony Vacuum, Inc. v. United States, 310
U.S. 150 (1940); Trenton Potteries, Inc. v. United States, 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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circumstances are relevant and how they should be evaluated.77 As a mat-
ter of sound policy then, Sylvania ought to be read to mandate this sub-
stantive approach to the rule of reason, but it is manifest that nothing in
the opinion compels this conclusion and some aspects of it clearly point in
other directions.
Closely related to the substantive definition of the rule of reason is the
procedural problem of which side has what burden of proof. This includes
the burden of final persuasion, the burden of pleading an issue, and the
burden of offering some proof on the point. A plaintiff to survive at all in
antitrust litigation must plead, offer evidence of and ultimately persuade
the court of existence of the restraint. The issue of reasonableness can be
an affirmative defense or an element in the plaintiff's case.
The matter need not be so absolute. In assigning procedural obligations
courts should regard the problem pragmatically bearing in mind that as a
party is forced to bear more of the burdens, its chances of winning in a close
case are reduced. In assigning these burdens the courts ought to be con-
cerned with finding a proper balance between the social interests in compe-
tition and in those restraints which the courts are to judge under the rule
of reason. Courts also ought to be very concerned with the potential for
open ended discovery and litigation that a rule of reason might call for and
so, in the interest of judicial economy, try to structure the inquiry to avoid
non-specific proceedings. Finally, proof of a negative, in the abstract, e.g.
unreasonableness without reference to a claim of why conduct is reasona-
ble, is well nigh impossible.
One way to strike the balance is to require the party defending a re-
straint to plead any asserted basis for reasonableness with sufficient specif-
icity that the factual basis for and legal theory of reasonableness are explic-
itly set forth."8 The defender should also be required to go forward with
the evidence in support of its theory of reasonableness. Only if its prima
facie case is adequate in law and fact should the inquiry proceed. If the
I" This approach does not mandate that all efficiency justified restraints be accepted.
Chief Justice Taft himself indicated that the risk of monopoly would justify rejecting even
an apparently efficient restraint. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 85 F. at 291.
BORK I, supra note 15, would presumably disagree. Any such rejection does raise risks of ad
hoc decision-making of the same kind as that found in the second approach to the rule of
reason. But where the courts define a general class of restraint to be rejected without regard
to its efficiency justification, they have fashioned a rule to its efficiency justification, they
have fashioned a rule which avoids the ad hoc quality even if it has an arbitrary effect. The
so-called "per se" rules in Topco, Schwinn, Albrecht and the tying cases discussed later are
of this character. This analysis is developed in Carstensen, supra note 19, at 831-38. Such
per se rules have explicit exceptions and as Sylvania shows can be repealed in part without
necessarily requiring rejection of other similar rules. This is forcefully indicated by the ex-
plicit reaffirmance in Sylvania, 97 S. Ct. at 2558 n.18, of the general ban on resale price fixing
which has similar redeeming qualities to other resale controls. Id. at 2566-68 (White, J.,
concurring).
I's Such pleading could possibly be done while also denying the existence of a restraint.
It is likely that a defender would be forced to elect its theory because a reasonableness claim
implies some explicit specification of the how and why of the restraint.
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first approach to the rule of reason is adopted, the defender will prevail in
most cases despite any pleading burden while if the second approach is
employed the defender will also have a fairly easy time, but at least some
ad hoc guidance will be present as to what circumstances will make re-
straints permissible. If the third approach is followed, defenders will have
a more difficult, more rigorously defined task and more cases should be
resolvable at this stage.
Once a prima facie case is made out, the challenger has the option of
disputing either the characterization of the restraint as efficiency related
or, conceding the general character, the reasonableness of the specific re-
straint given its purported function. Once again some obligation of explic-
itness at the pleading and motion stage as to what the nature of the chal-
lenger's case will facilitate the avoidance of excessive litigation and focus
the inquiry on fewer factual issues.
Nevertheless, the probability is that there will be substantial uncer-
tainty in many cases about the general characterization or the specific
reasonableness of practices or both, and so the allocation of the ultimate
burden of persuasion may well be significant both in cutting off access to
the jury and in guiding the jury's decision. The effect of placing persuasion
upon the defender of a restraint is that such a party, if counseled in ad-
vance, may be likely to be very cautious in employing any restraint. This
may be undesirable because, given the risks, restraint will be likely to be
employed in suboptimal ways thus denying the public the advantages of
reasonable restraints. At trial if close questions can be resolved against the
party defending a prima facie reasonable restraint, it is likely that a num-
ber of reasonable restraints will be held unlawful. Conversely if the chal-
lenger has the persuasion burden, any challenge to arguably reasonable
restraints is discouraged since the prospects of success will be reduced. A
possible result is that many unjustified restraints would escape challenge
and the totality of restraint on economic activity could exceed the level
intended by the rule of reason. This problem is greater under the second
and third approaches to the rule of reason both of which involve a weighing
of competing considerations. It is clearly greatest under the second because
of the lack of any explicit way to weigh or relate the competing values.
No easy solution suggests itself, but if the defender has a significant
burden both in pleading and in producing evidence of a prima facie case,
the courts can fairly conclude that the restraint in issue is within the
ballpark of arguable reasonableness so that it is probably the better course
to insist that the attacker carry the burden of persuasion.
As applied to the record in Sylvania, it is not at all clear that if the
court imposes any requirements- of pleading or proof on Sylvania that it
can meet them unless the first approach is used. Its legal theory of reason-
ableness is very sweeping and does not provide a definition of reasonable
and unreasonable restraints, or otherwise identify a reasonableness crite-
rion in the rule of reason except perhaps in terms of a right of the producer.
Moreover, there is no articulated theory connecting the restraint with the
outcome. By addressing this causal issue, which is relevant to either the
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second or third approaches, in terms more logical than post hoc ergo prop-
tor hoc Sylvania would have to identify the connection it believed existed
between restraint and survival and so by implication state something
about the functions which a permissible restraint could serve. Since it is
not clear that Sylvania's managers or expert knew how the restraint might
have functioned to save the company, this may be the end of the case.
More likely, Sylvania would focus on the efficiency arguments and thus
create factual issues of characterization and reasonableness, both of which
are highly ambiguous on this record. 7'
4. The Rule of Reason Reconsidered
The Court has embraced the rule of reason as the appropriate standard
for judging the validity of non-price vertical restraints. This has already
resulted in the reversal of other decisions 8 ' and the opening up of many
cases to potentially prolonged litigation. Given the functional similarity
between price and non-price, vertical and horizontal restraints, and the
unsatisfying nature of the Court's distinctions among them, the present
limitation to vertical, non-price restraints may be only temporary. But if
the trend of the past four decades towards relatively absolute rules in
antitrust is to be reversed and some more open inquiry substituted in most
cases, the Court has the obligation of clarifying and explicating what this
new standard is. The majority conspicuously failed to do this in Sylvania
where it had a record before it from which it might have formulated some
factual and legal guidelines for the lower courts.
The history of the rule of reason in the Supreme Court is one of a
tension between the open-ended Brandeis version which may connote a
willingness to weigh any restraint against any possible benefit, and the
Taft version which would limit the application of the rule to cases in which
it is claimed that the restraint is ancillarly to some other specific, effi-
ciency producing activity. As a historical matter, the Taft formulation has
been dominant, albeit implicitly, in the actual application of the rule of
reason, especially in conduct type cases, even while the Brandeis formula-
tion is more frequently quoted. Moreover there has been little or no devel-
opment or informative applications of the rule. Thus for Justice Powell to
act as if all knew exactly what was meant by the rule of reason, is a kind
of practical joke on the judiciary which is likely to backfire in most un-
funny ways on the Supreme Court itself.
Two other problems with the rule of reason merit noting. The first is
119 Sylvania may also have to justify its specific conduct both excluding Continental from
Sacramento, since the evidence was that no adverse effect was likely even if they did enter,
and in causing the closing, temporarily, of Continental's entire group of stores which might
seem a more drastic response than was reasonable in the context. A rigorous analysis ought
to include a concern with the reasonableness of specific applications of a restraint as well as
for its overall justification.
110 McClatchy Newspapers v. Noble, 97 S. Ct. 2966 (1977) (per curiam); Adoplh Coors
& Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc. 1977-2 TRADE CAs. (CCH) 61, 565 (10th Cir. 1977).
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the role of less restrictive alternative doctrine. Both the second and third
approaches to the rule of reason have within them by implication a least
restrictive alternative requirement. 1 ' Whether we are inquiring as to the
connection between the restraint and the survival of the restraining firm
or between the restraint and some efficient conduct it has made possible,
the evidence must show that the restraint is needed, necessary and suffi-
cient. If another, lesser restraint could reasonably be expected to have done
the same job, then the restraint, while needed and sufficient, was not
necessary and so not reasonable if we assume, as the Sherman Act would
seem to require, that competition is a value which Congress wishes to have
maximized.82
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that a least
restrictive alternative is all that is allowed in a conduct case, it has so held
in a related context. In the bank merger field it is a defense to a merger
otherwise illegal that it is needed to serve some convenience and need of
the community. If service to such a convenience and need exists, then it
must be balanced against the competitive effect. To date no case has
required that weighing because the Court has held that there was no bene-
fit to convenience and needs unless the least restrictive approach was
taken.8" So, unless the parties demonstrated that methods other than
merger would not suffice to achieve this beneficial goal, they could not
assert that the merger was convenient and necessary. The justification for
this conclusion was that the Court did not want to sacrifice competition
needlessly-even in banking."' This holding would suggest that to be con-
sistent with a national policy in favor of competition, any formulation of
the rule of reason must concern itself with the problem of compelling
parties to minimize their restraints on competition.
The counter argument"" is that lawfulness ought not to turn entirely
on the imagination of subsequent litigators in coming up with less restric-
tive alternatives. Such a situation will be likely to discourage the use of
restraints which are socially desirable. It is therefore suggested that any
reasonably necessary restraint should be upheld.
The distinction may be largely a semantic one."6 To be justified as
"W The first (property right) approach would not necessarily require a least restrictive
alternative test because it has already assumed that this is a right that ought to be the
producer's and one can define that right in whatever terms are consistent with the scope of
rights conferred.
S2 To the contrary is American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230,
1249 (3rd Cir. 1975). Some slight support for this view is given in Sylvania where the restraints
were characterized as "neither the least nor most restrictive provision," 97 S. Ct. at 2562 n.29.
In context, the discussion was addressing the usefulness of a per se rule for such a type of
restraint.
18 United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
154 Id. at 189-92.
SE.g., Handler, Twenty-Five Years of Antitrust (25th Annual Antitrust Review), 73
COLUM. L. REv. 415 (1973).
M' Any test of less restrictive alternative must contemplate an examination of the facts
at a particular point in time and ask for no more than what a reasonable business person in
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"reasonably necessary," assuming that it is agreed that restraint beyond
the minimum required is affirmatively undesirable, a restraint must be
demonstrated to be no more than needed to serve whatever permitted goal
it has, i.e., that it was the least restrictive option available at the time.
Whether one puts test in terms of "least restrictive" or no more than
"reasonably necessary" so long as there is agreement on the relative rela-
tion of restraint and competition, the same fundamental proposition is
stated.'87
Finally there is a damage issue: when a party establishes only that a
restraint was unnecessarily restrictive, ought that party then be entitled
to damages ipso facto or must it also demonstrate that its damages would
not have occurred under the alternative, reasonable restraint which it has
proven. 8' This is a manifestation of broader problems of causation and
proximate causation which are now arising in private damage cases. The
general issues will be discussed subsequently. For present purposes it may
suffice to note that the choice of a damage rule will greatly affect incentives
to challenge provably unreasonable restraints. Thus while the choices are
clear, which is the better one is not obvious.
B. Tying: Fortner II and the Proof of Market Power
1. A Business Analysis of Tying
Tying, the conditioning of the sale of one product on the buyer agreeing
to buy some other product is an example of an internal restraint."9 It
operates to define the relationship between the parties and by doing so also
circumscribes the freedom of action of at least one of the parties with
respect to its dealings with competitors of the other party.
Unlike external restraints where usefulness necessarily requires that
the product or service involved possess some market power, no comparable
condition is necessary for tying to occur. It can make business sense for a
seller to offer something extra to the buyer to make a sale. Such situations
may be thought of as package deals. Such combinations are especially
the position of the parties would regard as the least restrictive alternative consistent with the
achievement of the permitted goal.
"I As a matter of procedure if a challenger wishes to challenge a restraint on this ground,
it seems clear that, assigning to such a challenger, the burdens of pleading, proving, and
persuading that such an alternative exists will also serve to redress the balance and insure
that mere imagination in pleading will not suffice to invalidate retroactively an otherwise not
unreasonable restraint.
" This is illustrated by the informed consent cases. Compare Cantebury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 277, 290-91 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972) (lack of informed consent to
operation gives rise to no liability if a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would have
consented) with Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (failure to give warning presumed to have causal connection to injury
and proof that warning would not have affected decision held irrelevant).
" Reciprocity, requirements contracts, exclusive dealing, and full line forcing agree-
ments are other examples. See Comment, Franchises, Requirements Contracts and Tie-Ins:
One Test for a Tangled Two, 74 YAst L. J. 691 (1965).
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useful when a seller confronts buyers with special needs. By assembling a
package for the buyer whether it is flour and sugar or houses and financing,
the seller may be giving more value than the equivalent price cut on the
primary object of sale. Indeed package deals are a variant on the tradi-
tional price cut and represent alternative ways in which an equivalent
discount can be offered. In such situations the tied product is the signifi-
cant object from the seller's perspective and the tying product is relevant
only in its role as the equivalent of a price cut. While such a seller would
be willing to sell the tied product by itself, it would probably not be willing
to part with the tying product alone except for at least its full market
value.
Without further information to show why or how a package sale is likely
to have an adverse effect on some market,'90 no one is likely to believe that
such conduct is unreasonable or anticompetitive. By hypothesis all other
sellers could offer the same package at the same price, and other sellers
can also offer the products separately; hence the buyer has had full free-
dom of choice and made a choice in this context on the basis that the
package gives more value than a cash discount. 9'
Tying can also, probably with greater frequency, represent an exercise
of market power. For a variety of reasons, the seller of a relatively unique
good or service may wish to employ its power over that good by requiring
buyers to take some other product or service. A business analysis of these
requirements suggests that they can function to serve a range of goals from
direct profit maximization by achieving price discrimination, to protection
of quality or good will, to transference of economic power from one product
line to another.1 2 The tying seller, using market power will, like a package
seller, not sell the tying product alone, except at a very high price, al-
though it will probably sell the tied product separately.
There is a substantial basis to object to tying based on market power.
Such tying is generally said to cause two kinds of injury. First it is an abuse
of the market power of the seller which unfairly exploits the buyers need
for the tying product. 9 3 Second, it is unfair to competitors in the sale of
,, This analysis may seem to conflict with the relatively absolute ban on tying contained
in § 3 of Clayton Act. However, that ban can be invoked. only when the conduct at issue
"may substantially tend to lessen competition." This condition will always occur in some
degree when tying involves use of market power. The use of a "quantitative substantially"
test with low thresholds for liability may make some sense then, but it will not in the context
of fungible products where no market power is being exploited although generally such con-
duct, too, may tend to "lessen competition." Compare United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
337 U.S. 293, 302-14 (1949) with Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329-
35 (1961). See also Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrange-
ments Under the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 267.
"' See Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1127
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Areeda].
1g2 F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 506-07 (1970).
,, United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962); Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1968); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936); see also
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
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the tied product since some portion of the market is foreclosed to them not
because of the superior virtue of the successful seller but because of the
power of that seller with respect to some other product or service.'94 It is
thus clear that the objection to tying rests on an assumption of market
power, and so proof of the validity of that assumption in a particular case
is a very central issue in any tying litigation. It is especially critical that
the threshold of what will be regarded as power be defined so that it is clear
when a seller has crossed that line. This is not an easy task to perform.
The observable characteristics of the tie and the conduct of the parties will
not provide unambiguous evidence. One needs to know something of the
market characteristics in which the tying good is sold. As the evidence
points toward uniqueness either of the product itself or cost advantages in
its production one can be relatively confident that the producer has some
power in its sale. This power is not necessarily large nor is it necessarily
equally applicable to all buyers.
Although traditionally characterized as "unfair," many uses of tying,
even where market power is present, are easily explicable in terms of the
same kind of efficiency arguments used to justify external (vertical) re-
straints earlier. In one class of tying arrangements, the tie is explicable in
terms of its utility in protecting some aspect of the tying product either
its productivity or its good will. Examples include cases in which the tie
is arguably necessary in order to assure that proper inputs (the tied prod-
uct) are used in a machine (the tying product), ' or that the equipment
purchased (the tying product) is properly installed (the tied service)' 9 or
that the producer's good will not be jeopardized by use of improper or
nonconforming parts or attachments.'97
The profit maximizing goal is also consistent with efficiency if we as-
sume that a seller has a right not only to discriminate among buyers but
also to use functionally equivalent methods which are more efficient to
achieve the same result. If one with market power has a right to the maxi-
mum "monopoly" profit that this power will yield through any means,
then a tie can be but an efficient way of exercising that right.'9 8 The
"I United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 6 (1968); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
,13 See, e.g., International Salt v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); IBM Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
"I See, e.g., Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.
1935), aff'd, 299 U.S. 3 (1936).
I's This is probably the better explanation for the ties found in the cases cited in note
194. See also United States v. Loew's Inc. 371 U.S. 38, 49 (1962) and Northern Pacific Ry. v.
United States 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958) (by discounting the price of land sold to buyers agreeing
to ship on defendant's railroad, the railroad secured added business not otherwise available).
The basic theory behind this analysis is that by using a tied product whose volume of
purchase or price can be varied with the buyers demand or need for the tying product, buyers
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determination of whether there ought to be a right to maximize monopoly
profits, assuming the monopoly is itself otherwise lawful, represents a pol-
icy judgment not only of economic'99 but of social and political character10
as well.
Other uses of tying are more clearly like those which fall under the
cartel analysis with respect to external restraints. The classic case is where
a producer uses its power in one area to foreclose competition in another
only for the sake of that end. This is purely anticompetitive in the usual
case. It involves a refusal to compete on terms that can be met directly by
others in that market.
20 1
At the very least then some uses of tying based on market power are
arguably ancillary to achieving efficiency, but depending on the definition
of rights of a seller with market power, more or less of the uses of tying are
analogous to a cartel-like exploitation of power for its own sake. There is
thus a strong parallelism between the logical analysis of external restraints
and tying based on market power.
2. The Legal Analysis of Tying Prior to Fortner II
The judicial treatment of tying prior to Fortner 11 has been a consistent
and vigorous condemnation. The courts have refused to accept any argu-
ment that producers have a right to maximize profit by the use of a tie-
will pay varied prices for the tying product and the seller will run no risk of cross sales (a low
price buyer reselling to one with a high price) and the prices paid will reflect relative demand.
I" The economic argument would focus on the benefits. Will a seller produce more if it
can exercise this right? If it will, then the right is socially productive from an economic view
point.
The conclusion turns out to be more ambiguous than might seem to be the case. Depend-
ing on the amount demanded at various degrees of need we may find more or the same
production under discrimination as under uniform price. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements
and the Leverage Problem, 67 YAU L. J. 19 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Bowman]; Stigler,
United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 152.
It is worth passing notice that the economist would differentiate this case from that of a
cartel on the basis that here there is a single integrated producer which will produce more or
less depending on its total profit whereas the cartel will produce less than its participants
would otherwise because they have created collectively market power and employed it to
suppress production. So long as the power of the tying product is assumed to be "natural" or
"inherent" the cases look and are dissimilar. But if the legal system consciously chooses to
allow product differentiations, then one may wish to question the propriety of the underlying
market power that gives rise to the capacity to tie. Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief about
Monopoly, in INDusTRmL CONCENTRArION, THE Nzw LARNiNG 164, 200 (GOLDSCHMID, MANN
& WESTON eds. 1974).
" The social and political arguments are cast largely in terms of fairness. Is it right or
proper to allow either unequal treatment of buyers taking similar goods or foreclosure of
selling opportunities to competitors in the tied product especially where the foreclosure is
something which is unrelated to the merits of the product sold? The argument seems to imply
a sort of cost benefit analysis which would weigh the loss to a sense of fairness against the
economic costs which a "fair" rule was likely to generate. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 6, 11-12 (1958).
2' It may not always be objectionable because in some cases it may be an entry device
useful for a small firm seeking to gain entry into a market where the structure is very
oligopolistic. See Pearsall Butter Co. v. ETC, 292 F. 720, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1923).
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in 1 and have explicitly rejected the argument that efficiency considera-
tions will in general justify tie-ins. 03 The oft expressed view is that almost
any need a tie-in might serve can be served as well by some other require-
ment which does not involve trespassing on the rights of other producers
of the tied product. 24 Although the Court has sometimes put its views in
terms of the predatory implications of the usurpation of the market for the
tied product, it is farily evident that the real basis for condemnation is the
conclusion, reinforced by the Clayton Act and the Robinson Patman Act,
that it is unfair to both customers and competitors to allow market power
to be exploited in this way.25 A crucial factor premise underlying this
outcome is the belief that in most cases the seller has alternatives which
are not substantially less efficient to achieve any legitimate ends that may
exists.
21
The resulting condemnation is a "per se" rule with exceptions. The
exceptions relate either to the character of the tying firm,2 7 (if it is a new
or failing firm, it may use tying in reasonable ways to protect its efficiency
interests) or to impelling circumstances which make a tie not only efficient
but the only practical method of protecting some legitimate interest of the
seller.2 This kind of a per se rule is exactly parallel to that found in Topco,
Schwinn and Albrecht and quite different from the per se rule found in
Socony-Vacuum and similar cartel cases. Moreover its justification is the
protection of independent businesses which is the rationale for the "per se"
prohibitions announced in the first line of cases.
There are four elements that a plaintiff must demonstrate in a Sher-
man Act tying case:
1. That two distinct products are involved.
2. That the sale of one is tied to the purchase of the other.
3. That the tying product has some market power.
4. That not an insubstantial amount of commerce is affected.
2Z See cases cited in notes 199 & 195 supra.
See cases cited in note 195 supra.
' See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 6 n.5.
There is no reason to think the Court is willfully refusing to see the economic argu-
ment. It has instead, to date, found the potential marginal gain in efficiency not to be worth
the probable social cost in terms of reduced fairness to buyers and competitors. Compare
Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HAav. L. REv. 50
(1958) with Bowman, supra note 199; Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity and the Leverage
Theory, 76 YALE L. J. 1397 (1967); and 80 YALE L. J. 195 (1970).
2" Thus the franchisor in Siegal v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 498 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971),
can take a percent of the revenue of the franchisee. The IBM company can lease computers
based on usage, but see United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
352 (D. Mass. 1953), afl'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
' Pearsall Butter Co. v. F.T.C., 292 F. 720 (7th Cir. 1923). See also Siegal v. Chicken
Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
I' Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 931 (1961); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), aff'd,
299 U.S. 3 (1936).
[Vol. XXXV
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
The proof of these four elements makes out a case to which no general
rule of reason defense is possible although a defendant may still offer
selective defenses as discussed previously.
The first and last requirements are relatively clear. The two product
requirement is essential to the entire theory of a tying case because without
two products there can be no tie. The problems produced in application
of this standard are matters of factual characterization which, while diffi-
cult in some cases, raise few serious problems of factual or legal concep-
tualization.M Similarly while some tying may be so de minimus as not to
merit judicial action, exactly what that minimal amount is, is not yet
clear. 
210
The second element would seem similarly obvious: The sale of one
product must be conditioned on the buyer taking the other product. De-
spite the apparent clarity of the idea, recent decisions in the lower courts
reflect a confusion between conditioning of sales and some vague notion
of "coercion"."' Antitrust law regularly gets into trouble when its practi-
tioners use colorful terms whose meanings are not clear. Since tying in-
volves economic relationships, no coercion in a "godfather" sense" is likely
to occur. A business will not spend more for the bundle of tied goods or
services that they are worth in total; as a result, it is simply not accurate
to describe the business as being "coerced" if what is meant is conduct that
is economically irrational.213 If by coercion the courts merely mean an
action which the actor would not have taken but for the insistence of
another party, then the mere fact of charging a price for goods is an act of
coercion and the concept again has become meaningless.
What the coercion misnomer reflects is a muddling of the question of
when a combination sale is in fact conditioned with the question of whether
a tied sale involves the use of market power (hence coercion in some sense)
or not.214 The issues ought to be kept separate.
215
I" A good discussion of the issues is found in Ross, The Single Product Issue inAntitrust
Tying: A Functional Approach, 23 EMORY L. REv. 963 (1974).
210 In Fortner I, the Court was quite explicit about the low threshold required to get over
the de minimis level. Fortner Enterprises Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-
02 (1969).
2I Ungar v. Dunkin Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3rd Cir.), cert denied, 429
U.S. 823 (1976); this requirement was interpreted as merely calling for proof of a tie-in
requirement in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp. 1977-2 TRAnE CAs. (CCH) 61, 568 at 72, 299 (3rd
Cir. 1977) and in that later opinion the other circuit court opinions were read as being in
accord with this view: Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th
Cir. 1976); Davis v. Marathon Oil Co. 528 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823
(1976); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc. 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972);
American Mfrs. Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. 446
F.2d 1131 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972).
2,2 "I made him an offer he couldn't refuse." The Godfather, Part I.
2 Professor Areeda has demonstrated that a clever and quite logical argument can be
made that no damages ever accrue to the victim of a tie-in since, ex hypothesis, he got a value
that he was satisfied with because he agreed to the tie. Areeda, supra note 191.
214 Varner's defense of the coercion requirement more than adequately illustrates this
confusion. Varner, Voluntary Ties and the Sherman Act, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 271 (1977).
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The greatest source of difficulty is the definition and test of market
power. Since the basic objective of the per se prohibition is to deal with
the unfairness of tying, the prohibition need only apply when it is a game
that one and not many can play. Hence the package sale not accompanied
by market power does not involve the kind of competitive unfairness that
the per se prohibition has as its concern. The key question is what power
will trigger the rule."1 6 There is a clear line of development of the market
power analysis in tying which culminated in Fortner L2 7 The trend was to
reject consistently any requirement of proof of the kind of power such that
its possessor might risk a monopolization charge;" 8 but even Fortner I did
not dispense with a requirement of proof of some market power 219 although
it did hint that the showing of extensive sales under tying conditions might
satisfy the requirement. Moreover the Court has always adhered to the
idea that the power must be general in some degree and not limited to a
single relational context.2 ' Relational power arises in any contractual con-
text in which one party has the legal right to insist on some future conduct
or performance. If the entry into such a contract did not involve the exer-
cise of market power, then subsequent insistence on adherence to the con-
tract, while an exercise of relational power, would not involve an exercise
of market power.'
The return of the Fortner case provided the new majority with an
- The first question is whether the sale of one good was in fact made dependent on the
buyer taking some other good. In cases where the tying good was ostensibly offered separately,
the relevant tests are whether that is true and whether the tied purchase was significantly
better than any other transaction possible. If there was no separate sale or such sale was
economically irrational conduct for a buyer, there is a tie-in sale; but, of course, if the reason
for a lower combination price is some economy of joint production or sale, then the tie-in will
not reflect the use of market power and so will not be objectionable but on other grounds.
Ungar v. Dunkin Donuts, Inc. 531 F.2d 1211 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) for
example turned on the issue of whether sales of products were in fact tied to the sale of the
franchise and would have been far easier to understand if the opinion had focused on that
issue explicitly instead of rambling on about coercion.
26 Sufficient power can come from a patent, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947); a popular product, e.g., IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936);
land ownership, e.g., Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); or copyright,
e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
217 Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
211 The line starts with some oblique language in International Salt, 332 U.S. at 396,
which seems to call for substantial market power absent a patent or other presumptive
source of power, see also Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-
09 (1953), moves to a weaker standard in Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5-7, and culminates
in Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45, and Fortner I's, 394 U.S. at 499, 506, requirement of a sufficient
uniqueness to a good or service that it is able to attract buyers.
211 The opinion in Fortner I called for a showing that "the seller has the power to raise
prices, or impose other burdensome terms .... " 394 U.S. at 504.
2 See, Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Rela-
tional Power, 53 TEx. L. REv. 1180 (1975).
22 The "coercion" element may also address this issue by trying to insist that the proper




opportunity to reconsider the law on tying. Most particularly the case
presented the issue of what evidence could be said to prove objectionable
market power.
3. Fortner II
In the late 1950's, Fortner was a builder and developer of single family
homes in the Louisville area with a farily thin financial position. He held
an option on some land which he wished to develop with relatively low cost
housing. At this time U.S. Steel's not very successful prefabricated homes
business was looking for additional outlets for its product. After some
negotiation, Fortner and U.S. Steel agreed that U.S. Steel Credit Corpora-
tion, a subsidiary of U.S. Steel engaged in financing U.S. Steel sales and
related activity, would loan Fortner all the funds necessary to finance the
entire project;22 in return Fortner agreed to buy U.S. Steel prefabricated
homes.2 2 The contract explicitly conditioned the loan on the buying of the
houses. After assembling some of these houses and finding that they were
not satisfactory, Fortner sought to be released from that requirement; U.S.
Steel refused; and subsequently the Credit Corporation started a foreclo-
sure action on the project. Fortner counter-claimed charging an attemt to
monopolize, unreasonable restraint of trade and tying.
Initially, the district court dismissed Fortner's tying claims before trial
finding that no substantial amount of commerce was involved and that




It found that substantial commerce was indeed involved. The more impor-
tant aspect of the opinion dealt with whether or not there was sufficient
evidence of market power to defeat a motion to dismiss before trial. The
Court found, primarily in the affidavit of one mortgage banker and in the
tie itself, sufficient evidence of the probability of market power that a
factual issue was created such that trial was warranted.226 The case finally
came to trial before the judge sitting without jury. The judge made find-
ings of fact which concluded that U.S. Steel had market power as a matter
of fact with respect to financing, and this made the conceded tie unlaw-
ful.2 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed.2 2 It bears noting here that the trial
22 In addition to financing the cost of the houses themselves, this project needed financ-
ing to cover the cost of land acquisition and development (i.e., sewers and water lines,
sidewalks, streets, etc.).
2z The homes themselves amounted to about one third of the total financing.
22 Fornter Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. 293 F. Supp. 762, 768-69 (W. D. Ky.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
211 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
226 Id. at 504-05. Although the opinion is fairly explicit on this point, the district court
judge nevertheless concluded that Fortner was entitled to summary judgment, but the circuit
court rejected this conclusion. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 452 F.2d 1095
(6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
221 This decision was not reported.
m Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975),
rev'd, 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
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judge and court of appeals were clearly responding to the "music" of the
original Fortner judgement and not just its words. This music was in the
tradition of bigness is badness, and any apparently wrongful conduct by a
big firm is probably illegal. As a more technical legal matter the courts
sought to use the fact of a tying agreement together with its substantial
use2 9 as some evidence of market power. The high cost of U.S. Steel's
houses, was also said to indicate something about market power. However,
while emphasizing that U.S. Steel's loan was in fact unique and was not
imitated by other lenders at that time, the Court of Appeals, at least,
concluded that there was no evidence that other lenders could not have
made similar loans or that U.S. Steel had a cost advantage over such other
potential competitors in making such loans.
2 0
The problem of what evidentiary implications to draw from the fact of
a tie-in is one that several circuits have considered. The most informative
discussion is that of Judge Sobeloff in the SCM case.2' He suggests that
the market power requirement of Fortner I can be satisfied by proof of a
tie not otherwise explained involving any significant number of buyers.
This only shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence to the
defendant in a tying case once the plaintiff has shown that a tie exists. The
question remains whether the plaintiff can rely on that inference once the
defendant offers another explanation. That is to say, does the defendant
have the persuasion burden as well? This is the basic legal issue that the
Fortner case presented to the Supreme Court, but in resolving that issue
the Court could have elected to reconsider much of tying law.
U.S. Steel argued that it had taken a low price on its money, below
what it could have gotten on a comparable loan, in order to obtain the sale
of the houses, and that it had no market power in the money market.
In addition to pointing to the number of ties that U.S. Steel employed,
Fortner argued that because U.S. Steel charged a low price for its money,
it must have had power with respect to money. Fortner sought to buttress
this argument by a showing that banks and savings and loan associations
were legally barred from making comparable loans. This might tend to
establish that other mortgage and construction lenders could not meet this
kind of competition regardless of price but only if the significance of these
specific types of lenders is established. 2
A primary element in Fortner's position was the populist theme of big,
bad U.S. Steel using its large resources to destroy competition. The funda-
mental objection to this approach is not that it is a necessarily bad theory
2n 523 F.2d at 966-67. The court also alluded to the high cost of U.S. Steel homes.
z" Id. at 966.
Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
212 There appears, however, to have been no analysis of mortgage lending or construction
financing in the Louisville area so that there is no structural information about numbers or
types of lenders, types of loans made, relative costs of funds to lenders, or the barriers to entry
into the market by out-of-area lenders. Without more of this structural information there is
no implication of the limits on bank and savings association lending.
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but that it is not a theory to be developed in a per se case. It requires a
record showing how this kind of competition affects and is likely to affect
the business of selling homes as well, perhaps, as the business of financing
the construction and development of such homes. Only with such a record
can a plaintiff prevail on this kind of theory.2 3
Given, then, that Fortner restricted itself to proving a per se case the
issue became whether the record supported the finding of market power,
and the burden was on the plaintiff to persuade that the tie represented
an exercise of market power. Fortner's own expert and the Court of Appeals
both recognized that the rate on the loan to Fortner was substantially
below what one would have expected given the facts about the business
and the risks involved. It was therefore understandable that he would take
the loan and agree to buy the houses. In fact this deal avoided the problems
of finding independent financing and so was probably more attractive than
a comparable price cut on the houses themselves since that would not have
solved the financing problem. The facts are therefore consistent with a
pure package deal:2m U.S. Steel gave Fortner more value by providing
cheap financing rather than cheaper houses, and so the financing was the
equivalent of a price cut. Moreoever, this deal makes business sense
whether or not U.S. Steel has market power with respect to finance.
Fortner's counter arguments failed to rebut this. Although banks and
savings and loan associations were legally precluded from offering the same
kind of loans, it was clear that at least some other lenders, e.g. mortgage
bankers, were not so precluded and it was not established that the legally
barred lenders were significant. If, nevertheless, it had been shown that
U.S. Steel was in a more favorable position in terms of cost of money than
other making construction loans, a different result might have been possi-
ble because then U.S. Steel's position with respect to a class of borrower
(construction loan borrowers) would have continued economic unique-
ness."
Fortner could still point to three other items, the first two of which the
circuit court had also relied upon: the large number of tied sales, the low
cost of the loan, and the uniqueness of the loan. The first two facts are not
2 Some recent cases show a continuation of the great traditions of predation. See, e.g.,
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 901 (1974), aff'g 360 F. Supp. 451 (D. Minn.
1973); Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp. 1977-1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61, 465 (9th Cir.
1977). It is therefore not implausible that a plaintiff might make a reasonably creditable
record which would justify the conclusion that package selling in this context by a large firm
even without market power is unreasonable conduct. Fortner did not do this despite an
explicit invitation in Fortner I. Significantly, the Court in Fortner II indicates that the issue
was not addressed and so was not considered in deciding the appeal. 429 U.S. at 612 n.1.
2: Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither A Borrower, nor a Lender
Be." 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 1. Areeda, supra note 191. See also L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST, 470 (1977).
" A third obvious argument is that once Fortner signed the contract, U.S. Steel had
power in relation to him which the facts easily demonstrated; but such purely relational
power is not the equivalent of general market power and is not probative of it.
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dispositive ones."6 Footner's strongest argument was that U.S. Steel's loan
was unique. This meant that at the time of the loan Fortner had no then
available, complete substitute. It would seem undeniable that this would
give the offeror of such a product some power, however transient. If a buyer
needs this product now, it has to deal with one supplier and in this sense
Fortner did establish some transient power in U.S. Steel. Yet even Fortner
I suggests that such power is not impermissible power unless others are
legally or economically unable to make an offer of similar products or
services,27 and Fortner II, by holding that indeed such power is not legal
sufficient to create an illegal tie-in, resolves this issue correctly. One of the
most likely sources of innovation is, of course, those who need to solve a
problem to serve their own related interests. U.S. Steel thus pioneered
100% financing not because it was primarily a finance company, but be-
cause it believed this would attract or perhaps even create certain classes
of buyers.2 8 It was seeking to sell houses. So long as its competitors in
financing can copy its innovation freely, thus insuring that no lasting or
substantial power will accrue, the transitory power that may exist is an
essential and unavoidable concomitant of the process of innovation. Hence
the Court's conclusion that uniqueness alone was not sufficient evidence
to establish power makes very good sense as a policy judgment delimiting
the kind of power which is subject to the tying rule.
The Court's opinion essentially presents an analysis of Fortner's evi-
dence to show that none of it is probative of the kind of non-transitory
market power that is essential for a tying case. The opinion embraces the
Sobeloff formula as a useful starting place,29 but it makes clear that once
the alternative explanation is tendered a plaintiff cannot continue to rely
on some general inference of market power.
The opinion for a unanimous court does not admit to any doubt as to
the correctness of the nearly total ban on tying when market power is
employed. It thus keeps the case focused on the single issue of defining
market power. As to that issue, it is fully in accord with the position of
Fortner I.2
z" To the extent that U.S. Steel overpriced its houses we would expect discounts of some
sort would occur to drop the price. To find large scale tying is suggestive that the discounts
are taking the form of some other good or service rather than a direct price cut and to find
that the particular good or service being "thrown in" is priced below its general market price
would then seem to clinch the argument. These facts do not at all negate the possibility that
U.S. Steel had market power. They simply do not resolve the issue. Hence, depending on the
initial presumption one would or would not find power.
211 397 U.S. at 504-05.
211 U.S. Steel argued in the circuit court that Fortner would never have been able to buy
any homes but for the 100% financing, and so competing sellers of homes had not lost a
customer. The evidence was very thin on this point. 523 F.2d at 967. But it is certainly a
plausible factual claim and an explanation for innovation.
21 429 U.S. at 618 n.10.
110 The District Court had also found an attempt to monopolize based on the tying
conduct. The Court in a footnote reversed this conclusion, 429 U.S. at 612 n.1, on the basis
that because U.S. Steel's conduct had been shown to be "nonpredatory competitive conduct,"
[Vol. XXXV
ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS
4. Fortner II and the Status of Tying Law
Fortner II is not a departure from the main line of tying cases. It does
treat the outer limits of the market power problem and demonstrates that
the present Court, not surprisingly, is disinclined to infer market power in
the absence of proof. This will reduce the potential for summary judgments
for plaintiffs in tying cases, but ought not seriously affect the main line of
litigation in this area.
Unlike Sylvania, the Fortner II opinion reflects an adherence to existing
doctrine, thus suggesting that the law at least as to tying is not going to
change. By way of footnote, for example, Justice Stevens demonstrated
that he is quite aware of the economic and legal arguments for a iore open
view of tying and these are inferentially rejected.2 4 1 The vice of tying we
are told is that it is "an abuse of market power '242 and the Court will not
tolerate such abuse regardless of its justification.
C. The Tension Between Fortner II and Sylvania
In Fortner II, Justice Stevens announces that the Court has long be-
lieved that market power ought not to be misused and that tying based
on such power is an example of misuse. However, although one can charac-
terize the Sylvania facts to make them fit a tying pattern,242 Justice Powell
largely ignored the fact that market power was an essential element in the
operation of any external restraint and so did not address the question of
why this use of market power is permissible in spite of the Fortner II
declaration. Thus, while the outcomes are not necessarily inconsistent,
there is an inconsistency in their recognition of market power and a more
basic risk of inconsistency in their differing treatment of the use of such
power. Why is one use an abuse on its face without regard to justification
while the other is not an abuse unless it is "unreasonable"? It is not
adequate to invoke stare decisis in one case, but reject it in the other. In
some way the Court needs to recognize more directly than it has, the
market characteristics that underlie the situations with which it is dealing.
Further, the Court should consider the alternative ways power can be used
and decide in general whether and what kind of efficiency or cartel inter-
ests it will allow to be presented to justify restraints. Only by considering
no inference of wrongful intent could be drawn. This treatment, which would suggest that
intent and conduct can create a violation regardless of probability of success, would imply
that any unlawful tie-in was also an attempt to monopolize, but earlier in the same note the
court indicates that the lack of evidence of a "large market share or dominant market posi-
tion" is also dispositive. If that is the case, then the power needed to make a tie unlawful
may not be and, under the analysis of the tying cases, ought not be sufficient on its own to
show either an attempt to monopolize or actual monopolization in violation of § 2.
429 U.S. at 617 n.7, citing Bowman, supra note 199, at 618 n.8.
429 U.S. at 620.
2 Sylvania "tied" the sale of its products to the buyer's accepting territorial limitations
(the buyers buying those limits). The object here is only to demonstrate that external re-
straints and tying based on market power involve similar market analysis.
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these questions can the Court avoid the kind of ad hoc decision making
that has heretofore characterized its treatment of market power. The fun-
damental ambiguity over the meaning of the rule of reason reflects the ad
hoc quality of present decisions. If the decisions are to avoid the creation
of meaningless, formalistic categories whose effect is either to trap the
unwary or to allow courts to condemn restraints at random some more
explicit analysis of why and when firms may legally use their market power
is essential.
The revival of an ad hoc rule of reason analysis for restraints also
suggests that some long dormant cases might be revived. Appalachian
Coals244 and National Window Glass245 prior to Socony Vacuum could be
said to have allowed failing firms or industries to defend traditional cartel
type price fixing and market allocating activity. The Court has never over-
ruled these cases. They could provide, along with Chicago Board of Trade,





Il. The Relationship of Antitrust Law to State Courts and Law
Two cases decided in the past year dealt with the problems of the
interrelationship between antitrust law and state law and courts. Although
the cases are non-substantive in form, attitudes toward antitrust law and
its significance as national policy clearly underlie the resolutions reached.
A. Vendo and the Relationship Between Federal and State Courts
1. Background
In 1959, Harry B. Stoner caused a corporation he controlled to sell its
candy vending machine manufacturing business to Vendo, one of the larg-
est makers of vending machines in the country. As part of that transaction,
Stoner also entered into a five year "employment" contract with Vendo
244 Applachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
2"5 National Ass'n of Window Glass Mfr. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923).
2146 This issue arises most immediately in the context of the increased penalty for violation
of the Sherman Act. One district court has indicated that it will allow defendants great
latitude to demonstrate that their agreement to restrict and eliminate competition was in
some sense reasonable and thus not a felony under the revised law. United States v. Nu-
Phonics, 433 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The judge declared that while the defendants
may not try to prove that a chosen price was reasonable, they may try to prove the eliminating
price competition among themselves by agreement was a public service since it reduced
deception of customers. In other words if a cartel agreement serves some public interest or
value beyond the preservation of the parties, it may not be a criminal violation of the Sher-
man Act; and if it is a defense to a criminal case, why not in a civil case? Cf. United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115 (3rd Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 52 (1977) (court
recognized a defense that allows conspirators to confer on prices provided they do so to check
specific bids because of the Robinson-Patman Act; the defense implies a pre-existing agree-
ment to keep prices above the competitive level to which they would otherwise fall because
the price exchange makes sense only as a means of policing that antecedent agreement; the
court is thus creating a legally protected right to maintain a cartel aggreement).
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which did not require him to do any work.24 The sales agreement bound
the corporation and the employment agreement bound Stoner not to com-
pete with Vendo in the manufacture or sale of vending machines of any
kind in any territory in which Vendo was then selling or might in the future
sell for a period of ten years.2 8 The product line and the territory thus
encompassed were both greatly in excess of products and sales territory of
the business which was acquired.2 14 The length of the restraint would also
appear to go beyond any conceivably justifiable period with respect to that
acquired business,2° and, in fact, Vendo's management viewed the re-
straint as a potential competitor of Vendo in any of Vendo's activities.2
1
This purpose is functionally unrelated to the business acquired from
Stoner or his "employment" with Vendo.
Shortly after Stoner sold his business, a former employee developed
and patented a new vending machine which was a significant technological
advance and a commercial success. Stoner, who had aided financially in
the development of this machine kept that fact concealed from Vendo, but
did disclose his own interest in investing in the production of the machine.
Vendo refused to let him and then asked him to try to buy it for them.
Vendo was apparently unwilling to pay the price asked and did not follow
up on the initial negotiations. Stoner then invested in the company estab-
lished to produce the machine.
Upon discovering the investment, Vendo sued Stoner for breach of the
convenant not to compete. This suit was in the Illinois courts. 52 The only
247 "The ... contract provided that Stoner '[s]hould regulate his own hours of employ-
ment and shall determine the amount of time and effort he shall devote' . to Vendo."
Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 545 F.2d 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 1976).
214 The Agreements are set out in some detail in the Illinois appellate court opinion,
Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 10.5 Ill. App. 2d 261, 267, 268, 245 N.E. 2d 263, 266-67 (1969).
21 Stoner's company made only candy vending machines which were sold entirely within
the United States while Vendo had until that time, made beverage and ice cream vending
machines which it sold internationally. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527,
530 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
21 The function of a covenant not to compete in the sale of a business is not to work a
perpetual foreclosure, but only to allow the new buyer time to have fair chance to compete
for and attract the sellers' customers. Ten years would seem grossly excessive to achieve this
goal in the vending machine business.
71 "[Olne of the major advantages was . . . it guaranteed that your [Stoner's] design
genius and experience would never be coupled with our money to put a new and most
formidable competitor into the business against Vendo." 58 Ill. 2d 289, 298, 321 N.E.2d 1, 6
(1974). This letter also indicates that Vendo's management did not regard Stoner as an
employee. Even if he were so regarded, the restraints bear no relationship to the actual work
he did for, or knowledge he acquired of, Vendo as a result of his "employment." Since he did
nothing for and knew nothing unique about Vendo, Vendo had no valid interest in restricting
his future employment. See Sullivan, Revisiting the Neglected Stepchild: Antitrust Treat-
ment of Post Employment Restraints of Trade 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 621; cf. Purchasing Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Weitz, 13 N.Y. 2d 267, 196 N.E.2d 245, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1963) (covenant not
to compete enforced only to the extent necessary to protect trade secrets, processes, and
formulae).
'21 Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 Ill. App. 2d 261, 245 N.E.2d 263 (1969), 13 Ill. App. 3rd 241,
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explicit consideration of the lawfulness of the restraint as a matter of
common law took the form of a highly mechanical analysis.25 That analysis
accepted the formal characterization of Stoner's contract with Vendo as
one of employment and asked only whether the restraints were too broad
because they covered more than allowed by the state of Illinois. The court
relied on an exception in Illinois case law to uphold the restraints.
25
The Supreme Court of Illinois sought to avoid the issue of validity of
the restraint and ostensibly put its decision on a different, independent
ground, but that ground, breach of a fiduciary duty, necessarily assumed
the validity of the characterization of the agreement as one of employment
and the validity of Vendo's rejection of Stoner's request to quit. The fidu-
ciary duty and corporate opportunity analysis in the Illinois Supreme
Court is also open to very serious question given the facts in the case.,,
Having thus lost in the state courts, Stoner revived a pending federal
antitrust case and asked for a preliminary injunction against the enforce-
ment of the state court judgement. The trial judge concluded that the
restraints were clearly illegal at common law outside Illinois, and, more
importantly, violated the Sherman Act in their own right and were but
part of a more general scheme to monopolize the vending machine busi-
ness. 256 The court of appeals accepted explicitly these conclusions as did
at least four of the justices of the Supreme Court. 257 In addition, the district
court held that the effort to enforce unlawful restraints in a state court was
itself a violation of the Sherman Act if there was knowledge of the illegality
of the restraints under the federal laws.25 Given the facts reported in the
various decisions, a conclusion of illegality under the Sherman Act for the
restraint seems unavoidable. Vendo's efforts to enforce such a patently
unlawful restraint would also seem highly objectionable although it may
be questionable whether such a suit should be made a separate offense if
the underlying, substantive restraint is readily condemnable.
300 N.E.2d 632 (1973), rev'd, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 975
(1975).
23 105 Ill. App. 2d at 281-87, 245 N.E.2d at 271-76.
2' The exception excluded from a general ban on statewide restraints contracts covering
the entire state or any larger area enforced "in-term"; to make this an "in-term" restraint
the court had to treat it as an employment contract. Id. at 284-86, 245 N.E.2d at 273-75. As
to the accuracy of that description, see note 251 supra.
- 58 I1. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1975). The court asserted that Stoner had breached a
fiduciary duty to Vendo when he invested in the project since otherwise Vendo might have
done so. For a critical comment on this aspect, see Carstensen, Antitrust, 53 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 167, 183-84 [hereinafter cited as Carstensen III. It may also be worth noting that Vendo
was a Missouri corporation and not an Illinois corporation, 403 F. Supp. at 527, so that the
application of the Illinois standard to it seems doubly dubious.
256 Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (the trial judge
was Richard McLaren, sometime head of the antitrust division, and an acknowledged expert
on antitrust law).
'7 545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2881, 2894-2902 (1977) (Stevens, J.
dissenting); neither did the two majority opinions express disagreement with the conclusion
of illegality.
21 403 F. Supp. at 535.
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The case thus reveals a serious and continuing problem of federalism.
The Illinois courts had failed to make an analysis of the facts and law that
was consistent with the national policy of free and open competition as
embodied in the Sherman Act. 59 Although arguably the damage remedy
would remain following enforcement of the state judgement, the competi-
tive harm would be done unless the federal court were allowed to intervene
in the state proceeding to vindicate the national interest.26
At the same time, the case illustrates a pattern that the Supreme Court
has in other ways sought to encourage: use of the state rather than the
federal forum.26' Thus, most of the factual issues were resolved by findings
in state court having at least some collateral estoppel effect.2 2 Thus the
task of the federal court was greatly eased and focused on the federal issue:
had the state court resolution interferred with the federal policy of compe-
tition. However, the federal court also faced the problem of balancing the
explicit federalist interest of Congress in preserving freedom of action for
state courts.
Under the anti-injunction act,22 federal courts are generally forbidden
from enjoining state court actions. Exceptions exist if a federal statute
specifically permits such an action or it such an action is needed in protec-
tion of the jurisdiction of the court. Judge McLaren found that Section 16
of the Clayton Act was a specific exception by implication to the anti-
injunction act, 24 and that an injunction was essential in order to protect
the court's jurisdiction.2 6 5 Having also found that the conduct at issue was
very probably a violation of the antitrust laws which would have irrevoca-
ble effect on competition he issued a preliminary injunction. The court of
appeals affirmed based on the first ground only.
266
21 The substantive failure of the state court analysis and the correctness of the federal
court analysis is the focus of this writer's earlier commentary on this case, Carstensen H, note
255 supra, at 178-85.
20 It was contended that ownership of Lektro-Vend Corp. would pass to Vendo, and so
the former would be eliminated as an effective competitor of the latter.
2"I See, e.g., Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 432 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, Inc. 421 U.S. 723(1976).
262 Judge McLaren interpreted the facts differently from the earlier courts, but he did
not suggest that the basic facts were or could be different in this case.
295 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1970).
21, 403 F. Supp. at 536-37.
2I Id. at 537-38.
255 545 F.2d at 1056-58. The general standard in the case law for finding an exception to
the anti-injunction rule is whether "an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or
remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity could be given its intended scope only by the
stay of a state court proceeding." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972). Thus the
standard for intervention turns on an evaluation of what is needed to give "intended scope"
to a specific congressionally declared policy and ultimately requires a judge to weigh or
balance interests even if only implicitly.
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2. The Opinions
The Supreme Court reversed. 67 Even though six Justices held that
Section 16 does allow for injunction of state court actions, two of the six
would limit that right so that it would not cover this case. The remaining
three Justices held that Section 16 conferred no right to enjoin state courts.
Thus the majority was split three to two on the basis for its decision. The
opinions are significant because they reflect a three way division of the
Court in fundamental attitude toward competition and the policies
thereon embodied in the antitrust laws.
To Justices Rehnquist, Powell and Stewart intervention was not neces-
sary. Justice Rehnquist's opinion on their behalf talks of federalism, 26 8 but
it addresses also the relative significance of the antitrust laws as matters
of national policy. 2 9 It is clear that state courts can and will, as in Vendo,
frustrate the federal policy either if they fail to take it into account or if
they hold contrary views about the importance of competition as a value.
Congress was clear about the function of the antitrust laws and the goal
they were to achieve. If Congress did not address the issue of intervention
in state court proceedings explicitly, it is not at all clear why that should
lead to an inference that Congress had affirmatively decided that the
states should be given freedom to reverse this national policy at will, the
effect of the plurality position. 20 In other contexts subsequent to the adop-
tion of Section 16, Congress has been very careful to define what rights it
was delegating to the states by way of control over competition and in fact
has subsequently withdrawn that delegation.Y Similarly the Court had
previously read narrowly such delegation. 272 This subsequent development
can be said to show a judicial and congressional recognition of the need to
restrict state freedom of action, both legislative and judicial. Indeed these
developments tell more of the reality of the federal relationship than one
is likely to find in the original legislative history. Justice Rehnquist's posi-
tion, nevertheless, is not objectionable if one accepts the policy premise
that the interest in federalism overrides all other national interests lacking
very substantial merit and the policy conclusion that the antitrust laws
lack such merit.
267 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
2, Id. at 2886.
20 According to this opinion there was a clear Congressional concern reflected in the
statute construed in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 23 (1972) that state courts could and would
adversely affect the federal rights. 97 S. Ct. at 2888-89. This was in part what the Vendo case
showed state courts could and would do in antitrust matters as well. If the policy of the
antitrust law is important, then the facts demonstrate it can "be given its intended scope
only by the stay of" these state proceedings and others like them.
2"0 Justice Rehnquist's argument that: ". . . Congress in no way focused upon a scheme
using litigation in the state courts," 97 S. Ct. at 2888, is a rhetoric device largely designed to
justify a conclusion arrived at on other grounds.
211 See, e.g., Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act and McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (2) (5)
(1970), repealed, 89 Stat. 801 (1975).
2'1 Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
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If a strong federalist policy is the goal, it is still arguable that the
plurality position in fact may tend to push in exactly the opposite direc-
tion. One needs to consider what the practical lesson of Vendo is. That
lesson, a little late for Mr. Stoner and his counsel, but clear to all future
parties, is to rush to the federal court house and seek initial relief there,
as well as an early trial of all issues.21 3 The strict construction achieves the
avoidance of friction between state and federal courts by allocating a
greater burden to the federal courts and making the state courts higher risk
forums for dealing with matters that involve national policy issues together
with state issues.
Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the result,
held that while Section 16 does permit injunctions of state actions, it only
permits them when there has been a continued abuse of state court pro-
ceedings: "no injunction may issue. . . unless those proceedings are them-
selves part of a 'pattern of baseless, repetitive claims' that are being used
as an anticompetitive device." ' 4 Since this litigation involved only one
state court suit, it did not fit under that standard. Thus, the two justices
concurred in the result of the plurality in this case.
Justice Blackmun's three paragraph opinion strongly reflects a mini-
mal intervention approach. It does not appear to consider fully the relev-
ance of state court actions to the achievement or frustration of the federal
policy in the antitrust laws. As the dissent pointed out there are many
situations in which a single suit will do as much damage to the federal
values as will a large number. Justice Blackmun's response is to rely on
California Trucking as dispositive of the issue.25 This response demon-
strates that Justice Blackmun views the issue in terms of an abuse of legal
process as a separate kind of antitrust problem. Only when such abuse of
process is present would Justice Blackmun allow intervention. He thus
ignores the substance of Vendo's conduct which was, based on the record
and decisions so far, clearly illegal and contrary to the federal antitrust
laws.
Vendo proved it had a legal right under Illinois law to achieve highly
anticompetitive and illegal restraint. Vendo's substantive wrong was in
seeking and obtaining the restraint on Stoner. The Illinois courts facili-
tated the wrong doing because they did not or could not consider the
national interest in competition. Justice Blackmun's position would pre-
clude barring state court assistance to wrongdoers so long as the state court
found the claims to have a proper basis. This is consistent with Justice
" The plurality opinion suggests that Stoner should have raised his federal issue as an
affirmative defense, 97 S. Ct. at 2889 n.6, and he could then have had a review in the Supreme
Court if that Court was willing to grant certiorari. Fairly obviously, someone relying on a
federal law which the state courts are likely to ignore takes a great risk in assuming that the
Supreme Court will rush to the rescue. The more cautious course is to pursue federal rights
in the federal courts. Thus, the plurality position is disingenuous at the very least.
2'1 97 S. Ct. at 2893-94, 2902-05.
"I California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
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Blackmun's expressed reservations about the abstract merits of competi-
tion.27
The Vendo case requires balancing the interest in protecting a state
forum for business litigation against the risks created to the effective main-
tenance of national policy favoring competition between unregulated busi-
nesses operating in or affecting interstate commerce. The result in Vendo
is one which, as part of achieving the first interest, gives great deference
to the state court judgments on the latter issues. Neither the plurality nor
the concurring opinion sees this as a problem although it would be a serious
one if the competitive policy of the antitrust laws were held to be central
and fundamental guides for the conduct of interstate commerce. These two
opinions then suggest that at present five of the justices have serious and
substantial reservations about the validity or usefulness of the policy of the
antitrust laws.
Justice Stevens' dissent focuses on the merits of the underlying compet-
itive issues and is far more enthusiastic about competition as a central
national policy. As a result, the dissenters would emphasize the broader
reading of the cases on the anti-injunction act, would down play an ab-
stract emphasis on federalism, and so would have sustained intervention
in this case. 77 The dissent would read post-civil war federalism as requiring
the states generally to adhere to federal policies embodied in the set of
statutes which authorize injunctions.
Justice Stevens' view of federalism may be a more functional and useful
one for the last quarter of the Twentieth Century than that of either the
plurality or the concurring opinion. It would make it possible for federal
courts to defer more to state courts as the forum for major litigation involv-
ing both state and federal issues. The federal courts need then only review
resolution of the matter as it affects the federal issues after there is full
litigation. Unless some such method exists for considering closely the fed-
eral issues in state court litigation, the temptation to move to federal court
for all purposes will remain quite strong and may prove impossible to deny.
While the outcome in Vendo is undesirable both as a matter of judicial
efficiency and antitrust policy, it may point toward a closer integration of
state and federal courts in handling competitive issues. The question of
when federal courts may intervene will arise again25 since it is clear that
at least some intervention is proper.2 7
9
I" United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 729-30
(1974) (opinion by Justice Blackmun).
21 97 S. Ct. 2894-2902 (1977).
2 See, e.g., 827 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (RNA) A-2 (1977). (Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Sims warned that the Antitrust Division might use a Vendo right to block
disbarment proceedings if used to police overly restrictive advertising rules).
279 The problems will be most acute in the "state action" cases. See, e.g., Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); United States v. Texas State Board of Public
Accountancy (No. A-76-CA-219, filed Nov. 18, 1976, M.D. Texas), see also TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 45, 076 (1976). In those cases, the state or a private party may seek to enforce rights
under state law which are the object of a federal litigation.
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Even if the concurring opinion in Vendo does not accept the competi-
tive policies themselves as substantial enough to warrant intervention,
perhaps a concern to achieve effective federalism which means, among
other things, that the choice of a state forum should not expose a party to
excessive risks of losing federal rights and the effort to find effective ways
to reduce the federal court work load will lead its author to accept a more
sweeping right to invervene as a functionally more productive way to han-
dle the real problems involved in this class of case.
B. Bates and The Problem of State Regulation and the Antitrust Laws.
Following up on several recent cases dealing with state economic regu-
lation, the Court held in Bates v. Arizona Bar Association that it is a
violation of the First Amendment for the State of Arizona to forbid lawyers
to advertise their services and to advertise prices for certain kinds of rou-
tine services."'0 The Arizona Supreme Court had adopted as part of its
regulation of the bar a requirement that lawyers not advertise. The chal-
lengers proceeded on an antitrust theory as well as the First Amendment
argument. The antitrust theory raised again the problem addressed in
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co."' and Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar"' of
when conduct apparently contrary to the antitrust laws can escape an
antitrust review because a state legislative scheme mandates it recognizing
the conduct as "state action." Attacks on such restraints proceed on the
theory that the state was a willing or unwilling agent of a conspiracy and
should not be allowed to achieve the result of the removing manifestly
anticompetitive conduct from the purview of the antitrust laws.
The Bates opinion, joined by all justices on this point, concludes that
the anticompetitive requirements were part of the state's regulatory
scheme and so cannot violate the antitrust laws. Bates had argued that the
recent decisions in Goldfarb and Cantor required a different result.
Goldfarb was easily distinguishable because of the explicit conclusion in
that case that neither the statutory mandate nor the state supreme court's
implementation thereof required the anticompetitive action of the state or
local bar associations. In Bates the regulatory agency had overtly promul-
gated the anticompetitive rule pursuant to explicit statutes and state con-
stitutional authority to regulate the bar.
However, in Cantor only a year earlier the Court had held that a util-
ity's tariff, approved by the state regulatory agency, to which the utility
was legally obligated to adhere until and unless that same agency allowed
a change, did not immunize the conduct from antitrust review. One stated
reason for this result was that the utility had in the first instance proposed
the anticompetitive practice." The challengers in Bates argued that since
2 Bates v. Arizona Bar Association, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
-1 428 U.S. 579 (1976); see Dorman, State Action Immunity: A Problem Under Cantor
v. Detroit Edison, 27 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 503 (1977).
- 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2 Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. at 594.
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the organized bar had clearly promoted the adoption of this anticompeti-
tive rule, the rule was not in reality a state mandate but rather, as in
Cantor, state acquiescence in a private restraint.2"
In addition the challengers argued that the federal interest in competi-
tion must be weighed against the state interest in regulating the bar and
ought to prevail especially because the anti-competitive requirement is
more intrusive than reasonably necessary " to protect any valid state inter-
est. This argument, also found in Cantor, invokes the doctrine first ex-
pressed in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange that the use of a less restric-
tive alternative test can and should determine jurisdiction as well as out-
come7.211 Professor Verkuil has argued convincingly that such an approach
would be unnecessarily and excessively intrusive into state affairs. 21 Scope
for state experimentation and variation would be severely limited. While
this is not necessarily undesirable, a basic commitment to federalism in-
cludes a willingness to accept and, indeed, a positive attitude toward, legal
variation which in turn may have apparent costs in excess of some other
options. Moreover, a less restrictive alternative test would be a very awk-
ward tool for determining outcomes because such a test is not sensitive to
the varied degrees of state interest in various regulatory activities or meth-
ods. To combine jurisdiction and liability therefore either would lead
courts to find many highly restrictive but justified state regulations to be
"least restrictive" thus making a hash out of that concept or else create a
degree of federal intervention and treble damage liability that would be
unacceptable even to those who want the federal courts to strike down
many state regulations.
The Court rejected the plaintiff's Cantor analogy and advanced three
reasons for its position. First, it pointed out that in Cantor private parties
were being sued and not a public agency while Bates was challenging the
state agency. Ths distinction is not a notably useful one since in Cantor if
the practice was unlawful under the Sherman Act, the utility presumably
could have gotten an injunction forbidding the state from requiring it to
engage in unlawful conduct. So too in Bates, where the theory is that the
bar has conspired to violate the law and that the state agency is a tool of
the conspiracy. Bates advanced its antitrust theory against the state
agency only to keep that agency from carrying out the violation of private
parties and not to impose liability on the state for wrongdoing.35 The only
"1 97 S. Ct. at 2700.
21 97 S. Ct. at 2707-08.
21 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). The Court suggests in the
case that a private entity enforcing delegated federal governmental power must use due
process and otherwise interfere no more than reasonably necessary to carry out its duties if it
is to avoid antitrust liability.
281 Verkuil, State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 328 (1975); see also Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regula-
tion and the Federal Antitrust Law, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 693 (1974); Slater, Antitrust and
Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 71 (1974).
2M 97 S. Ct. at 2696-98.
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reasonable conclusion, then, is that this argument is a make-weight in
Bates which has, one hopes, no significance except as it reflects a more
fundamental analysis of interests at stake.
The second reason for distinguishing Cantor was that Cantor had found
that there was no state interest in the particular type of regulation involved
whereas it was clear to the Bates Court especially in .light of Goldfarb that
there was a strong state interest in the regulating of legal practice including
the way it was marketed. This analysis of state interest is in all probability
the better explanation for the Bates Court's first ground for distinguishing
Cantor. The Court proposes to recognize certain areas as being the proper
subject of state regulation and within those areas a valid regulatory scheme
will not be ousted by the Sherman Act. This separates an initial jurisdic-
tional issue from the substantive outcome as to the conduct at issue. Im-
plicit in this approach is a revival of one aspect of the "substantive due
process" problem that underlies so much of this area."9 The Court has yet
to define criteria to decide whether or not the states ought to regulate
certain kinds of economic activity. The dimensions of this issue are but
barely discernable as of yet, but clearly the outcome in Cantor as explained
in Bates betokens a more rigorous analysis than has heretofore been em-
ployed. Presumably, the Court will respond differently to a formal state
legislative decision to regulate with its implicit declaration of a substantial
state concern and to a state regulatory agency decision to expand its juris-
diction. But what exactly will determine the scope of state powers is not
clear.
The third reason for distinguishing Cantor was that in Cantor the Court
was convinced that the state had merely acquiesced in the restraint
whereas the record in Bates indicated an explicit state policy "clearly and
affirmatively expressed" subject to "active supervision". 9 ' This criterion
seems designed to exclude from state action cases in which a state interest
in some regulation is clear, but in which the state has not explicitly articu-
lated and considered what policy it will adopt. This serves to limit the
jurisdictional immunity to those cases in which there is reasonable cer-
tainty that genuine state interests are at stake in the specific regulatory
scheme and not just a general interest which would justify some regulation.
Thus the state interest in regulating the bar does not justify allowing
Goldfarb type private action loosely linked to a state interest in formal
regulation.
The second and third reasons suggest a two step test for state action
that requires both a legitimate state interest and a real policy even if that
policy largely but not entirely reflects the interests and desires of the
regulated parties. Conduct pursuant to regulation meeting these two tests
ul Substantivd due process seems to involve first the question of whether any state
regulation is lawful, see e.g., Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) and second
whether the specific regulation adopted is reasonable, see, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934); Mann v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
"D 97 S. Ct. at 2698.
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will be deemed state action and immunized from the antitrust laws.
This would appear to be a reasonable resolution of the federalist con-
cerns. It would permit a more critical review of apparent state regulatory
actions than if the Court strictly adhered to legal formalism. But it would
also recognize a substantial zone in which the antitrust laws would not
have jurisdiction and in which anticompetitive and potentially undesirable
controls would hold sway. Moreover by defining the concern with the non-
public origin of regulations in terms of its reflection of conscious state
choice, the Court puts itself in position to tolerate regulatory schemes
largely or entirely promoted by and for the regulated so long as there is a
real acceptance and adoption of this outcome by state legislative and ad-
ministrative bodies.
Clearly a most important limitation for the exemption can come from
the development of guidelines for what interests or goals a state may seek
to advance or protect via regulation. Such guidelines will be much more
significant if they focus not only on the general topic or business subject
to regulation but also on the specific regulation and how it may or may
not relate to the interests that a state may have in regulation. By introduc-
ing more rigorous standards for interest identification and requiring a
clearer or more substantial relationship between regulation and specific
interest even without any substantial limit on the interests which states
may elect to protect, the courts are likely to pare down greatly the amount
of anticompetitive regulation immunized as "state action" because much
of it cannot withstand public exposure of the interest being protected or
explicit analysis of the relation between the interest protected and method
of regulation.
The ultimate outcome of the attack on the restrictive regulation in
Bates illustrates the jurisdictional character of the state action considera-
tion, and demonstrates that choice of jurisdiction need not be outcome
determinative.29' States do not regulate free from national policy, and so
while a finding of state action terminates some legal rights, e.g., treble
damages, it does not necessarily have to lead to a different substantive
outcome with respect to the conduct. In Bates, therefore, despite the state
action determination, the Court struck down the regulation. It did so on
economic free speech grounds, 9' but those grounds make little sense unless
the Court has some faith in the competitive market as a relevant and
useful device for achieving desirable price and output decisions. It is,
therefore, not surprising that it was the justices least enthusiastic about
competition who saw least merit in the outcome. Thus Justices Powell,
Stewart and Rehnquist, the hard liners in Vendo, all dissented in Bates,
this time joined by Chief Justice Burger. Justice Blackmun wrote for the
majority and was joined by the Justices White, Stevens, Brennan and
"I This is usually ignored by commentators. See Handler, Competition v. Regulation,
44 U. CIN. L. REv. 191 (1975). But see Stokes, A Few Irreverent Comments about Antitrust,
Agency Regulation and Primary Jurisdiction, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 529 (1964).
22 97 S. Ct. 2698-2700.
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Marshall (the latter being the four dissenters in Vendo).
Since Bates was resolved on the merits in terms of constitutional re-
quirements, this aspect of the decision falls slightly outside the scope of
this article. Nevertheless, the holding of the case merits two further notes
in terms of the significance of antitrust and competitive policy. First, in
rejecting the Sherman Act claim, Justice Blackmun, in a footnote, quotes
the Virginia Pharmacy case to the effect that "Virginia is free to require
whatever professional standards it wishes. . . .; it may subsidize .. or
protect from competition in other ways." '93 This statement is very much
at odds with the apparent enthusiasm for competition that underlies the
outcome in both Virginia Pharmacy and Bates. Although the point may
simply be that other explicit regulation to serve specific goals may be
permissible and that the Court is not saying that the goals sought are
impermissible, it may well be that this passage reflects ambivalence about
competition especially injustice Blackmun's mind. 94 In that case the free
speech problem is indeed crucial and achieving the same anticompetitive
result on the same dubious claims of public interest which were rejected
in both Bates and Virginia Pharmacy would be acceptable if the regulatory
devices were different. Such an approach would be defensible in terms of
a judgment that some methods of control are less permissible than others
but that the Court ought not to interfere in the final judgment once a
regulatory object is found to be within the state's purview. It would be
ironic indeed from a competitive policy perspective to find that more ex-
plicitly economic control such as a general price control plan for the state
would be protected from objection even though it had only the remotest
connection to the ethical interests that the state was ostensibly promoting.
Such an approach, if it is in reality what is motivating the majority, ought'
to have manifested itself in a more absolutist attitude on the free speech
issue. That is, if protecting speech is the real and primary goal, then the
very relativistic language of the opinion which suggests weighing gain
against loss would seem very inappropriate since other regulatory tools
could, at perhaps much greater costs, solve the same problems without any
interference with speech.
Moreover Bates, Goldfarb, Virginia Pharmacy, and Cantor all speak
'about competition as a substantively desirable national policy relevant to
state action. Hence, while ambivalence about competition certainly exists
on the Court, these cases should be read in terms of an implementation of
our national policy favoring competition. It is not sensible for that substan-
tive concern to be manifest only in a review of some forms of regulation
where a constitutional speech issue also exists especially when the issue
arises only because of a prior commitment to competition. Moreover, to
hide competitive policy issues under a First Amendment label is to obscure
the process of inquiry and direct it in a tangential course.
"1 97 S. Ct. at 2698 n.16, 97 S. Ct. at 2698 n.16, quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v.
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
"I See note 276 supra.
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The second observation that the Bates opinion suggests is that the
Court will soon have to articulate a general view on the least restrictive
alternatives doctrine. The Court's analysis of the values protected by the
advertising ban and how they might justify some ban even if not an abso-
lute one, suggests that here, as in some other constitutional areas,' 95 the
Court is following a least restrictive alternative approach and so will ulti-
mately find some regulation constitutional where no lesser restraint will
reasonably protect the interest at stake. So far none of the cases presented
have required a detailed evaluation of alternatives and their relationship
to permitted or intended goals. Still, a test of reasonableness that uses the
United States v. Third National Bank analysis '96 would seem suited not
only to the reconciliation of the First Amendment and other interests but
also to the more general task of balancing the national policy of competi-
tion, against state efforts to promote their legitimate interests by restrict-
ing such competition. What is suggested is that under a due process or
commerce analysis, state regulation can be evaluated in terms of the inter-
ests served and whether less restrictive (anticompetitive) alternatives
would serve those same interests equally well. If regulation was too restric-
tive, it would then be objectionable on constitutional and not antitrust
grounds. Such a solution needs to be explored and considered at greater
length than is here possible because it raises difficult problems for federal-
ism and may involve a return to a level of federal judicial intervention in
state matters not seen for some decades and perhaps not to be desired
either as a matter of judicial or substantive policy.
IV. The Private Damage Action: The Emergence of the "Proximate
Causation" Issue
When Congress initially adopted the Sherman Act it included in it a
private cause of action for damages.2 1 Some at the time thought this a
useless inclusion,' 98 and indeed it remained a less than overwhelming prob-
lem for wrongdoers for some substantial time. Nevertheless the Clayton
Act restated the private cause of action and expanded it to include the
right to injunctive as well as damage relief. '99 Despite much lavish praise
of the "private" attorney general as a force for achieving antitrust compli-
ance,00 it is only in the past two or three decades, expecially after the
electrical conspiracy cases, that private actions have achieved a great role
212 Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
," 390 U.S. 171, 189-92; see text accompanying notes 183 & 184 supra.
22 26 Stat. 210 (1890), The Sherman Act, ch. 647, §5.
211 Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage Antitrust
Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 691 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Pollock I] (discussing debates on
the Sherman Act).
21 15 U.S.C. §26 (1970) (injunction); 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970) (damages).




in shaping the substance of antitrust law and in creating a new and unique
set of problems.01
Damage liability under the antitrust laws, a form of tort action, is no
different from any common law tort except as there may be specific legisla-
tive limitations or expansions. The. basic antitrust statute authorizing pri-
vate damage actions contains most general and inclusive language: "
any person who shall be injured in his business or property . . . may sue
• . . without respect to the amount . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained . .".11 As a result, judicial interpretation and
development of the damage action has only the most remote root in specific
statutory language and proceeds instead primarily as a common law mat-
ter of judicial legislation.
Because a wrongful act may have a great variety of harmful conse-
quences, not all of which are ones the wrongdoers should be responsible for
and because the consequences of a wrongful act can carry forward through
time and spread out and affect a great number of remote individuals or
firms in one way or another at sometime, there must be limits on the scope
of liability for any wrongful act. These limits include the substantive defi-
nition of wrongful conduct as well as the limitations of the parties to whom
a legal duty is owed and the types and kinds of losses which will be treated
as legal injuries. This is as true for antitrust or securities law as for medical
malpractice or automobile negligence. •
Until recently such general tort issues, while obviously present in anti-
trust damage actions, have been submerged, surfacing only fitfully and
then not receiving substantial or sustained attention from the courts or
commentators. 3  The past year, however, produced two decisions from the
Court which address the problem of the limitations on private actions.
Consistent with the Court's limiting views on the substance of the law,
both decisions adopted quite limited rules on the scope of liability. In
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Court defined "injury to business and
property" so as to limit greatly the class of litigants who might sue a
wrongdoer.30 ' In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, the Court defined
narrowly the kinds of losses for which a wrongdoer might be held responsi-
ble.305 In both cases the Court apparently assumed that the conduct in
issue was wrongful as a matter of substantive antitrust law, and that the
"I See, M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, et. al, supra note 40, at 160 (Chart I).
-2 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970).
30 Justice Brennan, in dissent, saw this issue in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at
760 ("standing" in antitrust is "not unlike ... proximate cause. . ."). Several commenta-
tors have also made this observation; Pollock, supra note 298; and Pollock, Standing to Sue,
Remoteness of Injury, and the Passing on Doctrine, 32 ANTITRUST L. J. 5 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Pollock I]. See also Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations
in Antitrust Suits: The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 24-31
(1971); McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover
Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 177 (1971).
' 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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wrongful conduct in fact caused the losses of which the plaintiff com-
plained."' A traditional tort classification for the issues thus framed is
proximate causation or legal duty, and it is in terms of that notion, in part,
that we will examine these cases.
A. Extent of Duty: Illinois Brick
For those who enjoy the more cosmic of legal jokes, it is at least mildly
amusing that the "citadel" of privity °7 finally overthrown in products
liability and other common law torts may have arisen again this time to
plague antitrust. Alternatively, and probably equally amusing, the Court
may be trying to revive the distinction between "direct" and "indirect"
injury, made famous by the great pleading forms, Trespass and Case, as
distinctions of significance in antitrust matters, in spite of their disreputa-
ble legal history and despite the Court's rejection of ancient legal distinc-
tions in Sylvania.
1. Background
The vehicle for all of this hilarity was a treble damage suit against a
group of concrete block makers. The concrete block makers engaged in a
price fixing conspiracy"8 among whose primary, and allegedly intended
victims, were the state of Illinois and the local government and special
government units in that state that had built large numbers of buildings
using these materials. The government units had in most cases bought
completed buildings from general contractors that had subcontracted the
masonry work, and it was those masonry subcontractors that bought the
allegedly price fixed materials from the conspirators. The governmental
units alleged, however, that the intervening transactions between them-
selves and the contractors and between the contractors and subcontractors
only passed on the unlawfully high price of the concrete blocks. Essentially
the argument was that the governmental units, having specified the exact
m'aterials for building specific buildings, had determined the exact amount
of input so that, with respect to each construction contract, this element
was entirely inelastic and each intervening level of competition amounted
to no more than a cost plus addition.
The defendants moved to dismiss and argued that they were not liable
for the damage done since these plaintiffs had not purchased directly from
defendants."' The trial judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that
3 Actually both cases, like so many other tort matters resolved ostensibly on proximate
cause grounds, involve serious substantive or causal questions which while not formally
addressed may account for the result. See text accompanying notes 401-02 infra.
37 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv.
791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L. J. 1099 (1960).
30 United States v. Illinois Brick Co., [1974] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 75, 060 (D. Il1. 1974)
(consent decree).
10 The defendants had already settled with both the contractors and the subcontractors
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the plaintiffs lacked standing.10 The Court of Appeals reversed.31" The
Court of Appeals rejected the "standing" label and instead treated the case
as involving two issues: causation in fact and proximate causation. With
respect to causation in fact it concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations
would, if proven, solve the causation problem that existed in many compa-
rable cases.3 12 The court then considered whether despite the assumed
causal connection, the rights of buyers not in privity with the wrongdoer
should be so limited as to preclude them as a matter of law from recovering
the losses which it was now assumed the wrongdoers had caused. The court
concluded that the intended as well as reasonably foreseeable victim of an
illegal act under the antitrust laws ought to have a chance to collect any
loss suffered as a result of such wrongful conduct.
313
2. The Decision
By a six to three vote the Supreme Court reversed this decision and
held in an opinion by Justice White that "the overcharged direct pur-
chaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution is the
party 'injured in his business or property' within the meaning of the sec-
tion".3 1' The opinion followed Justice White's prior opinion in Hanover
Shoe Inc. v. United States Machinery Corp.315 which had rejected a similar
passing-on argument when asserted by a defendant trying to reduce its
obligation to a direct purchaser. Justice White purported to reconsider that
earlier decision and reaffirmed it. The opinion in this case involves a clas-
sic confusion between causation in fact and proximate causation as well
as a highly ambiguous ultimate standard for deciding the latter issue when
applied to cases involving issues other the price fixing.
A crucial but not fully resolved question is what issue or issues the
Supreme Court believed this case presented. If the problem is one of plead-
ing and causation in fact, then the issue turns on factual analysis of spe-
cific situations and kinds of burdens to be imposed on a party. If the
problem is one of deciding whether a class of businesses or consumers
which has in fact suffered economic loss as a result of wrongful conduct
in agreements which explicitly stated that these settlements were not to affect the defendants
liability to the ultimate consumers.
31- 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
311 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976). For a favorable view of this decision see Carstensen I,
supra note 255, at 175-78 (1977).
M 536 F.2d at 1166. The court treated Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) and Mangone v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
438 F. 2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971), as cases on causation. The court also treated its own earlier
decision in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.
1963) as involving this issue although that characterization is a dubious one for a case which
really decided that utilities were more appropriate parties to recover an overcharge than their
customers.
3'1 536 F.2d at 1165.
"11 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977).
315 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
19781
66 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
shall be allowed to sue for compensation, then the issue is one of legislative
policy addressing the broad functions of private antitrust actions and their
place in the judicial scheme of things. Causal proof problems are not irrev-
elevant to proximate cause issues, but they are not central either because,
as a generalization, the issue of proximate causation ought not arise unless
cause in fact is established.
At the outset of the Illinois Brick opinion, Justice White, through a
footnote, makes clear that there is substantial doubt on his part that
"passing-on" could in fact have been demonstrated in this case. The note
reports that only 7% of the 700 plaintiffs could state the cost of the block
used in the buildings they purchased." 6 Moreover, in the only example
cited to the Court the block involved cost less than one-half of the one
percent of the entire project." 7 The inability of the buyer to calculate the
costs involved and the very small portion of the whole represented by the
cost of concrete blocks are indeed facts making it unlikely that plaintiffs
could have shown a causal connection between the final building costs and
the existence of a conspiracy to fix concrete block prices to a degree of
certainty necessary to prevail in a civil action. It would be perfectly plausi-
ble to have handled "remote" buyer claims by insisting they they meet an
initial causation test which establishes not merely a possibility of effect,
but provides a clear factual record that allows a court to see that the effect
probably was present and substantial. To the extent that Justice White
has fairly characterized the facts, it seems dubious that damage could in
fact be shown and so the case ought to have ended. 8 The Court even
characterized the court of appeals opinion in causal terms. It then ap-
pended a footnote which said that the district court was wrong to put this
case on the issue of standing and that the court of appeals was correct to
suggest that "the questions of which persons have been injured .. .for
purposes of section 4 is analytically distinct from the question of which
persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them standing to
sue. ... ."319
Justice White does not explain what that distinction is, but he cites a
passage in an article by Handler and Blechman which asserts that the
basis for the Hanover Shoe rule is that it is generally impossible to show
the causal connection between a wrong at one level of production and
prices at any other level than that of the direct buyer.30 This suggests that
31 431 U.S. at 727 n. 6.
317 Id.
"I Such a result would have been quite consistent with the causal problems identified
in the ealier cases denying "standing" and would have distinguished them from the cases in
which the causal connections seem to have been much clearer. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 191 (1974). The Illinois
Brick Court conceded that the issue varies with the case in its degree of difficulty, 431 U.S.
at 743.
", 431 U.S. at 728 n. 7.
Handler & Blackman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: the Fallacy of Parens
Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L. J. 626, 644-45 (1976), cited, 431 U.S. at
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Justice White saw the distinction in terms of the difference between causa-
tion ("persons .. . injured" in fact) and proximate causation ("persons
. . .too remote" to have standing despite a causal injury). However, it
subsequently appears the Justice White proposes to define "persons...
injured" not by a factual inquiry as to actual injury but by definition of
what "injured" means as a legal concept. It is still possible to imagine
"persons ... too remote" as a matter of legal policy even if they belong
to the limited class of those who are legally "persons . . .injured". In light
of the result of the case, Justice White is using both tests to define narrowly
the class of permitted litigants, and he is doing so not on causal grounds
but on grounds of legal policy.
Although preserving a few narrow exceptions to the general rule, e.g.,
those for whom purchases are made on a cost plus basis can claim dam-
ages, which might also suggest that this is a factual problem, since the
Court, without a factual analysis of the instant case, rejected the right of
these plaintiffs and all others similarly situated to seek to prove the fact
of loss, it is clear that however much the lack of causal evidence influenced
the Court in this case, its result will be applicable regardless of the facts
of causation in other cases. This holding makes "indirect" parties "too
remote" from the wrong to be allowed to bring a suit because they have
suffered no legal "injury"; and, therefore, they lack standing. It is clear
that the Court ultimately developed a proximate cause or legal duty test
which delimits the class of possible plaintiffs, and that we must address
that as the law for better or worse. It is not clear, given the ambiguity of
the opinion, that the Court either understood the alternatives before it, or
appreciated that if its view of the facts was correct, it could have resolved
this and similar cases on a more limited analysis of causation.
Because the task the Court set for itself was that of legislating a mean-
ing for the category of "person . . . injured", its conclusion cannot be
criticized as right or wrong, but it can be evaluated in terms of its consist-
ency with the stated basis of decision, its applicability to other situations,
and the persuasiveness of the final result. In getting to the final rule Justice
White first considered whether the Hanover Shoe rule could remain for
defendants but allow plaintiffs to prove passing-on. He rejected this une-
qual application on two grounds.
First, such a rule could create serious problems of multiple recovery
since the first purchaser would presumably be entitled to recover the entire
overcharge while subsequent purchasers would be entitled to re-claim that
portion actually passed on to and absorbed by them. A crucial premise
here is that the amount of the overcharge is a proper measure of damages
in these cases. Another premise is that multiple recovery is unacceptable.
Given the trebling requirement already in the damage standard, an argu-
ment could be made that any additional charges on a wrongdoer were also
728 n.7 [hereinafter cited as Handler & Blackman]. For a contra view see Berger & Bern-
stein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 538 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Berger & Bernstein].
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inconsistent with congressional policy but, basic notions of fairness as well
as some conformity to the statutory scheme doesn't require that defen-
dants generally not be held to more than three times the damages they
have caused.
The lower courts which had not followed Hanover Shoe when dealing
with plaintiffs have pointed out a range of devices that can minimize the
risk of recovery exceeding the statutory norm.32 1 Cases can be consoli-
dated, 32 some damages can be escrowed for the period of the statute of
limitations, statutory interpleader and joinder can be used.3 3 Despite these
devices, there is some risk that claims in excess of the statutory norm will
be paid. There is, of course, no evidence that wrongdoers who have settled
with multiple classes of buyers have in fact paid more than three times the
damage they have caused.2 4 Nevertheless the Court finds there is a risk
and does ". . . not find this risk acceptable"2 5 The fact the Court cannot
and does not even try to quantify this risk or compare it to other risks of
inappropriate damage liability for the defendants32 sugggests that the ar-
gument is a make weight and not central to the result. It is, of course, also
possible that the majority simply assumed that the risk existed in suffi-
cient degree because of the obvious concern of defense lawyers with the
problem. 7 While such a technique for deducing economic facts is highly
suspect, it is not unknown in other legislative contexts
2
1
The second, more significant, reason 329 for rejecting the unequal treat-
ment approach is that the basis for the Hanover Shoe decision and, there-
fore, for the bar to consideration of passing-on was the burden and diffi-
culty of deciding the issue. There are the great "uncertainties and difficul-
ties in analyzing price and output decisions... ,,311 and these uncertain-
ties and difficulties would impose great costs on the judicial system and
"efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws" if they had to be resolved in
31, See, e.g., In Re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
1' See Multi-District Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. §1407 (1970).
32 28 U.S.C. §1335 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 22 (1) & 19.
"' In the antibiotic litigation, the settlements with all various classes do not seem to have
deprived the putative wrongdoers of more than their actual gain. See, Wolfrom, The Antibiot-
ics Class Actions, 1 A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 253 (1976).
"1 431 U.S. at 731 n. 11.
32, The basic and very minimal standards for proof of damages, Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282
U.S. 555 (1931) create risks that defendants who in fact, caused no damage or slight damage
will be held, by a jury which is given great latitude to speculate on damages, to have caused
substantial damage with resulting magnification from the trebling requirement, but these
risks have never botherd a majority of the court.
32 See, e.g., Handler & Blackman, supra note 320, Pollack I & II, supra notes 298 and
303. Plaintiffs lawyers have, of course, depricated any problems here. See, e.g., Berger &
Bernstein, supra note 320.
321 Recent "crisis" in medical malpractice and products liability insurance apparently
are examples of this process.




the court room. If this is the primary rationale for the Hanover Shoe
decison, it would follow that -it ought to be applied both ways. This is also
an explicitly factual rationale. It implies exceptions for cases in which a
theory of damage and the related prima facie evidence would demonstrate
that the uncertainty and difficulty would not be present. That is to say,
this is an argument based on causation in fact and would imply a set of
rules on presumptions and burdens of pleading and offering initial evi-
dence so that trial courts can separate out the few valid cases from the
scores of invalid ones. But just as in an analogous area of securities law,
the Court here is using the causation argument to justify a total closure of
access to the courts for a class of litigants. 3 ' Had the Court approached
the issue in terms of its own stated primary concern it would have seen that
a plaintiff's use of the passing-on theory, since it is an affirmative proof,
may be tested more easily than a defendant's negative use of passing-on
as a defense. The plaintiff must plead and offer proof that would show a
court with some certainty that the "uncertainties and difficulties in ana-
lyzing price and output decisions" normally to be expected can be over-
come. If in Illinois Brick the consumer was buying a bulding which it had
designed, including a detailed specification of materials, it would appear
that the consumer would have estimated the probable cost of any signifi-
cant item and would expect the contractor and sub-contractors to pass
along that cost since it would be a common and substantial factor in the
bids of all competitors."' Defendants trying to rebut a damage theory are
not generally in a comparable situation since they have no particular inter-
est in proving who else was in fact damaged. It may make very good
practical sense to take an even tougher line with defendants who seek to
escape liability by trying to show that a particular plaintiff passed on to
some unknown, non-party the costs of the violation than to a plaintiff who
offers a convincing proof of how the damage came to rest on it.
There are, however, two values which Justice White lists which explain,
perhaps, why this factual problem can be used to justify the line drawn.
31 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, Inc. 421 U.S. 723 (1975) the Court
converted the Birnbaum rule from one of causation which had exceptions when a non-buyer
could show the requisite causal connection into an absolute bar to suits by non-purchasers
or sellers. The opinion, having stressed the general causal problems to which the instant case
was an exception, nevertheless refused to allow the suit to proceed. As in Illinois Brick then,
the Court was actually adopting a rule of limitation not justified by its causal concerns, but
rather by other interests not fully articulated.
"I That this may not have been the fact in the Illinois Brick case is the burden of the
suggestion in one footnote, 431 U.S. 727 n.6. It does seem to have been the case in the electric
generator and turbine conspiracy damage cases. It would seem factually absurd to say that
the ultimate buyer as well as all intermediate contractors were not expecting the full cost of
that equipment to be passed on. In such cases, who the "buyer" is in the first instance seems
a most irrelevant inquiry in a functionally oriented analysis. E.g. Washington v. General
Electric Co., 246 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1965). See Missouri v. Stuapp Bridge & Iron Co.,
248 F. Supp. 169 (W.D. Mo. 1965). See also Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases:
The Offensive Use of Passing-On, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 976 (1975).
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First is the burden on trial courts of resolving these issues.3 3 If one believes
that antitrust cases are using up too much of the scarce and valuable time
of judges, then one will seek to simplify and limit the cases they hear.
Justice White returns to the theme of the burdens on the courts several
times in the opinion 34 and it appears that a device to reduce the number
and complexity of antitrust cases in the federal courts rather than a desire
to find reasonable ways to handle complex factual issues substantially
explains the bar to considering the passing-on issue. The second value
adverted to is effective enforcement of the antitrust law which here has
primarily a deterrence and not a compensation goal. For deterrence pur-
poses, concentrating recovery in the hands of one victim will be as satisfac-
tory (and perhaps make suit more attractive) as spreading the right
around. Having identified the role of damage actions as being primarily
one of deterrence, it is then rational to try to eliminate redundancy in
achieving that goal.
Having thus explained why whatever rule as to passing-on exists must
apply both ways and also having implicitly taken the rule out of the realm
of factual analysis despite the factual type of argumentation, Justice
White addresses the question of retention of the Hanover Shoe rule. Once
again Justice White's substantive analysis begins with the assumption
that the proper measure of damages is the overcharge collected by the
wrongdoer. The opinion then postulates that "potential plaintiffs at each
level in the distribution chain are in a position to assert conflicting claims
to a common fund-the amount of the alleged overcharge. . . . 35 But
despite the devices of joinder and interpleader, Justice White concludes
that it "is unlikely . . .that all potential plaintiffs could or would be
joined. ' 36 This creates risks of "multiple litigation and liability" which
presumably are unacceptable to the Court. More serious, however, is the
probability of transforming "trebel-damage actions into massive multi-
party litigations involving many levels of distribution and including large
classes of ultimate consumers remote from the defendant."' 7 Apparently
assuming that such "remote consumers" would never be "too remote" to
have standing once included in the class of "persons injured",33 Justice
White points to a tabulation showing that many price fixing cases involve
goods which are at best inputs into inputs which produce consumer
goods. 339 This is of course the "slippery slope" argument. It is a valid
argument, and it explains why all tort law has proximate cause rules as
well as causation rules to limit the class of litigants to those probably
injured by conduct not too remote. It is not, however, an argument that
13 431 U.S. at 730-32.
3' Id. at 741-42, 742 n.27.
13 Id. at 737.
' Id. at 739.
= Id.
3 Id. at 741 n.24.
"I Id. at 740 n.23.
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demonstrates why a large class of litigants need be cut off from all rights
unless it can be shown that courts have no other way to control the prob-
lem. Certainly Justice White makes no demonstration that such a situa-
tion exists in this case. In fact, he argues that in most such cases proof of
actual causation will be impossible. But if that is so, then there is not a
serious problem. Remote consumers will be easily dismissed because they
cannot make out a prima facie case. Still drawing the line "would entail
the very problem that the . ..rule was meant to avoid.""34 Once again,
the point of reference is the burden on the judiciary of dealing with these
problems. Justice White assumes that the Hanover Shoe rule provides a
judicially easier solution.
Justice White justifies the Hanover Shoe rule not only in terms of
easing the judicial burden, but also in terms of "effectiveness" of private
antitrust litigation. While recognizing that this result may deny recovery
to those "actually injured," the opinion again asserts that remote purchas-
ers have little stake in the matter and so will merely dissipate the common
fund and thereby discourage direct buyers from suing."1 The empirical
validity of this proposition is as dubious as any, and the effectiveness
argument points in reality back to the issue of judicial convenience.
In sum, the opinion, while analytically confused, does contain a clear
ultimate message: the Court wants to reduce the workload of the federal
judiciary and believes that by eliminating "indirect purchasers" from the
class of "persons . . .injured," it can achieve that result without unac-
ceptable compromise to the effectiveness of private antitrust actions. Very
important to this conclusion is the premise that the direct purchaser can
collect the full amount of any overcharge, trebled, so that the wrongdoers
are totally deprived of their ill-gotten gains. Viewed in this light much of
the opinion is surplusage and is not truly explanatory of the reasons for the
outcome.
Three problems, however, require further consideration. The first is the
correctness of equating damages to specific victims with the gain to the
wrongdoer. Second, is the role and significance of the 1976 amendments
to the antitrust laws as they may have altered rights to the overcharge
fund. Finally, it is important to define as rigorously as possible what the
court means by "direct purchaser" so that it is possible to determine what
this case may mean to other types of cases and other damage theories.3 4
2
o Id. at 745.
34 Id. at 745-46.
" Justice Brennan's dissent presents §4 as having "broad objectives: to compensate...
and to deter . . .", and it "was clearly evident to operate to protect individual consumers
• .." Id. at 748. He points to the 1976 legislation based on that premise and accuses the
majority of flouting the will of Congress. Id. at 748-49. Justice Brennan also stresses the need
to have a class of plaintiff able to deprive the wrongdoer of his full overcharge which he
equates with "the full social cost of... illegal conduct. .. " Id. at 752, thus giving Hanover
Shoe a relevance to defensive passing-on claims only.
Justice Brennan takes issue with the majority's implicit premise that excluding remote
buyers will reduce litigation, pointing out that most of the same problems exist in estimating
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3. The Overcharge as a Measure of Damages
Both majority and dissent assume that the overcharge is a fair measure
of the total damages caused by an unlawful restraint of trade. The gain to
the wrongdoer is indeed a measure of the damage done to the economy as
a whole in terms of the amount of cash diverted to the wrongdoers. But if
that cash were used in socially desirable ways or even paid out to share-
holders, the ultimate bad effect may not equal the initial diversion.3 In
any event there is no reason to believe that it is an accurate measure of
the damage done to any particular victim.4 ' To the extent that an over-
charge is passed on without loss of sales or margin, the intermediary has
lost nothing and has not suffered real economic damage. If sales are re-
duced or margins affected, or both, to that extent the party has absorbed
the overcharge. 45 Such absorption can result, of course, in total business
failure. In that case, the damage to such victims may exceed the total gain
to the wrongdoers. The loss is even greater if one adds in the ultimate
"indirect" effects of such business failures. Conversely, where each level
passes on the price raise and the final consumer takes the same amount
as before,346 the damage can be said to have come to rest on whatever
producers and distributors of other goods which lost sales to those final
consumers. Obviously, a claim by any such seller would, absent very spe-
cial facts, run into insuperable problems of proof of causation for the injury
is really only general and not specific.
It was this ultimate damage which the State of Hawaii sought to collect
in Hawaii v. Standard Oil" 7 when it sued a group of alleged price fixers.
the basic overcharge. Therefore, because he believes compensation is very important and a
central part of the statutory command, Justice Brennan would open the court house doors
and invite indirect buyers to try to prove their losses, but "there is a point beyond which the
wrongdoer should not be held liable." Id. at 760. This is the reason for requiring "standing"
which is "not unlike ... proximate cause..." Id. But whatever scope is given to §4, "surely
it must render the defendant liable to those within the defendant's chain of distribution."
Id. Thus Justice Brennan would draw a line of remoteness much further out and only employ
causation as limit on recovery. This would probably be too sweeping a result unless it were
coupled, as it is not, with a fairly rigorous test for causation. Justice Brennan apparently gives
inadequate consideration to the problems of excessive classes and redundant claimants.
Justice Brennan also evaluates in some detail the risks of multiple recovery in excess of
§4's authorization and concludes that risks are as "a practical matter, remote." Id. at 763-
64.
33 We would have to perform a sort of social cost benefit analysis based on an ultimate
tracing of the effects, good and bad, of the wrong.
31, The error of equating X's gain to Y's loss is an obvious point in most accident cases.
The initial confusion in antitrust arises from the fact that the initial injuring impact is in
the form of an overcharge in some cases. But just as the value of a car tells nothing definitive
about the injury it has done, so to the amount of an overcharge is not definitive of the
economic loss that has resulted.
" This would seem the better measure of initial economic loss. See Pollock, supra note
298.
"' Such a case of total inelasticity of demand may seem unlikely, but it is perhaps
exemplified by the antibiotics case. See note 331 supra.
"I Hawaii v. Standard Oil, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
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The Court, correctly perceiving that the ultimate effects of a wrong could
be multiplied many times over as they spread through the entire economy,
rejected this claim. 48 Moreover, in adopting the parens patria legislation,
Congress did not reverse that holding49 despite Justice Brennan's contrary
suggestion.3 1 Such damage is "too remote" to be collectable, and it would
impose too great a cost on the wrongdoer for the benefit to be gained.
There is a second generally recognized but harder to define limitation
on liability. It is a sort of reverse privity bar. Thus those in continuing
privity with the victim of a wrong have no right to make a separate claim
and can only look to the primary victim to act for them. This includes
situations in which the secondary victim is a shareholder or creditor of the
primary victim 35 ' or belongs to a class of continuing customers as in the
case of public utilities or public housing agencies. 52 Similarly, those who
are suppliers of a victim but who are not themselves in the direct line of
production and distribution of the affected item, generally cannot pursue
claims either for the lost business with the victim or for any consequential
injury.353 Here too, the fact that these secondary victims had a contractual
relationship which defined their rights and interests in the victim's busi-
ness, seems to provide a basis for excluding any general concern for the
consequences to them and for requiring that they rely on the victim or its
trustee in bankruptcy to assert whatever claim the victim has and to
apportion the results as required. Predictably the resulting hard cases are
those in which the arguably secondary party is more nearly a joint venturer
or partner with the victim and so appears more like an independent vic-
tim. 354 Not surprisingly the right of such a "partner" to sue on its own for
31 Id. at 262-64.
31 The new section limits liability to: "injury sustained ... to. .. property ... " 15
U.S.C. §15c (a) (1) (1976). Damage moreover maybe measured "by the computation of illegal
overcharges . . ." 15 U.S.C. §15d (1978). The House Report makes it very clear that the
purpose of the law is to reverse California v. Frito-Lay, 474 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 908 (1973) which denied the right of a state to seek any damages in a parens patria
capacity. H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 5, reprinted in, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2572, 2574. The measure of damages is implicitly limited by the rule in Hawaii v. Standard
Oil, 405 U.S. 251 (1972), and this is evident from the view that the new law will deprive
wrongdoers of ". . . all measurable fruits of... illegal activity. . ." H.R. REP. No. 94-499,
p. 14, reprinted in, [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEWS. 2583.
431 U.S. at 756.
' Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3rd Cir. 1910). See McGuire, The Passing-
On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchases to Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover
Shoe, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 177 (1971).
"I See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.
1963) (ultimate consumers denied standing when public utility already suing for damage);
cf. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 741 n. 24.
3 Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953), afl'd, 211 F.2d
405 (3rd. Cir. 1954). See also Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola, 431 F.2d 183 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1970) (franchisor had no standing to sue for injury to it inflicted via
injury to franchisee).
ml Congress Building Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957). See also Karsdal
Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F. 2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955) (franchisor held to have standing
for injury to it through franchisee).
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its loss is not uniformly resolved, but interestingly, the damage measure
seems to focus on the loss to that joint venture and not other consequential
injury to the party,"' thus illustrating the force of the basic limitation even
if its application is obscure in certain circumstances.
It thus becomes clear that the overcharge bears only a fortuitous corre-
lation to the total economic dislocation that a wrongful act causes." 6 The
overcharge does nevertheless measure the gain to the wrongdoer and to the
extent that wrongdoers expect to be deprived of their entire gain, trebled,
they should be discouraged from wrongful conduct. By equating damages
to the overcharge, the law creates a penalty designed to deter conduct and
not to compensate loss.
Absent a specific statutory plan for allocating the penalty, it would
seem that the fairer result is to allocate it to the most remote victim with
standing having deducted therefrom the claims paid for actual damage to
other intermediate victims. Since the intermediate victim is only injured
economically to the extent that sales volume or profits per sale are af-
fected, proof of damage for such victims would be unrelated to the amount
of the overcharge and would require a very different line of proof. Thus in
Illinois Brick, the plaintiff's proof of damage would relate to how much
taxes were raised or what other activity was foregone by virtue of this
wrongful conduct. To the extent that such injury exists and can be shown
it is only fair to compensate for it. Indeed, if the effect was more serious,
e.g., total failure, that too ought to be compensated even if compensation
to victims exceeds the benefits to the wrongdoer. The most remote victim,
to which injury can be traced, however, can argue that its passing-on took
the form of doing without other goods or buying less of the overpriced goods
and that the specific effects cannot be traced further, and so it is entitled
to the residual fund because there is no other way to measure its economic
loss.
The practical problems with such a result are first that the class of
residual victims will be large and disparate with both little individual
financial interest and little capacity for self organization. Second, to the
extent that many distribution levels intervened, each would have a poten-
tial claim which, if unprovable, would suggest that that level is the final
one. This reverses incentives to prove specific injury and is likely to make
it practically impossible to determine the proper resolution of the claims.
The Hanover Shoe result if read as a rule which allocated the penalty to
the first victim except as other claimants could show specific damage
served to solve the practical problem of assigning the right to a party likely
to exercise it while not depriving more distant victims of compensation
where injury occurred. Such a reading makes the plaintiffs right to prove
246 F.2d at 591-93.
36 See Morkovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-
Than-Second-Best-World. A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the
Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wisc. L. REv. 950.
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passing-on integral to the rule while also justifying the denial of such a
right to defendants and so could rationalize a double standard. This prag-
matic view turns very much on the incapacity of final consumers or some
remote class of distributor to organize and make their collective claim for
the penalty. Congress sought to solve this problem by the 1976 legislation.
4. The Parens Patria Legislation
The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 contained a provision by
which Congress47 created a specific right for state attorney generals to
bring suit to collect the damages to ultimate consumers; the amount of
these awards were to be reduced by the amount of other damages paid for
the same conduct."8 The residual fund would then be available to final
consumers who had been demonstrably overcharged with the state claim-
ing the remainder. Accepting at face value the statement that this statute
created no new liability for defendants,359 what sense does it make? Argua-
bly Congress accepted the view that one proper measure of damages was
the amount of the overcharge, but this sum, less payment for actual inju-
ries, should go to the states as representatives of the final consumers and
others who were as a class injured in their property in some degree. The
effect then was to allocate the penalty to a public body and to allow non-
remote parties to prove actual damages.
On this reading, even if individual consumers could not prove actual
losses, the state could claim and retain their presumptive collective
"direct" loss. "Direct" here means the initial overpayment and not the
consequential damage to the economy. In this way the legislation could
have become the first step toward the kind of economically rational en-
forcement system envisaged by Elzinga and Britt. 6 '
This construction of section 4(c) would not have been precluded by the
majority's outcome in Illinois Brick if that outcome were put in terms of a
rule of proof on causation or in terms of a rule defining remoteness, barring
private parties who were otherwise "persons . . . injured." The reading
suggested here requires only that ultimate consumers be deemed capable
of being "persons . . . injured." If that is so, then the state can make its
collective claim even if the individual is too remote. Thus, even while
barring this suit by Illinois as representative of specific buyers, the Court
could have allowed it to refile in its parens patria role to claim that portion
of the overcharge not allocable to other victims. The deterrence function
would thereby be served, and the Court could thus rationalize a very tight
limit on which possible victims can take judicial time trying to prove their
particular injury.
"1 90 Stat. 1383. P.L. No. 94-435; 15 U.S.C. §15 (1970).
"' 15 U.S.C. §§15c, 15d (1970).
431 U.S. at 733 n.13.
310 K. ELZINGA & W. BsR=, THE ANTrrRuST PNALTm: A STuoY iN LAW AND ECONOMIcS
(1976).
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Having chosen, however, to cast the issue in terms of defining "persons
injured" the Court has made much more difficult any accomodation of the
apparent Congressional scheme for assigning claims to the penalty fund.
It has defined the losses to consumers as not being legal injuries under the
antitrust laws.
The actual treatment of the 1976 act in the opinion is for a more limited
purpose. Justice White rejects the argument that the Act and the underly-
ing Congressional understanding of who has a legal claim for damages is
dispositive of the meaning of section 4. Justice Brennan similarly used
the statute as part of an argument that Congress intended at all times to
include ultimate consumers among the class of those who could sue under
section 4.361 Thus, neither opinion puts the new statute into the context of
the problems of depriving the wrongdoer of gain and compensating victims
when only private parties are litigants. While it is still open to the Court
to reread the legislative history in light of a broader analysis of what was
being accomplished thereby, such a prospect seems most unlikely.
5. Defining the Standard in Illinois Brick
In order to generalize about the limits of damage liability under section
4 it is necessary to define what relevant attributes explain when a party is
not injured within the meaning of the section. Two prospects suggest them-
selves. The first is that some notion of privity is involved here so that one
might look to Winterbottom v. Wright"'2 and its progeny for guidance. The
second is that "directness" is the important concept so that common law
distinctions between trespass and case might be useful.
If one wanted to argue privity here, one would point to the use of the
phrase "direct purchaser" as indicative of an underlying notion that there
ought to be actual, contractual dealings between the parties . 63 The excep-
tions to the rule reinforce this for they involve cases in which the buyer is
a de facto agent, for either some other buyer364 or for the seller.365 The
problem of buying from a seller other than the one sued could be solved
by treating the conspiracy as a unit and asserting that dealing with one
was the legal equivalent of dealing with all. Moreover, it is very clear that
the test for rejecting a claim rests on the lack of actual dealing, i.e., privity,
with a wrongdoer. Thus privity in some degree is at least implicity in the
"1 431 U.S. at 758.
12 Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
"I In one pre-McPherson antitrust case, a quasi-privity standard for measuring standing
(proximate cause) was employed. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203
U.S. 390 (1906). A similar rule exists for collecting freight overcharges, e.g., Southern Pacific
Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531 (1918), but that is explicable in substantial
measure by the nature of the statutory right involved. See Pollack 1I, supra note 303, at 24.
31 This is the cost plus case which is made an exception in Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at
494 and Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735-36.
3 E.g., Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969) (where direct purchaser is
controlled by seller, then next buyer can assert a claim).
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formulation of the specific rule and it would appear to be an essential idea.
The citadel thus created is not so procrustean as that in Winterbottom,
but it has the capacity of making decision simple and the test of liability
straight forward.
It would nevertheless seem that a privity requirement is as objectiona-
ble here as in products liability. Cardozo reject it as a reasonable rule in
McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 316 His words are applicable here:
The defendant knew the danger. It knew also that the car would
be used by persons other than the buyer. This was apparent from
its size; there were seats for three persons. It was apparent also
from the fact that the buyer was a dealer in cars, who bought to
resell. The maker of this car supplied it for the use of purchasers
from the dealer. . . .The dealer was indeed the one person of
whom it might be said with some approach to certainty that by
him the car would not be used. Yet the defendant would have us
say that he was the one person whom it was under legal duty to
protect. The law does not lead us to so inconsequent a conclu-
sion.367
It cannot be denied that the wrongdoers in antitrust cases know or ought
to know that some or all of their overcharge will come to rest on others.
Use of a privity bar permits escape from liability for the consequences of
this conduct. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the immediate
buyer may be unwilling or uninterested in vigorously prosecuting the claim
or taking more than nominal damages. These buyers are likely to have a
substantial stake in their continuing relationship with their supplier. The
relative interest in vigorous pursuit of these claims probably explains why
it is believed that the bar on class actions and parens patria claims for
overcharges will reduce costs and exposure of wrongdoers. There is a paral-
lel to other tort cases which preserve the privity requirement. 8 Denial of
liability on lack of privity grounds is explicable in terms of a policy judg-
ment that liability should be greatly limited. 69 Such cases leave rights only
with parties who suffered no real damage and so have no claim for compen-
sation. The antitrust situation is slightly different, but the effect of reduc-
ing claims is similar. Requiring privity as a basis for recovery is a device
to limit liability. It is, however, such an arbitrary line that it has lost favor
in most areas of tort law, and it is useless as a general guide in antitrust.
The typical boycott case illustrates the irrelevancy of privity. The com-
plaint of the victim is that it lacked privity with someone. Similarly, in
cases of predatory pricing or other monopolization conduct which is harm-
" 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3 Id. at 391; 111 N.E. at 1053.
3 E.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Moch v. Rensse-
laer Water Co. 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
2" Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the Duty of Care, 1 DE PAUL L. REv. 30, 60
(1951).
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ful to an actual or potential competitor of the monopolist, the effect is
quite independent of privity. Indeed, privity is unlikely to exist between
the wrongdoer and any victim of its wrong. Surely, the Court does not
mean that the beneficiary of the predatorily low price, because it was a
"direct purchaser" and is also a favored "private attorney general," has
the right to claim the value of the damage to its supplier's competitor
trebled.
Had Illinois recast its damage theory to show how much taxes were
raised or what other expenditures were foregone as a result of this wrongful
conduct, it would have shown that its damages were unrelated either to
the overcharge fund or to the line of privity by which the wrongdoers had
an impact. Indeed, in cases of territorial or customer allocation or other
restraints indirectly affecting price, the victim's harm, whether victim is
a direct purchaser or some more remote party, will not necessarily corre-
spond to the gain of the seller, direct or remote, but to the losses suffered.
If one rejects privity as a useful guide for other cases, but is still per-
suaded, as seems evident, that the Court intends to limit the scope of
liability, then one must assume that directness is the test. For centuries
tort law sought to use the distinction between direct and indirect injury
as a guidepost. In common law, directness referred to the force of an act.
When that force was spent, the act ceased to be a direct cause. But by the
late 1700s it was clear that life was too complex to sort easily or consis-
tently according to such mechanical analysis. The famous squib case of
Scott v. Shepherd 0 is but an example. In that case Blackstone argued that
an object thrown by two intervening actors (passed on, if you will) had
caused only an indirect injury while the majority with equal logic treated
these actors as responding inevitably to a situation (much as a middle man
reselling might be said to respond to price fixed goods) and so the force
was a continuous one making the injury "direct." The lesson which Ameri-
can courts soon drew was the degree of directness ought not affect the
substance of liability because it is not a rational or convenient distinc-
tion . 7' The ultimate victim in a passing-on case is thus a direct victim of
the economic force of the wrongdoer if a court says so and not if a court
says not. "Direct" is thus a conclusionary label employed to describe a
class which is to be favored.372
370 Scott v. Shephard, 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124.
31, See, Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850).
372 It should be added that the circuit court's standard of "reasonably foreseeable" vic-
tims is no more useful as an operational tool. Reasonable foreseeability involves a factual
question which focuses the inquiry on the expected injury. But except for the rare case of an
actor operating under a wrong but reasonable factual premise the resolution of a "reasonable
foreseeability" inquiry turns upon notions of policy and not fact. The fundamental question
is one of responsibility. Should this actor be held responsible for this outcome? If the conclu-
sion is that there ought not be responsibility, then the court will say there was not
"reasonable" foreseeability and the reverse if the opposite result is reached. Thus in the
famous Palsgraf decision, the arguments of majority and dissent can justify either conclusion
in the case, but it is Andrews who captures better the truth of the process:
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The result is that while it is understandable that a line be drawn to
exclude remote victims neither "privity" nor "directness" explain why the
line is drawn where it is or what considerations would justify its location
elsewhere in other cases. We do know that judicial burden, a lack of signifi-
cant, adverse effect on the desired level of deterrence, and the undisturbed,
theoretical capacity of the remaining private attorney generals to enforce
that penalty provision are advanced as explaining the specific outcome.
We also know from other decisions this term that three of the justices
voting for this position have, in general, a low regard for the value of the
policies antitrust seeks to vindicate while another, the Chief Justice, is
ambivalent in substantial measure. On the other hand, Justices White and
Stevens, who also voted with the majority, have in other contexts sup-
ported antitrust and the competitive policy it entails. Such substantive
support comports with a view that damage rights should be narrowly de-
fined. Such a narrow definition may make less fearsome strict substantive
requirements. This suggests in turn that the value adverted to in the opin-
ion may not in fact be the major factors that underlie the conclusions of
this heterogenous majority.
Thus while the broad message of limited scope for liability is clear its
form permits neither the abstraction of a general rule nor a model for
identifying relevant values and interests and relating them to each other
in a way which establishes relative weights. In short, the decision is a
fundamentally ad hoc one, having no immediate explanatory or guiding
capacity for other situations. This in turn suggests the Court has not solved
the problem of judicial burdens, although it has to be sure removed one
set of burdens with respect to one class of case. But plaintiffs can develop
"direct damage" theories, i.e., lost sales or other specific injury unrelated
in value to the amount of the overcharge, and they may not be excluded
from court. Such cases after all present different judicial burdens. Alter-
nately, these victims may sue the direct purchaser on theories of construc-
tive trust or some similar exotic contract notion."' More likely, defendants
in a great range of cases may seek to eliminate classes of plaintiffs. Thus
an accused monopolist may urge that its competitors could not be legally
"injured" since they did not purchase from the putative monopolist. To
eliminate this class of case, would of course reduce judicial burdens; and,
since the Justice Department, FTC and, perhaps, state attorney generals
can bring injunctive cases, a judge could conclude that the effective en-
What is a cause in a legal sense, still more what is a proximate cause, depend
in each case upon many considerations, as does the existence of negligence itself.
Any philosophical doctrine of causation does not help us .... What we do mean
by the word "proximate" is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a
rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond
a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
31 Some states are already trying to obtain in their purchase contracts assignment of any
antitrust claims the vendor may obtain by virtue of the transaction. 834 ANTITRUST & TRAD.
REG. REP. D-3 (Oct. 13, 1977).
19781
80 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
forcement of antitrust laws will not suffer.
It is doubtful then that the Court has in fact reduced the judicial
burden in antitrust litigation when the totality of the problem is consid-
ered. In addition, as already suggested, initial buyers in fact may be un-
likely to exact the full penalty and thus fail to deter as fully as they ought
wrongful conduct, especially when its economic impact has largely been
passed on. Moreover, by inviting defendants to seek to escape liability by
claiming that no legal injury occurred rather than focusing on the actual
economic impact and substantive lawfulness of the conduct, the Court
creates an added route of escape for wrongdoers and so reduces the cer-
tainty of liability and damages for wrongful conduct. The net result may
still be that an "effective" remedy exists but such a conclusion only em-
phasizes the fact that the Court is striking a fairly complex balance within
and among antitrust policy goals, broader social interests in continuity of
business and avoidance of excessive or unfair burdens on business, and
judicial institutional interests.
6. Conclusion on Illinois Brick
Even if no right or wrong answer exists when courts engage in rule
making, there are cases to evaluate. We have seen that the Court did a bad
job of identifying the concerns with which it dealt. As a result its own
arguments and analysis hardly justify or explain its resolution of the
problem it ultimately addressed. Worse, the solution adopted would
appear to transfer litigation and other problems into new areas without
any way resolving them.
Despite the weaknesses of the Illinois Brick opinion in its particular
context and the impossibility of using a direct injury test as a tool of
analysis or predictable guide to decision in other cases of antitrust damage
claims, the opinion does raise a real and serious problem for all commercial
tort litigation. In an interconnected economy, each antitrust wrongdoer is
part of the entirety of the economy. Its conduct affects, for good or ill,
many others over a long time. For this reason alone some boundary lines
must be drawn around the liability of specific wrongdoers. They should
reflect the social interest in having an open and competitive economy
(deterrence) and in compensating those firms and individuals who suffer
actual, specific damages without jeopardizing the functioning of signifi-
cant sectors of the economy or introducing excessively distorting costs.
Equally compelling, ultimately is the argument that the judicial system
must not be totally encumbered by intractable problems of antitrust dam-
age apportionment. However, to set up a boundary based on directness,
privity, or the first sale, is to employ an overly simplistic solution to a
complex problem of adjusting interests. If private antitrust damage actions
are to remain workable and defensible, it is very likely that Illinois Brick
will require great elaboration and interpretation or legislative limitation.7 4
31, Indeed, several bills are already pending in Congress to reverse this outcome.
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B. Permissible Damages: Polemis, Wagon Mound, and the Antitrust Law
The problem of which losses from a wrongful act are compensible has
long existed in general tort law. The famous Polemis5 case required com-
pensation for all damage resulting from a wrongful act even if the damage
was not foreseeable. The Wagon Mound"' decision reversed that holding,
and decreed that damages had to be of a kind related to the risks that one
might expect from a particular wrongful act. It is still generally the case
that plaintiffs can recover all of their damages even if they are much more
than was likely in such an injury. The distinction between kind of damage
and degree of damage is a nice one. It reflects underlying policy about the
role of the tort action and the degree it is to be encouraged or discouraged.
In antitrust, the price fixer who caused a business to fail will be held
liable for the lost value of the concern, but if the firm survives it collects
the lost profits on sales. As in the case of the egg-shell-skull victim of the
traffic accident, the antitrust wrongdoer takes its victim as it finds him if
it inflicts expected harm. However, if the injury is not of the type that
normally would be expected to flow from the wrong, or if the injury, while
predictably flowing from this wrong, is not one which the law wishes to
acknowledge as a legal right of the victim, then the injury is said to be of
a different kind and not merely another degree. The issue is one of legal
causation or responsibility. Given an act which is wrongful to the victim
and which causes a loss, is the wrongdoer is to be held responsible for the
loss?
1. Background of Brunswick
During the late 1950's and early 1960's the bowling alley business grew
rapidly; the makers of equipment engaged in a great many credit sales; and
when the market turned down found themselves with many credit prob-
lems on their hand.' 7 The result was litigation in many areas of business
law. 378 Brunswick, one of the largest of the equipment makers, survived the
market decline and resulting defaults. In some cases it resold the bowling
alleys which it had had to take over, but in other cases it undertook to
operate them. In total, it operated less than two percent of all bowling
alleys in the country. Nevertheless it was the largest single operator and,
by virtue of its overall size, was very much larger than any other opera-
tor. 9 Brunswick came to operate alleys in three cities, Pueblo, Paramus,
and Poughkeepsie in competition with ones operated by Treadway. Tread-
In re Plemis and Furness Withy & Co., [19211 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
' Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd., [1961] A.C.
388.
429 U.S. at 479.
3 E.g., Escott v. Bar Chris Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. N.Y. 1968) (established the
basic guidelines for prospectus disclosure and the liability of various parties for the failure to
conform to these obligations).
-11 429 U.S. at 480.
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way sued for damages, divestiture and other injunctive relief with respect
to these acquisitions.
At trial a jury found the mergers illegal, and the resulting damages to
be $2.3 million before trebling. 8 Despite a finding of error in the jury
instructions, the Court of Appeals upheld the substantive theory of the
plaintiff that a deep pocket "giant" which enters a market of pygmies by
acquisition may thereby violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act.3"' The four
examples of the ways competition might be lessened are instructive: three
clearly described ways in which the larger firm can be more efficient than
the smaller firm, while the fourth, a greater capacity to absorb low or
negative returns for a long period of time, is not inconsistent with ordinary
and acceptable competition.
The Court of Appeals also endorsed as the proper measure of damages
for this violation a determination of the lost opportunity of Treadway to
make profits in excess of those it had made because of the continued
existence of the Brunswick alleys in the markets. 2 The court of appeals
accepted all "causally linked" damages thus adopting a Polemis approach.
Interestingly, this theory required Treadway to prove that these alleys
would have failed and been removed from the market. This theory does not
quite square with the theory of substantive violation which addressed only
the risks to competition from the acquisition. The Supreme Court agreed
to examine the case only with respect to the damage issue and so did not
consider the merits of the merger case or the kinds of equitable relief that
might be in order. 31
3
- Treadway Companies v. Brunswick Corp., 389 F. Supp. 996 (D.N.J. 1974).
- NBO Industries Treadway Companies v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.
1975). Vertical and congolmerate mergers rules are only remotely connected to the traditional
concerns of antitrust policy. For this reason, this area of law has been extensively criticized,
See, e.g., P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS, POLICIES (1975). Bork & Bowman, The
Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (1965); see also Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 H.av. L. REV. 1313 (1965). Even its defenders do not try to
justify much of the case law. See, e.g., Blake & Jones, Towards a Three-Dimensional Anti-
trust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965). Yet the Court of Appeals theory of violation would
condemn even acquisitions of failing firms normally lawful. See United States v. Greater
Buffalo Press Co., 402 U.S. 549 (1971); Citizens Publishing Co., v. United States, 394 U.S.
131 (1969); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 230 U.S. 391 (1930). Moreoever, the condemnation
of combinations resulting in disproportionately deep pockets rests on the fear that the merged
firm will be more efficient than existing firms. The theory is not necessarily bad as merger
law doctrine especially if courts are not sure about economics and efficiencies in a local
market or in an industry of small firms. It makes sense to insist on a fair fight to determine
that kind of firm and industry structure will prevail, and a deep pocket entrant which buys
its position rather than competing for it is a distorting element. Cf. Union Leader v. Newspa-
pers of New England, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125 (D. Mass. 1960), aff'd in part, 234 F.2d 582 (1st
Cir. 1961). But the theory does press the law and logic of the law to an extreme, particularly
in the context of the bowling alley business which has low levels of concentration, hetero-
geneous ownership patterns, and lost cost of entry-all of which suggest that merger is not
likely to have a radical effect on local or general industry structure.
Id. at 272-73.
" The Court granted Brunswick's petition for certiorari 424 U.S. 908 (1976), and never




The Court through Justice Marshall unanimously rejected the Polemis
approach: a wrongful act of the defendant does not make all consequences
of that act a proper basis for damage recovery.84 The Court pointed out
that the plaintiff was in fact asserting a theory that it was wrongfully
denied a monopoly or oligopoly position in a market- and that its
"damages" represented the lost profits of that wrongfully denied monop-
oly. The Court, adopting the Wagon Mound approach, held that damages
must relate to the antitrust problem that gave rise to the suit. Since the
anti-merger rules relate to protection and maximization of competition,
the profits of a lost monopoly opportunity cannot represent the proper
measure of damage. Indeed, "[i]t is inimical to the purposes of these laws
to award damages for the type of injury claimed here." '385 In order to claim
damages the injury must flow "from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the
violation or of the anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation".
3 8
The absurdity of the Illinois Brick approach of equating the gain to the
wrongdoer with the amount of injury to the victim is evident in this case.
The problem thus becomes what damages could result in this kind of
case. Marshall suggests that if the unlawful merger results in
"anticompetitive behavior" victimized competitors "may be able to prove
antitrust injury before they actually are driven from the market;...
His specific example of such behavior is "predatory below cost pricing",
but it should be recalled that the court of appeals identified as other
competitive evils such things as "cost-savings," so that it may be possible
for a firm to recover damages upon a showing that its "normal profits"
were lost or it failed because its competitor became more efficient as a
result of a merger.
Examining the record, the Court found no evidence of "any cognizable
damages" despite some conclusory efforts to show abuse of the deep pocket
by Brunswick .3 Therefore the Supreme Court entered a directed verdict
on the damage issue and remanded for consideration of the lawfulness of
the mergers and any injunction as to future conduct which might then be
appropriate. This kind of cut off of the opportunity to have the trial court
decide whether a new trial on damages is in order raises a question of
whether the Supreme Court has dealt adequately with the case. The plain-
tiff could try to show that some or all of the lost earnings it had previously
demonstrated were lost because of some "anticompetitive" behavior such
as "cost-savings" achieved by the competitor. By refusing to allow the trial




Id. at 492 n.14.
Id. at 490.
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Court perhaps not signaling its own lack of confidence in the merits of the
purported violation? If Brunswick can achieve "cost-savings" for its alleys,
a court is very unlikely to bar that because it adversely affects existing
competitors. Thus, the lower court could be trusted to ignore most of its
wild rhetoric insofar as injunctions were concerned where the absurdity of
the command would be obvious, but in light of that same rhetoric one
cannot be sure how either the trial court or the circuit court would treat
the damage issue. In such a case it is perhaps preferable not to find out
and so foreclose that option.
3. Damage Policy
Even under a Wagon Mound approach, the Court's Brunswick decision
is not free from objection. Some monopoly is both permissible and lawful.
To the extent that it is legal, should it not be protected from loss imposed
by wrongful acts? Because one has a legal right to something, if it comes
one's way, does not, of course, mean it necessarily follows that its loss is
a compensable event. A classic common law case was that of the School-
masters of Gloucter5 9 who objected to a new competitor in their market
whose presence had produced a substantial price cutting on education.
While acknowledging the loss that resulted the court found that no legal
wrong was done because no interest entitled to legal protection had been
invaded. So too in the Brunswick case, the existing competitor can com-
plain only of losses resulting from unfair conduct that makes the compe-
titive race inequitable but not generally of the lost opportunity to make
excess profit.
However, in this instance the monopoly or oligopoly right is lost as a
result of a wrongful act which should never have occurred. Even though
one has no general right to be free from competition, should there neverthe-
less be a right to be free from this competition, and the losses that result?
While as an abstract principle this sounds dubious, it has the pragmatic
value of rewarding more completely, and so encouraging litigation of this
sort. If the result of the litigation would be clearly and always socially
desirable, then expanding the damage categories would be a sensible policy
tool. However, it is probably not the case that private suits will necessarily
serve the public good. In the traditional cartel cases in which a true per se
analysis applies, the undesirability of the conduct is clear. A broader range
of damages might therefore be logically allowable to anyone who identifies
and proves the underlying violation. 9 ' This in turn suggests that damage
rules ought to focus on the competitive and efficiency implications of
classes of conduct and narrow the damage reward wherever necessary to
" Anonymous, "The Schoolmaster Case," Y.B., 11 Hen, IV f. 47, pl. 21 (Ct. of Com.
Pleas, Hilary Term) reprinted in M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, et al., supra note 40, at 42-43.
390 The fact that lost profits may have involved an element of oligopoly power, for exam-
ple, should not necessarily mean that they be discounted when they were lost as a result of,
for example, a boycott.
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insure that private litigation will be as consistent as possible with the
fundamental public policy goals of antitrust. In the case of merger, this
view suggests that damages 39' and conduct injunctions392 be disfavored and
only divestiture be allowed as relief in the usual case.
193
Two other examples come to mind, the Robinson-Patman Act is one.
The Utah Pie case394 has been well described as an anticompetitive re-
31, To prove a damage claim in a merger case, the plaintiff must, in effect, show that
defendant is able to serve the market at a lower cost than existing competitors which means
that customers would prefer, presumably, the illegal merger and so any competitive effect
will be entirely incidental to the greater efficiency of the new firm. If no efficiency exists, then
losses will involve either disruption of a monopoly or tacitly collusive oligopoly, or an attempt
by the new entrant to achieve market dominance. In the first case, the merger has made the
market more and not less competitive so that whatever social concern there may be with
problems of injury to general social values that result from conglomeratization, there is no
effect on the local firms or market that is cognizable in antitrust. In the second case, the real
complaint is that one firm interferred with the others access to finance, supplies, customers,
etc., for the purpose of acquiring market power. But that is a case of attempted monopoli-
zation and ought to be governed by those standards. Therefore, an unlawful merger ought
not to give rise to damages unless some other statute is also violated.
112 A injunction to bar "deep pocket" conduct in the future would bar, on the circuit court
theory of the risks of such a merger, conduct which involves generally efficient use of re-
sources; assuming that injunctive relief is granted, the courts will be commanding wasteful
conduct. This seems highly objectionable as a matter of policy. Whatever values are to be
protected by a limit on this kind of merger if they do not warrant the prohibition of the merger
ought not warrant judicial regulation of the conduct of the business so as to produce ineffi-
cient behavior. It would be better, cheaper, and more administrable to tax, in the form of
annual damages, the efficient firm and pay that subsidy to the inefficient ones and then allow
each to go its own way.
I Divestiture returns the market to status quo ante and leaves those in and out free to
compete, to enter, or to leave as they see fit.
The divestiture remedy provides not only a more easily administered solution but insures
that the plaintiff is serving a public interest. A plaintiff seeking only lost monopoly profit
and/or an injunction barring its "illegal" competitor from effective competition is not serving
the public interest in promoting and protecting competition. But a plaintiff seeking to undo
a merger, while it obtains its legal expenses (15 U.S.C. §16 (1970)), is otherwise saying it
wants to retain a competitive environment. This conclusion may be qualified as to cases in
which the plaintiff is the management of a company seeking to avoid being taken over.
Motives in such cases are probably not at all altruistic and greater judicial circumspection is
in order. Cf. Missouri Portland Cement v. Cargill Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 883 (1974); see, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 1, THE PRiVATE ENFORCE-
MENT OF SECTION II OF THE CLAYTON ACT POLICY AND LAW, 29-42 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
ANTIrrusT SECTION MONOGRAPH I.] Hence absent extreme cases involving violations of other
provisions of the antitrust laws, divestiture and related incidental injunctive relief is the
preferred solution to an illegal merger problem. Regretably the present state of the law makes
it hard to achieve that result.
It is, therefore, unfortunate that the Court did not address the troublesome issue of
whether or not divestiture is a permissable form of equitable relief in private cases. The Ninth
Circuit in a procrustian reading of the provisions of the law has held that such relief is not
available. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th
Cir. 1975), accord, Calmetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); see ANTITRusT SECTION MONOGRAPH I. The circuit court in
Brunswick held that it was, but that the instant case was not appropriate for such relief. 532
F.2d at 279.
"I Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
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sult."9 5 The plaintiff there established a rule which makes competition less
and not more possible, and collected damages from new competitors. In
effect that claim, like the one in Brunswick, was for something akin to lost
monopoly profit. To award damages in that case, then, was to penalize
desirable competitive behavior. Even if the substantive conduct is wrong-
ful under Robinson-Patman, it need not give rise to damage liability if the
loss suffered is defined as being outside the scope of concern of the law.
3
1
A second example of this problem is damage claims by competitors of
monopolists charged with predatory pricing.31 While limit pricing whether
above or below marginal cost would seem to be evidence of monopoly
power, it proves at most conscious retention of such power. If the monopo-
list has not otherwise abused its position or if structural or other injunctive
315 Bowman, Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.
J. 70 (1967).
"I In that connection consider the contrasting postitions of a plaintiff which sought to
enter a market and was discriminated against as opposed to a plaintiff which was an estab-
lished firm facing a new entrant which used discriminatory methods. In the first case, the
concerns of the law for competition could justify damages but in the second damages could
discourage competition and injunctive relief could satisfy the concern for fair competition in
the local market. Similarly, a bar on future misconduct would seem adequate if both firms
were and are viable competitors. Greater emphasis on this kind of damage limitation might
permit the limiting of claims under Robinson-Patman into a more competitively acceptable
range. See Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting and Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 1945.
"' In the great debate on predatory pricing that took place recently between Professors
Turner and Areeda on one side and Professor Scherer on the other, it became clear that the
protagonists were in substantial measure talking past each other. Areeda & Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. Rv. 697
(1975); Areeda & Turner Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARv. L. REV. 891 (1976);
Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HAav. L. REv. 869 (1976);
Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 H~Av. L. REV. 901 (1976). Turner and
Areeda were apparently concerned with the case of a private damage action in which the
evidence showed the price charged by a confessed, but not otherwise unlawful, monopolist
was above its marginal costs and so was an economically rational price but this price had
the effect of causing loss or failure to some marginal competitor which then sought damages.
Turner and Areeda feared that in such a case a broad definition of predatory pricing which
focused on the intent or effect of pricing above marginal cost but below the theoretical short
run, profit maximizing point would force a lawful monopolist seeking to avoid liability to raise
its price to that maximum, and allow entry by firms unable to produce as efficiently as the
monopolist with a consequent economic misallocation. Moreover if any of those marginal
firms lost sales due to price cutting by the monpolist, they could get damages. Turner and
Areeda sought to describe predatory pricing, as a matter of substantive law, in very restrictive
terms so that only limited cases would fall within the definition.
Scherer, who was apparently concerned with the problems of proving existence of monop-
oly and determining its lawfulness, was correctly horrified by this narrow definition of preda-
tion recognizing that it would severely limit the proof of violation in § 2 cases if limit pricing
above marginal cost was neither evidence of monopoly nor an abuse of monopoly power
sufficient to make a not otherwise explicitly lawful monopoly unlawful. Scherer, therefore,
showed how such limit pricing could protect and promote monopoly in inefficient ways.
Had the protagonists been less economic and more legal in the analysis they might have
sorted out the issues and found less disagreement.
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relief is not to be obtained,"' then it is not clear that such conduct by a
monopolist is itself necessarily wrongful (because as Turner and Areeda
demonstrate there is good reason to be concerned about the efficiency
implications of a contrary conclusion) or should, under those circumstan-
ces, make the monopoly position unlawful. Thus the question properly
becomes whether and when damages should flow as a result of a monopo-
list's use of limit pricing. Where the lawfulness of a monopoly is conceded,
and the only complaint is its limit pricing, the plaintiff ought not to have
damages unless the proof conforms on the Turner-Areeda standard. 9 If the
claim is that the defendant is an unlawful monopolist, the plaintiff, in
order to establish such wrongful monopolization, needs to show that the
market situation would probably have been competitive and could be res-
tored to workable competition."' Such a proof, which is very relevant to
injunctive and divestiture actions, tends also to establish that absent the
unlawful monopoly, price would have been more nearly approximated by
the marginal cost of the product than by the monopolistic price. This in
turn means that above marginal cost limit pricing even by a unlawful
monopolist does not prove damage. Only if prices were below marginal cost
should damage liability based on prices alone exist, even in the case of an
unlawful monopoly."'
A special significance of limiting the damage rights of competitors of
monopolists or merging firms is that it makes it more possible to seek
effective relief in government cases without concern that a judgment of
substantive violation will impose a risk of unreasonable damage claims.
"I Proof that structural relief is possible on terms not involving any great inefficiency
establishes that the monopoly is not economically necessary and is also strong evidence that
the monopoly is unreasonable and ought to be unlawful. In such a context, whatever addi-
tional proof of wrongfulness is needed to establish the violation ought not to be very substan-
tial and so a showing of limit pricing should suffice. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F.
Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
311 Perhaps also the only damage is that which is demonstrably caused by the below
marginal cost price, so that a competitor whose injury would have resulted even if price were
above marginal cost, should not recover.
" If such proof is not available, the present monopoly position is a "natural" one and
not of itself wrongful even if its achievement or maintenance at some point in time was
wrongful.
"I Thus, for example, one might argue that the Tenth Circuit rightly decided the Telex
case but not on the grounds asserted. Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam). Assuming that IBM had priced above marginal cost at all times, even if this was
done to monopolize unlawfully, Telex has not proven any damages since either IBM is a
lawful monopoly despite this or if unlawful, its unlawful existence did not cause injury, and
in the competitive world, Telex would never have existed. This very narrow reading of the
Telex case is designed to be suggestive of the application of the damage theory being dis-
cussed and is not proposed here as a serious analysis of that lengthy case because pricing can
be part of a larger and more complex effort to limit or remove competitors; and if that is
shown, liability for the damages may exist quite independent of specific price levels. More-
over, once a monopolist is shown to be an unlawful one, the plaintiff as in Brunswick will be
entitled to future oriented injunctive relief.
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C. The Emerging Proximate Cause Issues
As the number and variety of private antitrust suits grows, limits on
who may sue whom for what need to be established. The use of legal
causation rules whether labeled rules of standing proximate causation duty
or statutory construction is one method of achieving such definition. But
this approach ought to be used with great care and circumspection, a sense
of the history of the evolution of general tort law concepts, and awareness
of the experience with specific rules and approaches in other areas of law,
a reflection upon the goals of the statutory scheme being implemented by
the decisions, and a consideration of alternative ways to achieve the same
policy objective are all necessary. It is also important that the courts face
squarely that fact that in deciding these cases they are in fact legislating,
establishing rules, whose ultimate basis is not primarily in prior decision
or statute but in the judicial policy analysis. This in turn means that the
analysis ought to be explicit and the crucial considerations fully stated.
Limits other than legal causation exist and can and should be devel-
oped more fully. The first is the requirement of causation in fact. It is
evident that in many of the cases in the lower courts and in Hanover Shoe
and even in Illinois Brick another basis for decision would have been that
the probability of establishing a causal connection between any part of the
price paid by a consumer and the antecedent overcharge was unlikely.
While finding cause in fact is the province of the jury when that issue is
in doubt, the courts are not precluded from insisting that at the pleading
stage and at the pre-trial, post-discovery stage there be pleading and evi-
dence that would support a jury in more than mere speculation. Courts use
the causation requirement as a method of deciding how many and what
kind of cases will get into court;"' burdens of proof and presumptions can
create barriers or let them down in a way that does not foreclose the rare
but foreseeable case in which the problem of causation is resolvable.
A second limit on causes of action that needs fuller consideration in
relation to the damage issue is that of the substantive rules. It is notewor-
thy that the effect of both Sylvania and Fortner II, which were also private
damage actions, was to deny damage recovery to plaintiffs not only in
those cases but in other similar cases unless the plaintiff made a different
substantive showing. Similarly, the Brunswick case with its restrictive
reading of allowable damages is explicable, perhaps, in terms of the doubts
the Court ought to have about the validity and applicability of the sub-
stantive theory of liability in that case. Generally by refining the rule of
reason and the other substantive standards of antitrust using competi-
tively relevant criteria, the courts can define the substance of the wrong
so that they can be more sure when a genuine wrongdoer is before them.
Even with these limiting devices it is still going to be necessary to
develop rules of limitation whether in terms of standing or in terms of the
property or business interests which section 4 is said to protect. These rules
W2 Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. Rzv. 60 (1956).
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will have to define the outer limits of liability in terms both of the potential
claimant and the kinds of damages. Brunswick rejected the measure of lost
monopoly profit and so is in conflict with Illinois Brick which was premised
on that equation, illustrating the judicial confusion on the proper measure
of damages.
Even if damages were better defined to reflect the true interests of the
parties, with a residual claimant to any remaining overcharge fund, the
courts would still face the problem of deciding which of those with some
causal claim ought to be allowed to sue. This is the hard problem of
proximate cause. It is not soluble in any final way because the policy
interests that underlie the resolution shift in weight and change in charac-
ter over time. The vice which ought to be avoided and was not in Illinois
Brick is the promulgation of non-rational distinctions as rules. Illinois
Brick propounds an ad hoc rule which cannot be generalized usefully to
other contexts in which some rule or policy guidance is needed. The use of
make weight and empirically questionable arguments together with the
failure to identify the relevant issues in the case greatly weaken the utility
of the opinion.
Since the antitrust laws are constitutional in character, their develop-
ment is largely through judicial interpretation. But in trying to make the
antitrust laws relevant and useful in the last quarter of the twentieth
century, the courts need to avoid the errors of the past. They need to think
more fully about the goals they wish to achieve and how those goals are
best served. The problem is never going to be solved, but it can be ap-
proached in more or less rational ways. Brunswick points one way while
Illinois Brick points the other.
V. Conclusion
The Court is moving in a number of ways to limit the scope of the
antitrust laws as they affect business. While clarification, and definition
and redefinition of the law is in order, it may be questioned whether the
overall approach of the present majority is reasonable or proper. Looking
at the music and not the words of the opinions, they reflect a result ori-
ented refusal to employ principled lines of analysis. Thus, the direct-
indirect distinction is advanced in one case as useful, but title passage, a
similar distinction, is rejected in another as too mechanical. Market power
is analyzed in one case and ignored in a second. A "rule of reason" is
announced without being defined. State courts are freed to wreak havoc
on competition but the first amendment is found to contain an implicit
mandate for economic competition so that regulation not liked by the
majority can be voided. The net effect is that the antitrust defendant wins
and the damage plaintiff loses or is obliged to prove a good deal more. But
the states may not bar lawyer advertising and price competition. The
policies are inconsistent, the rationales unconvincing. Professor Posner
may after all be right: the Court may not know what it is doing. 03
" Posne&r, supra note 25.
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